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The thesis examines the theory of the determinants and welfare 
impact of foreign direct investment on host countries, 
concluding that resource transfer effects are not necessarily 
beneficial in certain circumstances. The distribution and 
penetration of foreign direct investment in the South African 
economy is analysed in the context of the debate about 
dependency and the role of technology in economic development. 
It is concluded that given the small amounts of fixed capital 
actually transferred to South Africa and the negative basic 
transfer which has occurred since the war, the role of 
technology in the economic development of South Africa has been 
crucial. It is argued that despite the relatively low level of 
foreign direct investment penetration in south Africa, efforts 
to reduce this penetration are hampered by continuing high 
dependence on foreign technology, which reflects the ~ay in 
which the international technology market works. The 
conclusion is that this dependence can only be reduced by 
assimilating and copying foreign technology, which should, if 
necessary, be purchased separately from capital, especially if 
foreign investors are reluctant to risk fixed investment in the 
New South Africa. · The statistical sources used are official 
South African Reserve Bank figures for capital flows and 
stocks, a data base constructed by the author from the Bureau 
of Market Research's unpublished industrial register and the 
results of a questionnaire· administered to a stratified random 
sample of local and foreign manufacturing firms in South 
Africa. 
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this thesis is relatively straightforward and 
formal introduction. Chapter 1 deals with the 
relevant body of theory on the.determinants and impact of 
foreign direct investment on host countries. Chapter 2, on the 
other hand, presents an overview of foreign (inward) direct 
investment in post-war South Africa. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
role of foreign direct investment in the manufacturing sector; 
and Chapter 4 looks specifically at the influence of foreign 
direct investment on the balance of payments. Chapter 5, the 
last chapter, reviews the policy implications, drawing on the 
theory and description of foreign direct investment contained 
in the previous chapters. 
In addition, there are three appendices; the first extends the 
theory of immiserizing growth in the presence of tariffs to 
account for the implications of tariff revenue distribution; 
the second, outlines the research method used to compile data 
on manufacturing firms, the analysis of which is contained in 
Chapter 3; the last appendix consists of a single table setting 
out information calculated from the input-output tables for 
South Africa. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE DETERMINANTS AND WELFARE IMPACT OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT ON HOST COUNTRIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an overview of the theory pertaining to 
the causes of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its effects 
on host countries, assuming that FDI is carried out by 
multi-national corporations (MNCs). Whilst FDI (a partial 
input measure) and foreign production (an output measure) are 
not one and the same thing1 , FDI has historically been closely 
bound up with the development of international business, it 
still remains the backbone of mul tinat.ional enterprise and is 
the most frequently used proxy for the extent of MNC activity 
(Dunning, 1974, 1988; Eells, 1972). 
Strictly speaking, FDI is any flow of lending to, or purchases 
of ownership in, a foreign enterprise that is largely owned and 
controlled by residents of the investing country 
(Lindert, 1986:562) 2 . According to Helleiner (1989) the most 
frequently used statistics are those of the IMF which defines 
FDI as "investment made to acquire a lasting interest in a 
foreign enterprise with the purpose of having an effective 
voice in its management" (IMF, 1985:28). In principle it 
includes all flows, whether direct or through affiliates, from 
•• 
the investor; and includes reinvested earnings, and net 
borrowings, as well as equity capital. 
But the fact that FDI is associated with the transfer of many 
intangible assets implies that data on direct capital flows 
must be augmented with information on the non-financial 
operations of MNCs if an accurate picture of the effects of FDI 
on host country economic development is to be constructed (see 
Ragazzi, 1973). The choice· of the term "multinational 
corporation" to describe "a business enterprise which owns and 
controls income-genetating assets in more than one country" 
(Dunning, 1974:13), reflects common usage and is not intended 
to convey any special significance or bias 3 . 
Interest in the role and effects of FDI has generated an 
intense debate over its impact on host countries, and continues 
to produce a seemingly endless flow of literature which 
exhibits a rich variety of conflicting arguments and positions. 
This dialectic is the result of a two-fold failure: firstly, 
the MNC has not been brought into the core of theoretical 
thinking in international economics (Krugman, 1980); and, 
secondly, mutually acceptable definitions of welfare cannot be 
agreed on (Lall and Streeten, 1977). 
In order to bring some clarity to this literature, R. Jenkins 
(1987) suggests a fourfold classification of approaches towards 
FDI. He distinguishes between those writers· whose main 
emphasis is on the benefits of FDI and those who adopt a more 
critical approach. This classification is further divided into 
Marxist and non-Marxist perspectives in order to accommodate 
the methodological differences between the two paradigms. This 





Marxist Nee-fundamentalist Nee-imperialist 
*Note: R. Jenkins uses the term TNC in line with UNCTC usage. 
Source: R. Jenkins (1987:17) 
The distinction between what R. Jenkins calls the neoclassical 
and the Global Reach approaches seems overdrawn. With the 
extension of orthodox theory over the last thirty years, the 
view that MNCs always act as efficient allocaeors of resources 
internationally so as to maximize world welfare, has been 
.\ 
substantially modified. There is today a keen appreciation 
that MNCs can reduce efficiency by making markets less perfect 
as a result of their oligopolistic structure, and that the role 
of the state is important. In this spirit, the emphasis in 
this study is on synthesizing non-Marxist perspectives in a· 
broadly neoclassical framework. No attempt is made to locate 
the study within a broader critique of capitalist development. 
The literature on FDI can be usefully divided into two broad 
areas of analysis : one area, drawing on the theory of the firm 
and trade theory, examines its causes, and the other, drawing 
on theories of development, its effects on host countries. 
Although we are principally concerned with the impact of FDI, a 
brief examination of its determinants is useful because the 
conditions that give rise to FDI are also important factors in 
the development process in host countries. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted 
determinants of FDI and that body of theory 
to examining the 
dealing with the 
welfare impact of FDI on host countries. Section 2 traces the 
historical evolution of attempts to model the determinants of 
FDI. This is a useful exercise because it reveals the nature 
of FDI and exposes those conditions necessary for it to occur. 
This may be important to host countries which are trying to 
attract FDI, and is the subject of some discussion in Chapter 5 
below. 
Section 3 is a lengthy examination of the 
employment). effects of FDI on host countries. 
purposes this section is subdivided: 3.1 
welfare (and 
For functional 
deals with the 
controversy surrounding the measurement of costs and benefits; 
3.2 the welfare implications in a partial equilibrium 
framework; and 3.3 the welfare implications in a general 
equilibrium framework. 3.3 is further subdivided to enable 
separate discussion of capital and technology flows in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade model, and of immiserizing 
growth in the presence of foreign and domestic distortions. 
3.4 focuses attention on specific factor models of trade. 
The chapter ends with section 4 which provides a summary, 
conclusion and link with subsequent chapters. 
2. DETERMINANTS OF FDI 
2.1 The Traditional Approach : Capital Arbitrage 
The pure theory of international trade (Bhagwati, 1964; Carden, 
1974), does not take into account capital movements because it 
assumes that each country has a given stock of factors of 
production. The free movement of commodities, immobility of 
factors and perfectly competitive conditions that characterise 
it, make no allowance for trade in factor inputs (Baldwin, 
1970), mainly because the conditions necessary for such trade 
are assumed not to exist (Kindleberger, 1969). What caves 
(1982:31) calls the "key junction point" between international 
economics and the MNC, i.e. the export of equity capital that 
occurs when a company starts a foreign subsidiary, is thus 
ruled out. 
The more sophisticated neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(HOS) model accepts as a central proposition Pigou's (1935) 
point "that factor movements are, at least to some extent, a 
substitute for trade and vice versa" (Carden, 1974a:190). 
Capital is assumed to move internationally in response to 
marginal rates of return, the tendency being to equalise 
returns in different countries. Assuming identical production 
functions,· the resulting allocation of capital would tend to 
equalize factor proportions, and consequently prices of factors 
between countries (Samuelson, 1948). Mundell (1957) has 
explored the special case where trade and factor movements are 
perfect substitutes (see also Rajima, 1975), and Johnson 
(1968a, 1970) has attempted to take into account technology and 
knowledge differentials. FDI is treated simply as a form of 
international capital flow, and the MNC as what Caves (1982: 
31) calls "an arbitrager of 




In this form FDI, is 
framework of trade 
Whilst this tranquility was more or less satisfactory before 
the Second World War, post-war evidence linking the growth of 
FDI to MNCs (Hood and Young, 1979) raised serious doubts about 
the ability of trade theory to explain the determinants of FDI. 
It is usual to trace the locus classicus of these doubts to the 
1960 dissertation of Hymer (Dunning and Rugman, 1985), who 
argued that FDI can only be fully explained by analysing the 
behaviour of large oligopolistic private institutions or firms. 
More specific~lly, he argued that the existence and growth of 
FDI is related to market imperfections, which are internalized 
or eliminated by the MNC (Grubel, 1988). 
Whilst the existence of imperfections is incompatible with 
positive (as opposed to normative) trade theory (Bhagwati, 
1964; Corden, 1974b), caves (1982) has pointed out that it is 
still possible to utilize general equilibrium tools to analyse 
the normative or welfare aspects of FDI and even certain 
positive aspects. Despite the criticism of this approach 
(Vaitsos, 1974), the key junction point between international 
economics and the MNC, i.e. FDI, still exists. By equating 
the transfer of capital with changes in factor endowments and 
factor productivity, it is possible to trace the effects of 
z 
FDI within the HOS model, and arrive at some important 
conclusions in regard to host country welfare. 
2.2 The Modern Approach : The Transactional Hypothesis 
Hymer and Kindleberger (1969) laid the foundations of the 
modern microeconomic explanation of the determinants of the 
MNC, based partly on Coase's (1937) notion of market 
efficiency, and partly on Penrose's (1959) study of the 
transactional advantages for a firm when it makes use of its 
internal resources. 
In the first explicit attack on the received FDI doctrine, 
Hymer pointed out that the capital arbitrage hypothesis was 
inconsistent with the geographical distribution of capital 
flows and that MNCs were not randomly distributed among 
industries, as the perfectly competitive model predicts would 
occur. Instead MNCs were specifically linked to the presence 
of market imperfections. For example, where technological 
externalities arise from high fixed costs in capital intensive 
industries, great efficiency gains can be had by pursuing 
horizontal and even vertical integration. 
As Buckley (1985:2) says: 
"(at) The initial core of 1 modern theory (i.e. the 
Hymer-Kindleberger tradition) was a deceptively simple 
proposition, that in order to compete with indigenous 
firms, which possess innate strengths such as knowledge 
of the local environment, market and business 
conditions, foreign entrants must have some compensating 
advantage". 
He continues: 
"At a stroke, this proposition took FDI away from the 
theory of capital movements into the theory of 
industrial organisation. For, in a perfect market, FDI 
could not exist because local firms would always be 
able to outcompete foreign entrants". 
FDI can thus logically only exist where foreign firms possess 
some advantage over local 6ompetitors to compensate for their 
foreigness. These advantages are embodied in the nature of 
market imperfections. 
Numerous such ownership-specific advantages, or what Caves 
(1982) calls intangible assets, have been suggested by MNC 
theorists (see Hood and Young, 1979, for a useful summary). 
Johnson (1968, 1970) suggested that the significant advantage 
must have characteristics of "publicness" that lower the costs 
of subsidiaries relative to their competitors. Technology, 
broadly defined to include production secrets, management 
organisational techniques and marketing skills, is a good 
example of this. Other theorists emphasize the role of 
economies of scale in promoting FDI through defensive 
oligopolistic reaction. According to the leading proponents of 
this view (Knickerbocker, 1973; Scherer, 1967, 1969; Penrose, 
1969), the possibility of exploiting economies of scale in 
foreign markets causes oligopolists to follow one another into 
new markets as a defensive strategy. 
Various ownership-specific financial and monetary advantages 
associated with imperfections in capital markets have also been 
suggested. For example, Aliber (1970, 1971) has theorized that 
owing to the existence of currency areas, MNCs may be able to 
borrow at a lower rate of interest than indigenous firms, thus 
capitalising on the uncertainty caused by floating exchange 
rates. Grubel (1968) and Rugman (1976) have studied the roles 
of portfolio diversification and risk reduction respectively as 
explanations of ownership-specific advantages, and Lall and 
Streeten (1977) suggest that firm-specific priviledged access 
to raw material sources is an important source of advantage to 
existing and would-be MNCs alike. Radical economists, on the 
other hand, reject these orthodox views in the belief that MNCs 
are simply the agents of neocolonialist powers (Griffin and 
Gurley, 1985). 
Whilst these conventional explanations stress different 
attributes of the MNC, the existence of ownership-specific 
advantages per se represents a necessary but not a sufficient 
explanation of the determinants of FD! (Agarwal, 1980:749) 
because they only explain size factors. As Hood and Young 
(1979:46) stress: 
In 
"To explain the choice of FD! over the alternatives of 
exporting and licensing, it is necessary to take into 
account (at least in some cases) location - specific 
factors such as relative costs of production, trade 
barriers, market characteristics and the like". 
other words, unique ownership advantages cannot by 
themselves explain why a firm should specifically engage in 
foreign production, as opposed to domestic production or 
foreign licensing. 
To try and explain, this, theorists have extended the Hymer-
Kindlberger hypothesis in a number of directions. Hymer (1970) 
himself, in an extension of his earlier work, argued that firms 
often prefer FDI to licensing or exporting because it is more 
profitable, either because of imperfections in the market for 
knowledge in the case of licensing, or because of tariff and 
cost barriers in the case of exporting. Drawing on the work of 
Cease (1937), many theorists including McManus (1972), Buckley 
and Casson (1976), Dunning (1977), and Casson (1979) extend 
this argument to account for imperfections in both intermediate 
and final product markets, and more importantly, provide a 
logical explanation of why these imperfections encourage firms 
to replace external markets with their own internal markets. 
This internalisation of 
boundaries leads to FDI, 
external transactions across national 
a process that is continued until the 
benefits and costs of further internalisation are equalized at 
the margin. Rugman (1980, 1981, 1982, 1985), in particular, 
argues that the motivation to internalize provides a sufficient 
explanation for FDI, but this view has not found wide 
acceptance (Dunning, 1979, 1988; Parry, 1985), because it 
ignores location-specific factors, such as trade barriers. 
The internalisation argument is also not without its logical 
difficulties in those cases where the nature and existence - as 
opposed to growth - of MNCs (or any firm) does not have the 
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suppression of the. price mechanism as its exclusive 
distinguishing feature- (Fourie, 1989). The concept of 
internalisation as a legitimate explanation of the typically 
different relations of the firm and the market has also been 
subjected to heavy criticism (Putterman, 1986; Morris and 
Mueller, 1980). Part of the problem in accepting the 
transactions/internalisation approach as a general theory of 
international production thus lies in the ambiguous 
neoclassical conception of the firm - the so-called "black box" 
which can be subsumed within a general analysis of market 
pricing. 
'This approach represents an extension of the Hymer-Kindleberger 
tradition in the sense that the process of internalization 
provides the rationale for a firm that already has 
ownership-specific advantages to expand abroad, assuming profit 
maximisation. At a stroke, then, the static country-bound 
oligopolist becomes a dynamic foreign competitor, though 
Buckley (1983) and others (Kojima, 1978; Kumar and McLeod, 
1981) have suggested that the growing internationalisation of 
business introduces a limit to this process as oligopoly power 
and the comparative advantage of firms in particular locations 
are eroded over time. 
Another interesting extension of the Hymer-Kindleberger 
hypothesis is that of Aharoni (1966) who puts forward a 
behavioural hypothesis of why large firms ·engage in foreign 
production. Drawing on the work of Cyert and March (1963), he 
examines the process of decision making within firms, dropping 
the assumption of prof it maximisation and adopting satisficing 
criteria as his explanation for the motivation behind FDI. He 
argues that the implementation of a foreign project depends on 
the commitment and persuasive capability of the 'search team' 
in removing the natural pessimism (associated with higher risk) 
of top management. Partly because his analysis does not lead 
to testable empirical hypotheses and partly because the 
methodology behind his generalisations is inadequate, his views 
have not won wide acceptance (Agarwal, 1980). 
2.3 
The 
A General Theory? : The Eclectic Approach 
existence of ownership-specific advantages and the 
motivation to internalise are, however, still insufficient 
explanations for why a firm should choose foreign production 
over foreign licensing or exporting. It is in this connection 
that host country conditions exert an influence. For example, 
a firm may choose to service a foreign market via FDI because 
the possibility of licensing advanced technology may not exist 
in many host countries owing to the unavailability of the 
necessary skills among indigenous firms. Those locational 
factors that are relevant include labour costs, marketing 
factors, trade barriers and general government policy (Hood and 
Young, 1979). One or a combination of these factors, may tip 
the balance and encourage a firm to locate production abroad 
rather than export or licence. 
The way in which the relative 
factors changes over the life 
importance of location-specific 
cycle of any product has been 
highlighted by Vernon (1966, 1971, 1977, 
developed a product cycle model of FDI known 
1979) who has 
as the "product 
cycle hypothesis". In its original version, the life cycle is 
divided into three stages. In the first stage, when the 
product is new, it is produced by the innovating firm in its 
home market, i.e. the U.S. because of the need for close 
contact between customers and suppliers to overcome any 
teething problems, as well as the proximity of local customers 
with high per capita incomes. The second stage is 
characterised by the maturity and export of the product to 
countries having the next highest level of income. Expansion 
of demand and growing competition in these markets lead 
eventually to foreign production. The third stage is 
characterised by a complete standardisation of the product as 
well as its production technique, which by this stage is widely 
used, forcing the firm to seek cost advantages (especially on 
labour) in developing countries. 
Although the early work on the product cycle hypothesis (PCH) 
has been criticised for being overdeterministic (Buckley, 1985) 
and over-simplified (Buckley and Cason, 1976), it was never 
intended as a general theory of FDI. As Vernon (1971:657) has 
himself pointed out, it was merely a framework to explain the 
early post-war expansion of US investment into Europe. The 
scope and complexity of the PCH has been significantly extended 
by Vernon (1971, 1977, 1979) himself, as well as Hirsch (1976) 
and Agmon and Hirsch (1979) but they fail to counter the main 
criticism of the PCH that its emphasis on locational factors is 
not a sufficient explanation for FDI. 
However, Dunning (1977, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1988) has suggested 
an all-embracing approach based on the necessary conditions of 
ownership, location and internalisation. This approach is 
known as the eclectic or OLI approach for obvious reasons. 
Firstly, it applies these three conditions; secondly, it is 
relevant to all types of FDI; and thirdly, it explains which 
of . the three main vehicles of foreign involvement by 
enterprises, namely, direct investment, exports and licensing 
is likely to be preferred. The alternative ways of servicing 
foreign markets are summarized in the matrix below. 
Advantages 
ownership Internalisation Location 
FDI Yes Yes Yes 
Route of 
servicing Exports Yes Yes No 
Market 
Licensing Yes No No 
source: Dunning, 1981:30 
According to Dunning (1981:32): 
"In each case, the possession of ownership advantages is 
a necessary pre-requisite for foreign involvement. But 
the presence of internalisation advantages suggests that 
enterprises will exploit these advantages by way of 
exports or foreign direct investment rather than by 
contractual resource exchanges (licensing); whereas the 
equity investment route, rather than exports, will be 
chosen where locational advantages favour a foreign 
rather than a domestic production base". 
Critics of the OLI approach allege that on close examination it 
does not appear to be a distinct theory at all, but rather a 
loose association of the three main elements on which it is 
based (Chen, 1983). Buckley (1985) maintains that the 
relationship between these three elements and their development 
over time is unclear, and that the existence of separate (and 
separable) ownership advantages is doubtful and logically 
redundant because internalisation explains why firms exist even 
in the absence of such advantages. However, Buckley (1983:42) 
has elsewhere acknowledged that the absence of locational 
factors renders the transactions approach tautological. It is, 
he says, "a concept in search of a theory". 
Dunning (1988:41) has responded to these and other criticisms 
(Aliber, 1983; Kojima, 1978, 1982; Rugman, 1979) of 
eclectic theory in the following manner: 
"It is accepted that, precisely because of its 
generality, the eclectic paradigm has only limited power 
to explain or predict particular kinds of international 
production; and even less, the behaviour of individual 
enterprises. ,But this deficiency, if it is a 
deficiency, which some critics have alleged, could no 
less be directed at attempts to formulate a general but 
operational (sic) testable, paradigm of international 
trade". 
the 
As he points out/ the eclectic approach assumes that market 
imperfections are endogenous to MNC's, unlike the 
internalisation paradigm which assumes them to be exogenous 
(Buckley, 1987). This is a crucial distinction because it 
implies that there are significant differences between the two 
approaches in terms of their general applicability, and that 
they are not substitutes for each other as some writers imply 
(Rugman, 1981; R. Jenkins, 1987). The internalisation approach 
views MNC's as an efficient response to exogenous market 
imperfections, whereas the eclectic approach recognises that 
MNC's are potentially important creators of market 
imperfections. Penrose (1988), argues that the eclectic 
approach provides the better explanation for FDI, whilst Grubel 
(1988) believes that neither approach has been widely accepted, 
probably because the phenomenon is too complex to be captured 
. 
adequately by the theory of internalisation, whilst the 
eclectic theory is too broad because it includes all the many 
driving forces behind FDI. 
3. WELFARE EFFECTS OF FDI ON HOST COUNTRIES 
3.1 Measurement of Costs and Benefits 
The effects of foreign public and private investment on host 
countries, especially in the developing world, comprise a 
subject on which there is considerable controversy, confusion 
and seemingly endless debate~ A large part of the apparent 
failure to reach an acceptable consensus resides in a failure 
to find mutually acceptable definitions of just what 
constitutes welfare. Lall and Stree~en (1977:47) express this 
point rather succintly when they write: "Not only does endless 
debate take place about the existence and magnitude of the 
various costs and benefits, but there is also fundamental 
disagreement about what constitutes 'cost' or 'benefit'"· When 
discussing the welfare effects of MNC's, each writer implies 
that his own approach is more scientific, less subjective, than 
competing paradigms. But the truth is that no branch of 
applied economics based on normative analysis of what 
constitutes a "cost" or "benefit" can be value free. 
Although this problem arises with all forms of applied 
economics, analysis of the effects of MNC's on host countries 
has become an "ideological football" in the North-South "game", 
and on a more theoretical plane, a useful camouflage for hidden 
academic agendas. Writing in 1984 (p.339) Meier argued that: 
"Criticism of the MNE is but the latest attempt to dispel 
complacency over the relevance of the neoclassical 
theory of international trade for development 
problems ••• · critics of the neoclassical trade theory 
first attempted to discredit the theory's power to 
explain historical development by arguing that 
international trade had actually operated historically 
as a mechanism of inequality. After the establishment 
of the post war international economic institutions, the 
argument shifted to a criticism of the alleged biases 
and deficiencies of the international institutions 
comprising the Bretton Woods system. And now the MNE 
has become the object of criticism, with pessimistic 
warnings about future detriment to the developing 
countries if the MNE is not sufficiently regulated". 
Whilst the contemporary debate may not be cast in quite such · 
stark relief, there are several additional reasons why analysis 
of the effects of MNCs raises specific problems for welfare 
analysis which compound the situation. Firstly, there are 
large gaps in our ·knowledge about their activities. This is 
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partly related to the dearth of satisfactory empirical analysis 
of FDI in general owing to conceptual difficulties in 
quantifying its effects what Frank (1~80) calls the 
"imputation problem" - and partly related to the unavailability 
of reliable data in less developed countries (LDCs) in 
particular. Secondly, as Streeten (1974:257) has opined: "A 
major difficulty in assessing these contributions (of MNCs) is 
that far from being able to quantify precisely these effects, 
we do not even know, in general, their direction." In other 
words, there is a priori no way of knowing whether these 
contributions will be positive or negative. 
Thirdly, assuming that the costs and benefits can be quantified 
and'their direction established, whatever the contribution made 
by MNcs, it must be considered what would have occurred under a 
feasible alternative. This 'alternative situation' is a 
hypothetical situation where foreign investment is assumed 
absent, against which its costs and benefits in the actual case 
can be gauged. This is conceivably the greatest problem, 
"With some analysts taking only marginal changes in 
foreign investment into account, some thinking in terms 
of nationally-owned private firms replacing large areas 
of foreign investment, and other considering a totally 
different political-economic structure, with no role for 
private investment at all" (Lall and Streeten, 1977: 
48). 
The criteria used to determine this 'alternative' or 'shadow' 
position crucially determine the assessment of FDI. Very few 
studies have attempted to tackle this particular problem, with 
the noteable exception of Lall and Streeten (1977) who apply 
the Little-Mirlees technique to measure the effects of FDI on 
host countries. 
As Streeten (1972:211) makes clear, the relevant comparison is 
between the following possibilities: 
"(i) to raise the capital and other resources domes-
tically and set up an indigenous (cement) plant; 
(ii) to borrow money abroad, hire engineers and managers 
and buy the know-how through a licensing arrangement; 
(iii) any partial combination between (i) and (ii), 
including joint ventures with foreign firms, 
management contracts, etc; 
(iv) to import the finished product, and· 
(v) not to carry out the investment now nor to import the 
product, but to do without it for the time being". 
Fourthly, presuming that these problems can be overcome, there 
still remains the policy question of whether, and in what form, 
FDI should be encouraged; and, more fundamentally, whether the 
policy makers are capable of acting in the interests of 
society. 
Considering all these 
intrinsically insoluble, 
differences in opinion 
complications, some of which are 
it is hardly surprising to find large 
about the role of MNCs in host 
countries. At the same time, sensible economic analysis is not 
possible without taking some position in relation to the 
definition of welfare. This action is quite defensible as long 
as the premises are clearly outlined and understood, and no 
claim to the "moral high ground" of superior objectivity is 
made. Whatever analytical paradigm is chosen, the discussion 
of MNC's must be judged on its own merits. 
Generally speaking, the orthodox neoclassical view of foreign 
investment is that it always raises incomes and 
in host countries unless market imperfections 
This conclusion is implicit in 
socia:J,. welfare 
are present. 
methods of the assumptions and 
conventional welfare theory which assumes that there is a basic 
harmony of individual interests in society, that individuals 
know best how to maximise their own welfare, that the state is 
the respository of 'social welfare' or the best interests of 
the community, and that the ideal conditions or optimum 
optimorum are those that obtain under perfect competition. 
In contrast, arguments along Marxian lines stress that there is 
a basic disharmony of group interests in society between those 
who own the means of production and those who do not. This 
radical dialectic of group interests is diametrically opposed 
to the liberal philosophy underlying the neoclassical emphasis 
on individualism. It often arrives at opposite conclusions to 
neoclassical theory in respect of the impact of MNC's on host 
countries because it identifies the former with the "haves" and 
the latter with the "have nots" who occupy a subordinate rather 
than benign role in the world system of capitalism (Griffin and 
Gurley, 1976). Once again, however, its conclusions are 
largely predetermined by the nature of the premises and method 
used. 
Conventional welfare economics also faces the problem of being 
unable to evaluate any situation that involves altering the 
distributional status quo. Keeping to strict Paretian rules 
thus implies that many otherwise sensible judgements about 
distribution cannot be made, other than the fact that the 
status quo distribution is preferred to any other (Peacock and 
Rowley, 1975). Such "political" or "moral" judgements are left 
to the government, acting as "benevolent despot". But if this 
conceptualization of the role of government is challenged, and 
a utility-maximizing theory of the state introduced, it is an 
open question just whose interests are being pursued. 
These limitations have been aired at some time or other by most 
economists, especially those working on development problems 
(Lall, 1976), and few economists today would accept 
uncritically the conclusions of conventional neoclassical 
economics. Nevertheless, neoclassical tools do have an 
important role to play in clarifying the various issues, 
several of which have already been identified, bearing in mind 
that given the underlying premises on which they are 
constructed, there is often 'another side to the story'. This 
situation is summed up well by caves (1982:252), when he writes 
that: 
"Economic analysis has played no great part in resolving 
disputes between critics and defenders of the MNEs' role 
in development processes. Nevertheless, economics has 
an important role to play because MNCs' allocative 
decisions affect existing imbalances and distortions in 
host economics. There is, after all, a much greater 
degree of concurrence that key markets in developing 
countries are malfunctioning, or important prices are 
misaligned to their shadow equivalents, so that saving 
and investment, the foreign-exchange rate, wage rates, 
returns to human capital, and other such important 
magnitudes may be far off the mark". 
In South Africa the debate about the costs and benefits of 
foreign capital in the development process has been a 
particularly lively one (Legassick and Hemson, 1976; 
Lipton, 1976; Rogers, 1976; Suckling, 1975; United Nations 
centre Against Apartheid, 1978, 1980; Leape, 1991) because of 
its centrality to the wider debate on the relationship between 
the institutions of apartheid and capitalism which has 
dominated the post-war history of south African political 
economy (Lipton, 1986). Broadly speaking, ·it is possible to 
identify two views of this relationship; a conv~ntional or 
liberal view which construes "i~rational" apartheid policies as 
dysfunctional to capitalism (Butler, Elphick and Welsh, 1987; 
Moll, 1991), and a revisionist or marxist view which construes 
apartheid policies and capitalism to be mutually reinforcing 
(Murray, 1988). 
Depending on which view one subscribes to, foreign capital is 
thus seen as either improving welfare or increasing labour 
repression and exploitation. Taking advantage of widespread 
international concern about racism, marxist commentators in 
particular have used opposition to apartheid as a form of 
camouflage to disguise their attack on capitalism in South 
Africa. The effect of this has been to retard flows of capital 
I ... --------~------
to South Africa and to increase pressure for disinvestment, 
irrespective of a growing realisation that this was inimical to 
development. In many respects the debate about the role of 
foreign capital in South African development is mirrored in the 
broader "dependency" debate about the merits of capitalist 
development itself, and this· issue is taken up again in 
Chapter 2 below. 
3.2 Neoclassical Analysis 
Much of the early research on the welfare effects of FDI was in 
the neoclassical tradition, broadly defined. In an influential 
early treatment, MacDougall (1960) analyses the static effects 
of capital flows on host and home countries in terms of 
marginal productivity theory (see also Kemp, 1962a, 1962b). 
Based on the capital-arbitrage concept of FDI, he assumes that 
foreign capital increases the hos't country stock of capital and 
reduces the home country's stock on a simple one-for-one basis. 
He also assumes that the perfectly competitive economic system 
is in long run full 
of payments is in 
employment equilibrium; that the balance 
equilibrium; that there are no terms of 
trade effects; that returns to scale are constant; that there 
is no taxation; and that both the size of the labour force and 
the stock of domestically owned capital are independent of the 
stock of foreign capital. 
MacDougall's methodology can be examined with the help of 
Figure 1.1, where the marginal productivity and quantity of 
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respectively. We assume that the world capital stock consists 
of the quantity AZ, and that there are two countries, X (host 
country) and Y (home country). Their marginal productivity 
schedules are shown originating on the left and right hand 
sides of Figure 1.1 respectively. In the initial equilibrium, 
AC of capital is held in country X of which AB is 
domestically-owned and BC foreign-owned. Total output in 
country X is GDCA, of which FEBA is profits on domestic 
capital, EDCB is profits on foreign capital and GDF represents 
wages. Capital (both domestic and foreign-owned) in country 
X has a yield of AF. In country Y there is no foreign 
capital and the yield is ZT. 
Assuming that the restrictions limiting foreign capital in 
country X to BC are removed, and that the owners of capital in 
country Y invest CM there, these investments reduce output in Y 
and increase it in X by the amounts CMLN and CMLD respectively. 
As a result, rates of return are equalised in the two countries 
at ML and the total productivity of the world's capital stock 
is increased by the area NLD, irrespective of what form the 
capital movement takes. From the host country's point of view, 
foreign profits become JLMB, a net gain to foreign investors of 
NLK. Since the marginal product of capital, and hence the 
profit rate, has fallen, total profits on host country domestic 
capital decline to HJBA. In contrast the relative yield on 
labour has increased by FDLH, although FEJH is merely a 
transfer from domestic capitalists. The host country as a 
whole gains EDLJ, part of which (OLK) represents pure 
productivity gains, and part of which (EDKJ) represents the 
transfer of foreign profits to domestic real wages. The extent 
of this redistribution depends, of course, on the elasticities 
of the respective marginal productivity schedules. 
From similar, if simpler, analysis, McDougall concluded that 
host country gains would be small relative to the profits 
accruing to the new foreign capital (KLMC). Though not 
stressed by him, it is also clear that the capital inflow 
causes a redistribution of income from both domestic and 
foreign capital to labour, something that labour unions in host 
countries such as South Africa conveniently overlook. 
Similarly, it can be seen that world welfare is increased by 
the reallocation of resources (see also Caves, 1982:231), 
though such efficiency implications are beyond the scope of the 
present discussion. 
MacDougall then enriches his static framework by gradually 
relaxing certain of the assumptions and tracing the 
implications of taxation, external economies, increasing 
returns, and imperfect competition. He finds that the most 
important direct benefits from FDI come via higher tax 
revenues, unless the introduction of tax reduces the rate of 
return on capital to such an extent that capital inflow ceases. 
Suppose, for example, that a rate of tax is imposed by the host 
country on foreign profits. Then the profits accruing to the 
owners of the extra foreign capital decline from KLMC - EDKJ to 
1-t (KLMC - EDKJ). A high foreign profits tax clearly makes a 
significant difference to the gains derived by the host 
country. Tacit recognition of this is given by the eagerness 
with which double taxation agreements are entered into by 
trading partners because tax revenue accruing to the host 
government represents a loss of potential revenue to the home 
government (see Caves, 1982:229f.). The issue of an 
appropriate FDI-tax policy for South Africa is taken up in 
Chapter 5 below. 
Another source of benefit to the host country occurs when 
external economies are introduced as a result of the public 
good nat~re of certain aspects of the FDI package. According 
to Parry (1980), these can take the form of either direct or 
indirect benefits. The direct efficiency gains created by the 
superior know-how of the MNC, manifest themselves in higher 
marginal productivity of foreign capital. This is represented 
in Figure 1.2 by the twisting of MPKx (as opposed to a shift of 
the entire curve) on the assumption that MNC's retain some 
control over their technological advantages because of 
imperfections in the market for knowledge. In other words, the 
marginal productivity of foreign capital is greater than that 
of the domestic equivalent. The relevance of this higher 
productivity for the pattern of South African economic 
development is examined in Chapter 3 below. 
In Figure 1.2 AB represents domestic capital, BO foreign 
capital, MPKx the marginal productivity of domestic capital, 
and MPK 1 x the marginal productivity of foreign capital. 
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differentials, the inflow of foreign capital will cease at R* 
when they are equalized. Domestic output will increase by 
BDEF, of which BDEG is the return to foreign capital and GEF is 
the net gain to domestic factors. On the other hand, if 
domestic capital had expanded instead, the increase in output 
would only be BCHF of which GHF is the net gain to domestic 
factors. 
Since the net gain to domestic factors owing to the presence of 
foreign capital {GEF) is greater than that owing to increases 
in domestic capital {GHF) in Figure 1.1, we must conclude that 
such direct efficiency gains constitute an important added 
benefit of FDI that accrues to domestic labour not domestic 
capital (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1981). 
Indirect efficiency gains are associated with the spread of MNC 
technology and know-how (as distinct from economies of scale) 
to indigenous firms. They include manpower training of MNC 
employees who are later hired by domestic firms, managerial, 
technical and scientific skill development, and demonstration 
and competition effects in domestic firms. The importance of 
these gains in South African manufacturing is examined in 
Chapter 3 below. They reflect themselves in increased 
productivity for domestic firms, resulting in an upward shift 
f th MPK to MPKX~ i'n o e x curve Figure 1.2. The increased 
efficiency of domestic capital results in increased returns to 
' 
both domestic capital and labour. The gain to domestic 
capital is given by RFJR', and the gain to labour is LKJM. 
The net gain to the host country is LFJM, 
the extent of the indirect benefits, 
depending on the elasticities involved, 
Figure 1.2. 
which, depending on 
can be considerable, 
as can be seen in 
MacDougall (1972:142) does point out, however, that if the 
improvement in technology was heavily biased towards labour 
saving as opposed to capital saving, this may enable domestic 
firms to produce the same output with their existing capital 
but with less labour while the marginal product of labour at 
full employment was reduced. Under these circumstances it is 
possible that the host country may lose if the economies caused 
an absolute loss to labour that was greater than the gains to 
capital and tax. Whilst there is no obvious a priori reason to 
expect such economies to be biased in favour of either factor, 
at least under the assumption of perfect competition, this 
possibility does have implications for wages and employment in 
South Africa where there has been a noticeable deepening of 
capital in the manufacturing sector in recent years. These 
implications are examined in Chapter 3 below. 
A further source of benefits may occur through internal 
economies of scale owing to a greater capital stock and higher 
output. In this case, the proportionate growth in output is 
greater than the proportionate increase in labour and capital 
inputs, irrespective of ownership. The marginal product of 
both domestic and foreign capital will increase, shifting the 
curve MJFE outwards in Figure 1.2. This again seems likely to 
bring a gain to the recipient country. There could conceivably 
be a loss for reasons similar to those discussed above, but 
this seems to be even more improbable, because an increase in 
scale is less likely to cause changes in production methods 
than the presence of additional FDI per se. Obviously the 
reverse is also possible, which in the context of disinvestment 
in South Africa, is likely to compound the situation. 






competition can lead to a range of 
foreign investment are 
assumption of perfect 
possible outcomes. For 
example, if such relaxation leads to labour saving techniques 
of production as might be expected when the market for 
technology is imperfect, owing to, say, "technological dualism" 
(Singer, 1970-71) and "inappropriate" technology (Leibenstein, 
1960), then as Macoougall points out, it is possible that the 
host country might suffer a loss of welfare (see also Streeten, 
1974). Cost advantages may also not be passed on to consumers 
through lower prices or to workers in higher wages, but rather 
accrue to the MNC as profits. Moreover, fluctuations in the 
net inflow of capital and the fact that part of foreign 
earnings will be remitted to the home country, may create 
balance of payments difficulties which require deflationary 
measures that impact adversely on domestic employment and 
growth. The implications of these problems for South African 
economic development are dealt with in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
below. 
The conclusion derived from the standpoint of 
welfare is that foreign investment is beneficial 
host country 
only as long 
as the consequent increase in real income is greater than the 
concomitant appropriation of profits by the foreign investor. 
As long as foreign investment increases productivity and this 
increase is not wholly absorbed by the investor, domestic 
factors must benefit. These benefits can accrue to domestic 
labour in the form of higher wages, to consumers by way of 
lower prices and to the government through higher tax revenue. 
They are more likely to be realised when external economies and 
economies of scale are present. 
Against these benefits must be set the costs of foreign 
investment to the host country. Such costs may arise from a 
deterioration in the terms of trade, problems of balance of 
payments adju~tment, and from the introduction of monopoly 
elements into the economy. The problem, as MacDougall admits, 
is that partial equilibrium analysis is an unsatisfactory 
method for dealing with such issues. 
predictions of the model are fairly 
has been extended to account for 
Brems, 1970) and comparative-static 
Rowan, 1966). 
In total, therefore, the 
ambiguous, even though it 
growth (Pitchford, 1970; 
methodology (Pearce and 
The main criticisms 
limitations associated 
framework to analyse 
levelled at this approach arise from 
with the use of a comparative static 
dynamic capital flows (Balogh and 
Streeten, 1960), and from the assumption of perfect competition 
(Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969; caves, 1971). The Post-
Keynesian school also argues that the neoclassical technique of 
aggregating the capital stock is analytically incorrect, 
because, they argue, capital simply cannot be aggregated 
(Harcourt, 1972; Richardson, 1981/2). In general, the neo-
classical approach tends to emphasize the benefits of foreign 
investment because analysis of its costs is difficult whilst 
the assumption of perfect competition is retained. Although no 
direct attempt is made to quantify these costs and benefits, 
they are examined in the context of post-war South African 
economic development in the chapters below. 
3.3 The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model 
3.3.1 Capital Inflow and Technology 
Despite the criticisms levelled at the view of FDI as capital 
arbitrage, several authors doing general equilibrium work on 
FDI adopt this approach in order to apply conventional 
international trade theory to the question of how MNC's affect 
resource allocation (e.g. Bhagwati, 1973; Hamanda, 1974; 
Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro, 1977; Bhagwati, 1979; Markusen and 
Melvin, 1979). 
The advantage of using such general equilibrium (GE) analysis 
is that, unlike partial analysis, it simultaneously allows 
the examination of employment, distribution, allocation and 
real income effects in a host country. Most of the model 
building that accounts for MNC activity in a GE framework is 
derived directly from the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(HOS) model, which has the great advantage of concentrating on 
' 
the interrelationship between a nation's pattern of 
international trade and its endowment of factors of production 
(including capital). By equating the MNC's transfer of capital 
with changes in factor endowments and factor productivity it is 
thus possible to trace the effects of FDI and arrive at some 
important conclusions in regard to host country welfare. 
In its simplist form, the HOS model assumes 
i) two countries with identical production functions 
ii) two traded commodities, produced under conditions of 
constant returns to scale, nonreversability of 
factor-intensity ranking, and with different 
production functions 
iii) two factors of production, fixed in supply and inter-
nationally immobile 
iv) perfect competition 
v) balanced trade (Corden, 1974). 
The theory predicts that a country will have a comparative 
advantage and therefore will export those products in which its 
most abundant factor is used relatively intensively; conversely 
it will import commodities embodying factors with which the 
country is poorly endowed (Chacholiades, 1981). Extensions of 
the basic model to incorporate FDI involve modification of 
assumption three, so that capital is mobile internationally. 
Allowing for such factor mobility, Rybczynski (1955) has shown 
that if the goods-price and factor-price ratios are fixed, then 
an increase in the endowment of capital with a constant labour 
supply, will shift labour to the capital-intensive industry, 
resulting in a drop in capital employment in the labour-
intensive industry. This causes a more than proportionate 
increase in the output of the capital-intensive commodity, and 
an absolute decline in the output of the other commodity. For 
a country with a comparative. advantage in the production of 
capital-intensive commodities, capital accumulation will have 
what Krauss and Johnson (1967:298) call an ultra-pro-trade 
biased production effect, i.e. more than the whole increase in 
national income is devoted to the purchase of imports so that 
the demand for home-produced goods actually falls and the 
country becomes absolutely less self-sufficient at constant 
terms of trade. 
In other words, if the capital inflow can be absorbed without 
diminishing returns, the resulting change in the 
factor-endowment ratio will bring about a relative and 
absolute increase in the output of the capital-intensive good, 
Y, and a similar decline in the output of the labour-intensive 
good, X (Rybczynski, 1955). Under such circumstances the 
Stolper-samuelson theorem (1941) predicts that there will be no 
decline in the reward to capital, which is equivalent to 
assuming a constant marginal product of capital (Bhagwati and 
and Srinivasan, 1983). 
inf lows accrue to the 
In this case, all returns to capital 
owners of foreign capital and its 
presence, or absence, is therefore a matter of indifference to 
host countries, assuming full employment ex ante. 
But keeping a constant goods-price ratio is unrealistic because 
it ignores the impact of demand, and results in a movement of 
the equilibrium from P0 to P1 in Figure 1.3 which implies that 
the labour-intensive good X is an inferior good because less of 
it is produced despite the higher income (Sodersten, 1980). 
In order to examine the welfare effects of capital inflow on 
host countries it is therefore necessary to rule out the 
possibility that one of the goods is inferior, hence dropping 
the overly restrictive assumption of a constant capital:labour 
ratio. In terms of the Krauss and Johnson classification 
given in Figure 1.3, capital accumulation cannot have an ultra-
pro-trade-biased 
effect. 
or an ultra-anti-trade-biased production 
Keeping a constant goods and/or factor price ratio, the new 
equilibrium will be at point P1 in Figure 1.3, but excluding 
inferior goods, the new equilibrium can only lie on T1T1 
somewhere between the dotted lines P0 A and P0 B. The precise 
point will be determined by demand factors in the form of 
indifference curves, which are not shown. The slope of any 
price line tangent to this segment will be steeper than f 0 or 
which implies that the relative price Of the 
import-competing good, Y, will be lower in the new equilibrium 
situation.. Because the import-competing sector, Y, is the 


















Capital Accumulation, Production and Welfare 
improvement in the country's terms of trade and potential 
welfare. However, had we assumed that the export sector, x, 
was more capital-intensive, a capital inflow would have caused 
a deterioration of the terms of trade and potential welfare. 
The implications of this for the pattern of FDI in South Africa 
are examined in Chapter 2 below. 
Gains in productive capacity represented by outward shifts of 
the production possibility curve can, of course, be caused by 
increases in factor endowments or factor productivity or both. 
Without going into the detailed consequences of technical 
improvements on the pattern of economic growth, the HOS 
model provides a convenient way of summarizing the combined 
effects of capital inflow and technological improvements. 
This is particularly relevant to the analysis of FDI where 
both are involved. 
FDI can have either a positive or a negative effect on a 
country's terms of trade depending on whether it takes place in 
the export or import-competing sector, and on whether technical 
progress is Hicks-neutral, capital- or labour-saving. It is 
rather surprising that given the nature of the FDI "package" 
more attempts have not been made to model it in terms of 
technical progress (but see Minabe, 1974), especially since so 
many commentators maintain that technology, not movement of 
capital, is at the heart of FDI (Johnson, 1970; Lall, 1978; 
Hood and Young, 1979). Perhaps one of the notable exceptions 
to this is Vernon's (1966, 1974) product cycle theory, but it 
is difficult to see how this can be integrated into standard GE 
analysis, if it is possible at all. 
According to Sodersten (1980), neutral technical progress will 
always have a negative effect on the relative price of the good 
produced in the innovating sector. In this case FDI in the 
export sector will always lead to a deterioration in a 
country's terms of trade; and FDI in the importables sector to 
an improvement. 
The effects of biased innovations are similar. Capital-saving 
technical progress in the capital-intensive sector, and 
labour-saving progress in the labour-intensive sector also 
have the effect of reinforcing the impact of capital inflows 
into these sectors. Hence if the import-competing sector is 
I 
capital-intensive, and capital-saving technical progress takes 
place in this sector, the terms of trade will deteriorate. 
And if importables are labour-intensive and labour-saving 
technical progress occurs in this sector, the terms of trade 
will improve. 
But when labour-saving innovations occur in the capital-
intensive industry and capital-saving innovations in the 
labour-intensive industry the results are ambiguous because we 
cannot tell a priori whether the price of the innovating 
product will increase or decrease. The effects of the capital 
inf low may thus be counteracted by the nature of the associated 
technical progress. Perhaps because of such ambiguity, there 
have been few attempts to equate FDI with combined capital 
inf low and technical 
latter ambiguous case, 
reinforce the impact 
sector it goes to. 
progress. With the exception of the 
the effect of technical progress is to 
of capital inflow irrespective of which 
In the case of developing countries the existence of a limited 
number of production processes the "factor-proportions 
problem" - as well as the "inappropriateness" of the technology 
transferred by MNCs constitute major limitations on potential 
welfare gains and employment (Eckhaus, 1955; Leibenstein, 1960; 
singer, 1970/1; Black, 1983). The transfer of capital-
intensive technology to labour-surplus economies exacerbates 
the factor proportions problem and may even reduce labour 
absorption. 
south Africa 
More information on the role of technology in 
is contained in Chapters 3 and 5 below but the 
impact of "inappropriate" technology on welfare and employment 
is demonstrated in Figure 1.4 by dividing the typical less 
developed country (LDC) economy into two sectors, an industrial 
sector (Y) and an agricultural sector (X). 
In the industrial sector (Y) there are (or entrepreneurs 
perceive there to be) fixed technical coefficients of 
production, giving a fixed-proportions production function. In 
the agricultural sector (X) production techniques are assumed 
to be variable but only within a limited range of factor 
proportions, which means that its factor absorption capacity is 
constrained. These production functions are shown in the 
Edgeworth box diagram in Figure 1.4, where the ridge lines 
Dx 
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Welfare and Employment Effects of "Inappropriate" 





representing the economic limits of production in sector x, the 
agricultural sector, are given by OxG and OxH· The Leontieff 
production function for sector Y, the industrial sector, is 
given by OyA· The efficiency locus or contract curve 
maximising total output can be derived by finding the maximum 
output of X, for every given level of Y's output: for example, 
if the output of Y is at level Y2 , then the maximum attainable 
output of X is given by level x2 along the ridge line OxH· 
Applying this procedure to each level of output Y, we obtain 
the efficiency locus, OxE cum AE and EOy. This information 
may be used to trace out the corresponding transformation 
curve AEOy. in Figure 1. 4. Output combinations along EOy 
indicate full employment of both factors, and output 
combinations along AE represent some ~egree of labour 
unemployment. 
The implications for labour unemployment of the transfer of 
inappropriate technology can now be explained under the 
assumption that it causes capital-using technological progress 
in the capital intensive sector of the economy (see 
Leibenstein, 1960). This enables sector Y to employ fewer 
units of both capital and labour in the production of any 
given level of output Y, at the same time that it uses a more 
capital intensive production technique than before. The 





causing a shift in the efficiency locus because production 
process OyB "dominates" process OyA· For example, if sector X 
produces the output levels x2 , then the maximum attainable Y 
output is given by Y1 3 
Repeating 
along ray OyB, rather than by Y2 along 
this process yields a new efficiency 
lo~us, OxF cum BF and FOy. This implies a shift in the 
transformation curve from AEOy to BFOy, effectively 
lengthening the labour-unemployment segment from AE to BF. 
This example illustrates how the transfer of inappropriate 
technology by MNCs can potentially aggravate the factor 
proportions problem, thereby having a deleterious effect on 
employment and underemployment. 
In the case of South Africa, the trend towards 
capital-deepening during the recent past is a worrisome 
feature in the context of growing unemployment. However, as 
we point out in Chapters 2 and 3 below, there is no evidence 
that MNCs are the cause of this capital-deepening, and they 
are more likely to make adaptations to imported technology 
than local firms. Whilst it is declining, South Africa's 
dependence on foreign technology is still disturbingly high 
and is likely to remain so until (and if) domestic capital 
goods production is rapidly expanded. This dependence 
reflects the way in which the world-wide technology market 
operates (see Chapter 3) but the transfer of capital-
intensive production techniques to developing labour-surplus 
countries is not necessarily undesirable if it lowers costs of 
production. 
There is a growing awareness that the "appropriateness" of 
foreign technology should be judged on the basis of unit costs 
of production rather than in relation to factor endowments 
(Meth, 1990). In South Africa, for example, the trend towards 
increasing capital-intensity is a rational · response to higher 
labour costs (see Chapter 3). Whilst this may not greatly 
improve the unemployment situation in the short term, 
competitiveness is crucial to the success of current efforts 
to penetrate export markets, the trade strategy which offers 
the most hope for long term development (see Chapter 5). 
The analysis above establishes that capital accumulation is 
not unambiguously beneficial. When the importables sector is 
capital-intensive, an inflow of capital improves the country's 
terms of trade and welfare, but when the exportables sector is 
capital-intensive, an inflow of capital causes a deterioration 
in the terms of trade and level of welfare. Increases in 
factor productivity via the transfer of technology are 
likewise not always beneficial. This depends on the nature of 
the technical progress and on the sector in which it occurs. 
In developing countries the existence of a "factor proportions 
problem" combined with the "inappropriateness" of foreign 
technology, are added complications, especially in the 
presence of surplus labour. Chapter 3 below examines these 




then, a large number of 
and/or technical progress 
the presence of market 
cases where capital 
reduce potential 
distortions. The 
introduction of demand factors into our analysis, in the form 
of indifference curves, allows us to examine the welfare 
/ 
implications of these distortions in more detail. It is usual 
to distinguish between foreign and domestic distortions, and 
it is to the analysis of these that we now turn. 
3.3.2. Foreign Distortions and Immiserizing Growth 
Based on the observations of Edgeworth (1894), Prebisch (1950) 
and Singer (1950), Bhagwati (1958) has shown that it is 
theoretically possible for the terms of trade to deteriorate to 
such an extent that the welfare of a "large" host country, i.e. 
one with a degree of monopoly/monopsony power, actually 
declines as a result of trade- or resource transfer-induced 
growth (Chacholiades, 1981:151). This possibility is 
illustrated in Figure 1.5, 
intensive export sector, 
assuming that X is the capital-
where the initial production 
equilibrium is.at P0 , on the production possibility curve T0 T0 , 
and consumption occurs at c0 , where the indifference curve W0 , 
is tangent to the world price f 0 • Capital accumulation is 
assumed to expand the production frontier non-parametrically to 
T1T1 • As a result of the decline in the relative price of 
exports, the terms of trade deteriorates to f 1 and production 
moves to P1 and consumption to c1 . As can be seen, this 
implies a lower level of welfare w1 . 
This GE analysis demonstrates that it may be misleading to rely 
on MacDougall-type partial analysis because factor growth may 
not be synonamous with welfare improvements. According to 
partial analysis, capital inflow always increases host country 
welfare when diminishing returns to capital operate, because 
Importab1es 
(Labour-
i ntensi ve) 
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Foreign Distortions and Immiserizing Growth 
its contribution to the national income of the host country 
exceeds its return, leaving an intra-marginal surplus that 
accrues to labour (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1981). In 
contrast, the analysis of capital inflow in a two-sector, 
two-factor, two-commodity framework, that incorporates demand 
as well as supply, reaches a more qualified conclusion. 
Diminishing returns on the supply-side combined with 
demand-side preferences will determine the extent of relative 
price changes, which may or may not result in an improvement in 
welfare, and in the large country case, will always cause a 
deterioration in the terms of trade when capital accumulation 
takes place in the capital-intensive export sector. 
Ironically, if the effects of the capital inflow are offset by 
the nature of· the associated technical progress, this may 
prevent immiserizing growth in the large country case where the 
capital inflow goes into the capital-intensive export sector. 
The pattern of FDI in South Africa and the impact of the 
associated transfer of technology is examined in Chapters 2 and 
3 below. However, it seems plausible to argue that South 
Africa is largely a price taker in world markets (Lawrence and 
van der Westhuizen, 1990) and that the large country case 
analysed in this section is therefore inapplicable, although 
this may not be true of certain mineral exports like coal. 
Immiserizing growth only occurs because of the existence of a 
distortion (either foreign or domestic) that is not offset by 
an optimal policy (Chacholiades, 1981:216). In the fdreign 
distortion case above, the country is implicitly a large one 
with monopoly-monopsony power in international trade, and it 
does not pursue an offsetting optimal tariff policy. However, 
immiserization is also possible when domestic distortions are 
present, even in the case of a "small" country. 
3.3.3 Domestic Distortions and Immiserizing Growth 
The theory of immiserizing growth is usually associated with 
the large country case described above where foreign 
distortions are present. It is less well known that domestic 
distortions may also cause immiserizing growth (Johnson, 1967). 
Although domestic distortions can occur in countries of any 
size, it is usual to examine their impact on welfare in the 
small country case, in order to exclude foreign distortions by 
assumption. There is a large class of situations where capital 
inf lows may cause immiserization because of domestic 
distortions (Bhagwati and Brecher, 1980, 1981; Bhagwati and 
Tironi, 1980; Brecher and Findlay, 1983; Neary and Ruane, 1988; 
sechzer, 1988; Tsai, 1987). Arguably the most important cause 
of domestic distortions (Chacholiades, 1978), and one that is 
particularly relevant to this study, is that of tariff 
protection. 
As Johnson (1967:153) points out, as a result of a tariff, 
additional factors of production (especially capital, which is 
more mobile internationally) are attracted to the sector in 
which the host country does not have a comparative advantage. 
This misallocation causes additional welfare losses over and 
above those directly associated with tariff-induced distortions 
under initial free trade conditions. If this waste of 
resources is greater than the increase in potential output per 
head, inuniserizing growth will occur. 
In general, this possibility depends on the tariff rate, the 
nature of the factor used intensively in the protected sector, 
and the elasticities of substitution between factors. Capital 
inflows into capital-intensive protected sectors are a 
particular problem because as Corden (1974:334) points out, in 
the simple Heckscher-Ohlin-samuelson model, with no factor or 
trade reversals, a country that is a net capital importer must 
have capital-intensive importables so that protection will 
induce capital inflow. The reason for this is that a country 
is likely to import that product which is intensive in the 
country's relatively scarce factor, and if the country imports 
capital, then, presumably, its scarce resource is capital. 
This situation can be analysed with the help of Figure 1.6. 
Before the capital inflow, the "small" country, which provides 
tariff protection to its capital-intensive import-competing 
industry, produces at P0 and consumes at c0 • The domestic 
(tariff-inclusive) terms of trade (given by the absolute slope 
of parallel broken lines, d 0 , d 1 , d 2 and d 3 ) is lower than the 
fixed world terms of trade (given by the absolute slope of 
unbroken parallel lines f 0 , f 1 , f 2 and f 3 ). 
causes the transformation curve to shift 
The capital inflow 
outwards to T1T1 . 
Production shifts to P1 , where the real value of production at 
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C1, which lies on a lower community indifference curve than 
C0 • If the tariff did not exist, production and consumption 
would have occurred at P 2 and c2 , respectively, before the 
capital inflow, and at P 3 and c3 , respectively, after the 
capital inflow. As a result of the tariff-induced 
distortion, capital accumulation reduces welfare. 
When this capital accumulation comes from foreign sources, 
Brecher and Diaz Alejandro (1977) argue that under these 
conditions immiseration is the only outcome that can result 
from a tariff-induced inflow of untaxed foreign capital. They 
distinguish (for comparative static purposes) the following 
three contributing effects: 
11 (1) the well-known loss due to tariff-created distor-
tions in consumption and production, given only the 
initial factor endowments; 
(2) the loss or gain that would result even from accu-
mulation of nationally owned capital in the presence of 
a tariff, for reasons expounded by Johnson (1967) and 
further explored by Bertrand and Flatters (1971) and Tan 
(1969); and 
(3) the loss arising when foreign profits are subtrac-
ted to determine national income" (Brecher and Diaz 
Alejandro, 1977:17). 
Ignoring effect (1) which is always negative, they concentrate 
on (2) and (3), which they call the 'net inflow-impact'. They 
show that this impact is also negative on balance even before 
effect (1) is added to it. Adding effect (1) merely 
reinforces the conclusion that immiseration is the only 
possible outcome that can result from a tariff induced inflow 
of untaxed capital from abroad. 
In Figure 1.7, the country produces intially at P0 on the 
production possibility curve T0 T0 • The domestic (tariff-
inclusive) price ratio is given by the slope of the line d0 , 
tangent to T0 T0 at P0 • The world price ratio, reflecting the 
small country assumption, is given by the slope of line f 0 • 
Consumption occurs at C0 , where f 0 intersects line oo, which is 
the income-consumption curve corresponding to domestic prices. 
The community indifference curves from which line oo is taken 
are not drawn; 
The capital inflow shifts T0 T0 outwards (not shown) and, at 
constant prices, production moves from P0 to P1 which lies 
northwest of Po according to the Rybczynski Theorem. Both 
points lie on RR the Rybczynski line corresponding to the 
(fixed) ratio.of domestic prices (Krauss and Johnson, 1974). 
The Rybczynski line is defined as the output expansion 
(contraction) locus as the endowment of one factor is changed 
(the other remaining fixed) with constant prices. Its slope is 
negative; linearity follows from the assumption of linearly 
homogenous production functions in both sectors. Since RR is 
steeper than the world-price line f 0 in this case, the real 
value of total output increases at international prices, 
consumption increases from C0 to c1 , and welfare improves. If 
RR was flatter than f 0 welfare would decrease. 
However, when effect (3) is incorporated, the net outcome is 
always negative irrespective of the welfare effects of (2). 











Foreign Capital, Tariffs and Host Country Welfare 
53 
national income. Brecher and Diaz Alejandro (B 
that foreign capital receives the full (untaxed) 
marginal product, so that foreign profits absorb 
increase in total output valued at domestic 
Mundell (1957). 
Foreign profits expressed in exportables are equal 
and D) assume 
value of its 
the entire 
prices a' la 
horizontal distance between P1 and d0 • The host country is left 
with commodity bundle Z, which can be exchanged internationally 
along the world-price line f 2 to achieve consumption at c2 . 
Since c2 must lie southwest of C0 , the capital inflow clearly 
reduces the level of welfare. The same result is obtained 
mutatis mutandis if foreign profits are expressed in 
importables. 
Thus, even if capital accumulation increases national welfare 
in terms of effect (2), the "net inflow impact" must be 
negative when foreign investment receives the full value of its 
marginal product. This result can only be reversed if (i) host 
country importables are labour intensive (the Rybczynski line 
having a flat negative slope), in which case the net inflow 
impact will be positive; (ii) a trade subsidy is imposed 
instead of a tariff (assuming importables are capital-
intensive); or (iii) if the host country taxes foreign profits. 
This result can also be reversed or at least ameliorated if the 
implicit assumption that the government redistributes the 
tariff revenue to private consumers is dropped. If this 
revenue is returned to producers of exportables in the form of 
a production subsidy, this may prevent immiserization if it 
reduces the tariff-induced production distortion (see Appendix 
1). Even so, the pre-tariff welfare level is not attainable 
because effect (1) is always negative, at least until the 
attainment of a Mundell (1957) tariff-induced (post-inflow) 
equilibrium at which point the domestic product-price ratio 
equals the international ratio of commodity prices. 
The theory of immiserizing growth and domestic distortions has 
important implications for policy formulation since it implies 
that foreign investment is likely to impoverish a host country 
if it goes to the capital-intensive tariff protected sector. 
Although we have only examined the small country case. in order 
to exclude fo~eign distortions by assumption, this is a problem -
faced by all countries. As we pointed out above (see also 
corden, 1974), the theory of comparative advantage suggests 
that countries that import capital intensive goods are also 




but a real 
especially tariff protection, are widespread in 
developing countries, this suggests that 
growth is not an obscure analytical possibility 
practical problem, especially where foreign 
investors have been given some form of exemption from taxation. 
Host countries may therefore need to examine whether 
alternative development strategies are not more appropriate to 
their needs. 
In the case of South Africa, the evidence contained in Chapter 
2 below suggests that although most foreign investment has been 
in capital-intensive industry, on the whole these industries 
have received less effective protection than labour-intensive 
ones. Consequently, it is not clear whether protection 
combined with foreign investment has caused immiserizing 
growth. However, this seems unlikely to have occurred because 
foreign profits have always been taxed, often more heavily than 
local ones (see Chapter 5 below). 
3.4 Specific Factor Model 
Although the incorporation· of technical progress, tariffs and 
the like into the HOS framework is an improvement over simple 
capital arbitrage as an explanation of the welfare effects of 
FDI, the gap between the MNC and GE analysis still persists. 
Some economists attempting to push the two closer together have 
seized on the horizontal or multi-plant form of foreign 
investment, in which the firm based in a specific source 
country's industry transplants its capital to that same 
industry in the host country (Caves, 1971; Krugman, 1980). 
This has given rise to a more sophisticated model with 
sector-specific capital that may move from country to country, 
but does not move between industries in either country (Jones, 
1971; Caves, 1971; Carden, 1974; Burgess, 1978; Batra and 
Ramachandran, 1980; Das, 1981; Brecher and Findlay, 1983; 
Srinivasan, 1983; Mendez, 1983; Markusen, 1984; Helpman, 1984; 
Batra, 1986; and Tsai, 1987). 
The model is based on the assumption that there are two 
countries, capable of producing two products. Each country is. 
endowed with a labour supply that is homogenous and perfectly 
mobile between industries but does not move across national 
boundaries. Symmetrically, stocks of capital are potentially 
mobile across national boundaries but specific to the two 
respective industries. If the usual assumptions about 
production functions and trade barriers are kept, then factor 
prices will be equalized as long as one type of sector-specific 
capital is perfectly mobile; and a tariff still serves to 
attract foreign investment by enhancing sector-specific factor 
returns (Jones, 1967). 
An interesting and relevant version of the model comes from 
Batra, who assumes that global firms transmit technology but 
relatively small amounts of capital to less developed 
countries, a practice which has the effect of "generating or 
accentuating severe imperfections in local capital markets" 
(1986:343). The model assumes that the host country is a small 
country, with a capital-poor labour-rich economy, divided into 
two sectors, one wherein MNCs compete with each other and the 
other comprising local firms only, and that labour is 
unemployed because of an institutionally fixed real wage. The 
emergence of technologically more efficient MNCs leads to a 
shift of capital from the local to the multinational sector as 
the marginal products of capital and labour rise in the 
multinational sector. As a consequence, employment and output 
rise in the multinational sector and decline in the local 
sector. If the multinational sector is the relatively 
capital-intensive sector, th~n the emergence of the MNCs causes 
a decline in total employment in the labour-surplus host 
country. In addition to this employment or technology effect, 
if local capital markets show a preference for MNCs, an 
expansion of the multinational sector will cause a decline in 
the real income of underdeveloped host countries when their 
capital transfer is not sufficient to offset this preference. 
A geometrical exposition of these effects is provided in Figure 
1.8. 
In the case where total employment is constant, then for any 
given level of employment we can construct a transformation 
curve, T0 T0 , for the host country. The initial production 
point P0 is obtained where the given international price line, 
f 0 , touches T0 T0 • The superior technology brought into the 
multinational sector, X, causes the country's transformation 
curve to shift outwards to T0 T1 . If the local capital markets 
show no preference for the global firms, i.e. no capital market 
imperfections are present, the new production point will be at 
P1 and GNP in terms of X will rise by P1Q or RT. But assuming 
that the total value of untaxed profits are repatriated, the 
net national product will be unchanged, distance P1Q 
representing these profits. If the capital market imperfection 
does occur, then T0 T1 shrinks to the dotted curve and the 
production point only shifts to M. The rise in gross national 
product is then RM, but since repatriated earnings equal P1Q 
or RT, net national product actually declines by MT, which 
y 
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represents the cost of multinational firms in the presence of 
capital market imperfections. If total employment also 
declines, then the dotted transformation curve T0 T1 shifts 
inwards towards the origin, say, and the final 
production point is B and net national product has declined by 
RN plus MT. 
In order to overcome the adverse economic impact of MNCs, Batra 
I 
suggests that an appropriate income tax on them can reverse, if 
not completely eliminate, many of their harmful effects (see 
also Mendez (1983)). If the host country imposes a pure 
profits tax it has no effect on resource allocation because its 
effects are identical to a lump sum tax. Thus although it may 
prevent the full repatriation of MNC profits it does not 
improve the ailocational defect caused by discrimination in the 
banking sector. On the other hand, a Harberger (1962) tax on 
non-wage income earned by MNCs is more appropriate because it 
causes a rise in the employment of capital and labour in the 
local sector and a fall in their employment in the multi-
national sector. This first-best tax then corrects the 
resource misallocation caused by capital market imperfections, 
ensuring that FDI causes total employment and national income 
to rise. This effect is explained geometrically in Figure 1.9. 
In Figure 1.9, T0 T0 is the host country's transformation curve, 
for a given level of employment, prior to the tax on non-wage 
income earned by MNCs. Since capital market imperfections are 
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P0 • The imposition of the tax raises the gross (tax inclusive) 
cost of capital to MNCs causing the dotted transformation curve 
to shift upwards. The optimal tax is therefore the one that 
completely eliminates the capital cost differential between the 
two sectors. Holding the total level of employment constant, 
the production point moves to P1 . If we then allow the 
employment level to rise, the transformation curve moves to 
T1T1 and the production point to P2 . The level of real gross 
national product also rises to the level given by the price 
line f 2 • 
This analysis suggests that there is an optimum income tax 
which eliminates the capital-market imperfection, where the 
optimum is defined in terms of eliminating such distortions 
only. This tax need not drive out the MNCs, which still retain 
their technological superiority, because all it does is to 
deprive MNCs of the advantage of relatively lower interest 
rates. The analysis also suggests that if the developing host 
country wishes to avoid the real-income losses implied here, it 
should insist that the transfer of technology is accompanied by 
substantial capital transfer in order to combat local capital 
market imperfections. Otherwise, as Batra (p.353) concludes, 
"The emphasis of some underdeveloped countries on attracting 
technology at the expense of multinational capital is 
self-def eating and may cause losses of jobs as well as national 
income." 
This conclusion has some important implications for the current 
world trend towards ?oint ventures and 'new forms' of FDI in 
which technology is often licensed out to local firms but 
little or no equity investment takes place.. In recent years 
this has also been a fairly common modus operandi of MNCs in 
South Africa, largely because of political pressure in favour 
of capital disinvestment (see Innes, 1990 and Chapter 4 below). 
It is also likely that, in the short term at least, joint 
ventures of this nature may off er local manufacturers in South 
Africa the best chance of acquiring foreign technology. Local 
capital markets do not, however, favour MNCs, which face some 
important constraints on borrowing in local capital markets 
(see Chapter 5 below). The capital-market imperfection effect 
dbes not therefore seem partic~larly relevant to South Africa. 
But the emplo~ent effect may be more relevant, not because 
foreign firms are more capital-intensive (which they are not -
see Chapter 3), but because most FDI has taken place in 
relatively capital-intensive sectors within manufacturing, 
which is itself more capital-intensive than, say, mining or 
agriculture. On the other hand, as we have already stated, 
foreign profits are taxed in South Africa, so that the net 
national product may still increase as long as the increase in 
unemployment is small. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Even in its simplist form, trade theory 
predictions about how inflows of capital are 
provides useful 
likely to affect 
the welfare of capital-recipients via relative price changes. 
The introduction of technology, the factor proportions problem, 
foreign and domestic distortions, and specific factors add to 
its predictive capacity and bring about a more realistic 
representation of the FDI "package". As Helleiner (1989: 
1451), writing in the Handbook of Development Economics, says: 
"It is noteworthy ... that this (GE) analysis has uncovered 
circumstances in which capital inflows may reduce welfare in 
the capital-importing country - via domestic "distortions" or 
rigidities that limit income gains to less than the cost of 
external capital (or even render them negative), negative terms 
of trade effects, etc.". 
In general, capital inflows will raise output and employment in 
the capital-intensive industry by a greater proportion than 
they are lowered in the labour-intensive industry, from which 
it may be inferred that FDI improves potential levels of 
welfare in the country as long as it is not attracted by 
protectionist measures to a capital-intensive import-competing 
sector, and as long as it does not create or exacerbate host 
country factor- and capital-market imperfections. 
The specific measurement of the costs and benefits of FDI to 
host countries is more problematic since measurement cannot 
escape being based to a greater or lesser extent on normative 
analysis. Economic development involves a' complex interaction 
of social, cultural and political changes as well as economic 
ones, and the activities of MNCs will have an effect on all 
these factors. In this connection the role of the state is 
important because the contribution of FDI to social welfare can 
be significantly altered by the ability and willingness of the 
host government to pursue "appropriate policies". For example, 
the stance taken in regard to the taxation of foreign 
investment has a pivotal role to play in capturing the benefits 
of FDI (see Chapter 5 below). 
-
Likewise, many of the costs associated with "multinationality" 
such as external decision-making~ tax and monetary policy 
·evasion, and ~uperior bargaining strength - can be ameliorated 
by appropriate policy intervention. Furthermore, if the 
nation-state fragments the world economy by restricting 
commodity and factor movements, an interpretation of the MNC as 
an efficient unit of allocation implies that it is a means of 
pursuing the principle of comparative advantage that is to the 
economic benefit of all, including those in the host country. 
On the other hand, the economic benefits outweigh the 
non-economic costs is an open question that lies beyond the 
parameters of economic analysis. 
Endnotes: 
1. The distinction between FDI and the MNC is in many 
instances not an easy one to draw (see Caves, 1971). 
Nevertheless, there are. some obvious differences. 
Firstly, FDI can be made by non-MNC's, though in practice 
the amounts involved are very small (Dunning, 1971). 
Secondly, it incorporates foreign investment by all 
firms, irrespective of. the extent to which they are 
involved in foreign (or domestic) activities. Thirdly, 
MNC's may have the option of raising capital in the host 
economy or of reinvesting retained earnings, thereby 
avoiding international capital transfers. 
2. The proportions of ownership that define "largely" vary 
from country to country. For the United States 10 per 
cent ownership by the investing firm suffices as an 
official definition of FDI. The comparable figure for 
South Africa is 25 per cent (see Chapter 4). FDI 
includes any investment, whether new ownership or simple 
lending, as long as the investing firm owns over 25 per 
cent Cin the South African case) of the foreign firm 
being invested in. It also includes any lending to, or 
purchas~ of stock in, firms owned in greater proportion· 
by other parties in the investor's home country, even if 
the individual investor does not own 25 per cent of the 
firm being invested in. 
3. Alternative terms to "multinational corporation" include 
"multinational enterprise" (MNE), "transnational 
corporation" (TNC), "international firm" and so on. The 
United Nations adopted the term TNC with the creation of 
the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) in 
1974. The choice of "transnational" as opposed to 
"multinational" reflected the insistence of certain 
Latin-American and Caribbean states who wished to 
distinguish between foreigned-owned MNC's and joint 
ventures of two or more participating countries 
established as part of regional integration schemes 
(UNCTC, 1978:159). Notwithstanding the efforts of the 
UNCTC, the term "multinational corporation" has passed 
into common usage (Lumby, 1989). 
CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORICAL ROLE. COMPOSITION. DISTRIBUTION AND PENETRATION 
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POST-WAR SOUTH AFRICA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a broad overview of the South African 
experience of FDI since the war, with the emphasis falling on 
the contemporary period partly because of its relevance for 
policy and partly because of the availability of data. In 
general, when examining such issues as the composition, 
distribution and penetration of FDI, either official data 
sources publi~hed by the South African Reserve· Bank or those 
constructed by the author (see section 4.3 below) have been 
used. There is some controversy about the accuracy of official 
figures (Kahn, 1991b; Smit and Mocke, 1991) but they remain a 
valuable time 
sources such as 
the I.M.F. 
series and are more comprehensive 
International Finance Statistics 
than other 
published by 
In keeping with this broad-based approach, the chapter starts 
with an historical summary of the role played by FDI flows in 
South African economic development till 1988. Focusing on the 
post-war period, the next section analyses the composition of 
the various flows of aggregate foreign investment in order to 
distinguish FDI from non-FDI and examine how it has altered 
over time. The section following this investigates the 
distribution of FDI according to various criteria such as 
geographical origin, location, and manufacturing industry 
group. This is followed by a discussion of the meaning and 
extent of penetration and of the significance of the under-
development of the capital goods industry (which is a theme we 
return to in Chapter 3 when dealing with the question of 
foreign technology in more detail). The chapter ends with a 
summary and conclusion. 
Drawing from the theory in Chapter 1 above, an important 
consideration is whether the pattern of FDI and factor 
intensities has resulted in immiserizing growth as a result of 
the policy of tariff protection pursued as part of a wider 
policy of impo:rt substitution since before the war. Likewise, 
the impact of FDI on the international terms of trade is 
examined for evidence of immiserizing growth. Unfortunately, 
the conclusions reached about this issue in section 4.4 are 
ambiguous because of 
growth and which 
the numerous factors which impinge on 
one cannot hold constant empirically. 
Nevertheless, at face value it appears that immiserizing growth 
owing to domestic distortions may well have occurred, 
particularly during the era of "strategic industries" and 
economic sanctions when comparative advantage was deemed by the 
government to be less important in the allocation of resources. 
Given South Africa's relative insignificance as a price-setter 
in world markets, it is much less likely that immiserizing 
growth has occurred owing to foreign distortions. 
2. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Prior to the 11 discovery111 of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886, 
what is today South Africa was a geographically isolated, pre-
industrial society, relying almost exclusively on agriculture 
as a means of subsistence. The lack of markets and inadequate 
transport facilities militated against the accumulation of 
surplus wealth for investment purposes, and in the absence of 
easily exploitable natural resources there was little to 
attract capital from abroad2 . This situation was rapidly 
reversed by the discovery of diamonds and gold, the immediate 
effects of which have been described by Houghton (1964:13) as 
follows: 
"Gold and diamonds between them brought about an economic 
revolution in the sub-continent which, both for the 
speed with which it was accomplished and for its 
far-reaching consequences upon the whole character of 
the country, is without parallel elsewhere in the world 
except perhaps where a backward country has struck oil. 
The patriarchal subsistence economy was suddenly drawn 
into the full stream of world economic development. 
Southern Africa became one of the major investment areas 
of the world". 
The inflow of large amounts of private and public investment, 
labour, skills and enterprise which followed the discoveries, 
led to a rapid increase in the rate of economic development: 
South Africa joined the world economy and began to make use of 
foreign resources to further its economic development. 
Although the profitability of the diamond mines enabled the 
industry to self-finance all but an investment of about 20 
million pounds (Frankel, 1938:75), the development of gold 
mining required large outside capital investment. Frankel 
estimates that between 1887 and 1932, 60 per cent of the 
approximately 200 million rand invested, came from foreign 
sources, a figure accounting for nearly one-half of private 
foreign investment at that time. 
According to other estimates by Frankel (1938:158), South 
Africa had received a gross amount of about R1046 million from 
foreign sources by 1936. Gilbert (1933:64), on the other hand, 
believes that an estimated inf low of R800 million between 1886 
and 1910 might be conservative; and Sadie {1949:41) estimates 
a gross inflow of R432 million between 1937 and 1946. 
Accepting the estimates of Frankel and Sadie of gross inf lows 
of capital between 1870 and 1946, it appears that private 
capital represented almost 70 per cent. of total foreign 
investment over this period (Van der Suy Heyns, 1967:23). 
Clearly, before the Second World War, foreign investment played 
a major role in the development of the mining sector, 
especially if public investment in mining-related 
infrastructure, such as the railways, is taken into account. On 
this broader definition, Frankel believes that more than half 
of the gross foreign investment before 1932 was in those 
extractive industries that lay the foundations for the rapid 
growth of secondary industry in the post-war period. 
The diversification of the economy through the expansion of the 
manufacturing sector has been the most important structural 
change of the twentieth century. This growth has occurred in 
several distinct phases, as first agriculture, and then mining 
have been eclipsed as the largest single component of National 
Income. Prior to the Second World War mining was still 
dominant though manufacturing had expanded considerably, 
principally as a result of the deliberate strategy of tariff 
protection introduced by the PACT government in 1924. 
No figures appear available on the specific contribution of FDI 
to this expansion, but the number of resident establishments 
grew from 3638 in 1915/16, when the first industrial census was 
taken, to 9642 in 1945/6 (Lumby, 1983:202,224). Part of this 
growth was probably owing to the "natural" protection afforded 
by the First and Second World wars, but as domestic markets 
grew, manufacturing was encouraged, and a gradual shift of 
private foreig~ investment from primary to secondary industry 
occurred. In addition, the policy of tariff protection 
followed since the 1920's had the effect of encouraging foreign 
companies to establish local branches and subsidiaries (Sadie, 
1949:47). Manufacturing as a share of National Income grew 
from 6,7 per cent in 1912 to 9,8 per cent in 1918, 11,9 per 
cent in 1925 and 17,7 per cent in 1939 (Lumby, 1983:220). As a 
result of the foreign investment in mining and manufacturing 
before 1945 outlined above, the country entered the post-war 
period in a situation of international indebtedness. 
Following the Second World War, the pattern of foreign 
investment began to change, with a growing emphasis on 
investment in manufacturing. As before the war, the expansion 
of secondary industry was dependent on the prosperity of gold 
mining, and manufacturing continued to be a large net user of 
foreign exchange. Notwithstanding this structural deficiency 
in the economy, the sophistication of industry increased 
considerably after 1945, with production passing through the 
first phase of producing consumer goods on to the more complex 
phase of producing intermediate and capital goods. In this 
manufacturing investment, as in the continuing investment in 
mining, foreign capital continued to play an important role by 
supplementing domestic savings, transferring advanced 
technology and easing the balance of payments constraint. 
Frankel estimates that of the total amount of R600 million 
invested in the private sector between 1870 and 1936, 67 per 
cent was in mining, 13 per cent in commerce, agriculture and 
industry, and 20 per cent in real estate, financial and 
investment companies (1938:76), whilst Sadie estimates that the 
major share of private investment between 1937 and 1946 was in 
gold mining, with no more than R60 million being invested in 
manufacturing. However, by the early 1970's, 40 per cent of 
foreign investment was in manufacturing and 25 per cent in the 
financial and business service sector, whilst only 15 per cent 
was still invested in mining (Nattrass, 1988:85). 
It is difficult to be certain of any changes in the sectoral 
distribution of foreign investment that may have occurred since 
then because the basis on which the Reserve Bank compiles the 
figures was altered in The Third Census of Foreign 
Transactions, Liabilities and Assets (1982). The effect of 
this alteration is to increase the share of the financial and 
\ 
business service sector by including in it the figures for 
financial holding companies, which were previously classified 
according to the activities of subsidiaries. According to this 
census, in 1986 32 per cent of total foreign investment was in 
finance and business services, 21 per cent in manufacturing and 
only 7 per cent in mining. The corresponding figures for direct 
investment only, give a different picture however: 38 per cent 
in finance and business services; 37 per cent in 
manufacturing; and 5 per cent in mining. 
A further complication is that the growing politicisation of 
foreign investment3, accompanied by disinvestment in the 
1980's, makes it difficult to keep track of capital stocks and 
flows owing to official suppression of the relevant statistics 
and evasion of exchange control regulations. This obstacle can 
be overcome by consulting alternative sources, although these 
may not always be so reliable or consistent (Kahn, 1991; Smit 
and Mocke, 1991). 
From the end of 1956, when comprehensive data first became 
available, the country's net international indebtedness, i.e. 
the difference between its foreign liabilities and foreign 
assets, increased steadily at an average annual rate of about 
10 pe~ cent (in nominal terms) from R2067 million to R22224 
million at the end of 1981 (van der Merwe and Bester, 1983: 
24). This trend continued up to 1985 but was reversed in 1986 
when net international indebtedness fell by 8 per cent. More 
recent figures are not available, although Leape {1991) and 
Garner and Leape (1991) have produced more recent estimates of 
South Africa's borrowings abroad after the debt crisis in 
August 1985. 
It appears then that, historically speaking, secular changes in 
the pattern of economic activity have been accompanied by 
changes in the pattern of foreign investment. The remainder of 
this chapter discusses post-war changes in the composition, 
distribution and penetration of foreign investment, especially 
FDI, against the background of the international economy and of 
economic development in South Africa. 
3. THE POST-WAR COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
3.1 Growth and Fluctuations in Net International 
Indebtedness 
The inflow of capital during the first decade after the Second 
World War increased sharply as compared with pre-1946 inflows. 
For example, du Plessis (1958:61) has estimated a net inflow of 
private capital between 1910 and 1945 of R453 million, whilst 
combining Frankel and Sadie's estimates for the period 1870 to 
1946 gives a figure of R1030 million. In comparison, a net 
inflow of Rl528 million was recorded between 1946 and 1955 
(S.A. Reserve Bank·), and although these figures do not take 
into account changes in the value of money, it is clear that 
the rate of absorption of private foreign investment increased 
in the decade after the War. 
From the end of 1956, when comprehensive data first became 
available, it has been possible to establish far more 
accurately the magnitude and composition of foreign capital 
flows. Table 2.1 indicates the magnitude, annual changes and 
relation to GNP of South Africa's real (rand value) net 
international indebtedness, i.e. foreign liabilities less 
foreign assets in rand and adjusted for inflation, for the 
thirty-three years 1956 to 1988. Gold reserves are excluded 
from net international 
distort comparisons over 
valuation. From the end 
indebtedness figures, because they 
time owing to fluctuations in gold 
of 1956, the· country's real net 
indebtedness increased from R8202 million to international 
R29508 million in 1985, an increase of 360 
1985 there has been a sharp decline in 
per cent. Since 
real indebtedness. 
Decreases were recorded in nine out of thirty years, 
predominantly in three periods, the early 1960's, the late 
1970's, and the period following the so-called "debt crisis" 
in the late 1980's. The decline in the early 1960's is 
reflected in the lower annual percentage growth rates of real 
GDP in the late 1950's and early 1960's associated with 
the downward phases of the business cycle between 
February 1958 to March 1959, and May 1960 to August 1961 
(Smit and van der Walt, 1982:44). 
The declines in the 1970's and 1980's, though complicated by 
politically-induced capital flight, are also a reflection of 
the structural imbalances in the South African economy that 
emerged after 1972. For example, between 1956 and 1971 the 
TABLE 2.1 
SOUTH AFRICA'S REAL NET INTERNATIONAL INDEBTEDNESS 
1956 - 19884 
Rm (excluding Real Annual Annual % 
At the gold reserves) Percentage Percentage Growth 
end of in Constant Growth of of GNP Rates of 
Prices (1980=100) Indebtedness Real GDP 
1956 8202 - 50.4 5.0 
1957 8471 3.3 50.4 3.8 
1958 8764 3.4 52.4 3.1 
1959 8478 -3.2 48.5 4.4 
1960 8822 4.0 47.9 5.2 
1961 8311 -5.8 43.7 4.2 
1962 7944 -4.4 39.6 5.6 
1963 7976 .4 35.9 7.3 
1964 8342 4.6 35.0 6.7 
1965 8918 6.9 35.6 6.0 
1966 9587 7.5 36.4 4.3 
1967 9829 2.5 34.4 6.8 
1968 11741 19.4 38.7 4.3 
1969 12682 8.0 38.4 6.1 
1970 14227 12.2 41.4 5.2 
1971 16561 16.4 46.2 5.4 
1972 17042 2.9 44.8 2.2 
1973 16926 -.7 39.4 3.5 
1974 18852 11.4 39.9 6.8 
1975 21415 13.6 46.2 -.4 
1976 23986 12.0 50.9 • 3 
1977 23288 -2.9 49.8 -.1 
1978 21773 -6.5 44.4 4.4 
1979 20781 -4.5 35.3 5.0 
1980 17516 -15.7 28.7 10.7 
1981 19646 12.2 33.0 1.4 
1982 21596 9.9 32.1 -.4 
1983 22191 2.7 33.2 -.1 
1984 28660 29.1 45.4 5.4 
1985 29508 2.9 47.6 .1 
1986 19602 -33.6 31.6 .6 
1987 12919 -34.1 19.8 2~4 
1988 12333 -4.0 18.0 3.4 
Sources: c. Jenkins (1986:70); South African Statistics 1986; 
SA Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, September 1990. 
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average annual growth rate of real GDP was 5,2 per cent, 
whereas between 1972 and 1986 it was 2,8 per cent, record gold 
prices notwithstanding. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, 
fluctuations in real net indebtedness have increased markedly, 
with movements of more than 25 per cent in 1981 and 1984, and 
nearly 35 per cent in 1986 and 1987. These wide fluctuations 
were a response to changes in the regulations governing foreign 
exchange, which were themselves a response to changes in the 
political climate. For example, it has been estimated that 
following the abolition of the financial rand in 1983, foreign 
investments worth some R2.05 billion were liquidated (Razis, 
1986:214). 
As a ratio of GNP, real net indebtedness fell from 52 per cent 
in 1958 to 35 per cent in 1964, then rose again to 51 per cent 
in 1976, before falling to 18 per cent in 1988: the average 
ratio between 1956 and 1971 was 42,2 per cent, and between 1972 
and 1986 37,6 per cent. The sharp drop in the ratio after 1985 
was caused by disinvestment and debt repayments on the one hand 
(Leape, 1991), and increased outward investment on the other 
(Innes, 1989). 
A useful summary of some of the reasons underlying annual 
fluctuations in net international indebtedness between 1956 and 
1981 is given by van der Merwe and Bester (1983:23). 
"Annual changes in net international indebtedness were 
influenced to a large extent by the prevailing rates of 
economic growth and by the existing overall balance of 
payments position. During periods of relatively high 
' FIGURE 2.1 
SOUTH AFRICA'S REAL NET INTERNATIONAL INDEBTEDNESS AND 
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growth in the domestic economy, the net international 
indebtedness generally increased at a more rapid rate 
owing to sharp increases in the inflow of capital for 
the financing of infrastructural development and other 
forms of fixed investment. Changes in the balance of 
payments position contributed materially to fluctuations 
in net international indebtedness, particularly during 
the nineteen-seventies. At times, the authorities had 
to borrow substantial amounts of short-term funds abroad 
to support the level of the foreign exchange holdings, 
while on other occasions the improvement in the balance 
of payments position allowed for the repayment of such 
loans. In addition, exchange control over capital 
outflows was applied more leniently during periods when 
the level of the gold and other foreign reserves 
permitted, and vice versa". 
Van der Merwe and Bester omit from this summary the crucial 
role played by political factors in the determination of the 
pattern of net indebtedness. The high visibility, and 
consequent vulnerability of foreign investment to international 
pressure designed to isolate South Africa, was an overriding 
factor during the 1970s and (especially) the 1980s, and it is 
largely responsible for the changes in the direction of capital 
flows and composition of investment during this time shown in 
Table 2.2 below. 
Whilst real net international indebtedness is a useful measure 
of al+ (i.e. inward and outward capital) flows, we need to 
narrow the focus of our study.by concentrating 9n inward flows, 
which is the topic of the next section. 
3.2 The Changing Composition of Foreign (Inward) Investment 
Despite the fact that accurate estimates of the types of 
foreign investment inf lows are not available for the period 
before 1956, Sadie (1949:47) believes that only about 2~ per 
cent of private debt was non-direct, i.e. in the form of 
interest-bearing securities in 1946. Since the major portion 
of private foreign investment was in gold mining, which was 
extensively under foreign control at the time, it seems clear 
that most of the private foreign investment was of the FDI type 
prior to 1956. Reserve Bank figures show that direct private 
investment constituted 61,7 per cent and indirect private 
investment 38,3 per cent in 1956 respectively. On the other 
hand, it is not clear how concentrated the ownership of direct 
investment was, given the method of raising equity for the gold 
mines on the London Stock Exchange at the time. 
From 1956 to 1972, foreign liabilities were defined by the 
Reserve Bank as all investment by foreigners in organisations 
in South Africa in which control was exercised from abroad; 
and vice versa for foreign assets. This definition was changed· 
in 1973 to bring South Africa into line with I.M.F. practice. 
From 1973 direct investment was defined as (a) the total 
investment by foreigners in organisations in South Africa in 
which ~ have a controlling interest and the investment in 
these organisations of their affiliates and allied 
organisations or persons in foreign countries; and (b) vice 
versa for outward investment. The term direct investment from 
1973 is, therefore, limited to investment of the controlling 
person or organisation, its affiliates and allied organisations 
or persons in their own South African operations. The 
ownership of 25 per cent or more of total issued voting stock, 
or comparable ownership, or voting rights, is regarded as a 
controlling interest. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, real foreign investment since the 
war has more than doubled. At the same time this has been 
accompanied by some marked 
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). 
changes in its composition (see 
The ratio of direct investment to 
total foreign investment increased uninterruptedly from 49,6 
per cent at the end of 1956 to 61,1 per cent at the end of 
1969. After that it declined to 33,5 per cent at the end of 
1985, as the result of a combination of factors the 
substantial increase in non-FD!, the slow down in the rate of 
economic growth, and the increased political and social 
pressures on MNC's in South Africa to curtail their direct 
investment act'ivities, which were more visible. 
c. Jenkins (1986:86) has argued that FDI, unlike non-direct 
investment, is insensitive to political factors, and depends on 
the perceptions of long-term business prospects. However, when 
net capital flows are considered (see Chapter 4), it emerges 
that FD! is also sensitive to political factors in the 
short-term. 
Short term fluctuations and longer term changes in the 
composition of foreign investment must be seen against the 
background of both national and international trends. Inter-
nationally, FD! has been rising and falling, mainly rising, 
throughout the twentieth century. Its fastest period of growth 
TABLE 2.2 
REAL FOREIGN (INWARD) INYESTMENT STOCK 
TOTAL. GROWTH RATES AND COMPOSITION. 1956 - 1988 
(1980 = 100) 
Total Foreign Growth Rate Direct Indirect 
At the Investment of Total Investment Investment 
end of Rm Foreign ~ ~ 0 0 
Investment l1c-0 
1956 10,897 - 49.6 50.4 
1957 11,011 1.0 50.2 49.8 
1958 11,347 3.0 51.6 48.4 
1959 11,533 1.6 52.2 47.8 
1960 11,720 1.6 52.2 47.8 
1961 11,485 -2.0 52.5 47.5 
1962 11,501 .1 54.6 45.4 
1963 11,653 1.3 56.0 44.0 
1964 11,939 2.4 57.0 43.0 
1965 12,725 6. 6 . 57. 0 . 43.0 
1966 13,807 8.5 57.6 42.4 
1967 14,079 2.0 58.1 41.9 
1968 16', 405 16.5 59.0 41.0 
1969 17,606 7.3 61.1 38.9 
1970 19,648 11.6 59.0 41.0 
1971 20,993 6.8 54.5 45.5 
1972 23,502 11.9 54.8 45.2 
1973 23,324 -.7 53.9 46.1 
1974 25,723 10.3 52.4 47.6 
1975 29,300 13.9 45.2 54.8 
1976 31,750 8.4 41.4 58.6 
1977 30,921 -2.6 40.9 59.1 
1978 29,972 -3.1 42.5 57.5 
1979 26,338 -12.1 44.9 55.1 
1980 26,008 -1.2 48.3 51.7 
1981 28,634 10.1 45.9 54.1 
1982 30,738 7.3 43.5 56.5 
1983 31,570 2.7 41.8 58.2 
1984 41,074 30.1 38.5 61.5 
1985 43,334 5.5 33.5 66.5 
1986 32,404 -25.2 38.3 61.7 
1987 26,007 -19.7 38.4 61.6 
1988 24,14~ -7.2 37.4 62.6 
Sources: "Statistical Presentation of South Africa's 
Foreign Liabilities and Assets, 1956 to 1981"; 
supplement to SA Reserve'Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, 












Source: Table 2.2 






was in the postwar period dating 
(1950-53) to the first oil price 
roughly from the Korean War 
shock (1973-74) (Lindert, 
1986:564). Since the early 1970s FDI has grown more slowly, 
being eclipsed by two waves of portfolio lending - firstly, the 
ill-fated surge of lending to developing countries in 1974-81 
that followed the relaxation of exchange rates and the 
emergence of private sources of international capital, and 
secondly, 
1980s5 . 
the surge of lending to the United Sates in the 
FDI has also changed direction, moving away from the 
Third world, where it met with resistance and expropriations 
climaxing in the 1970s, towards the United States which changed 
from being the largest exporter of FDI to the largest recipient 
in the 1980s. 
Although the collapse in commodity prices and large debt 
overhang in many developing countries which gave rise to the 
debt crises of the 1980s has seen some revival of interest in 
FDI along the lines of debt for equity (or indirect for direct 
investment) swaps (Stewart, 1985), the sheer volume of out-
standing debt and the much smaller capitalisation value of LDC 
stockmarkets are major obstacles to this solution (UNCTC, 
1988:25). Debt-into-equity proposals have also met with 
overwhelming hostility from host countries for political as 
well as economic reasons. Third World countries have in fact 
switched from taxing and nationalizing FDI, to wooing it with 
special tax breaks. 
- ------ -------------------------------------
From Figure 2.2 we can see that FDI in South Africa grew as a 
proportion of total foreign investment until 1969, and started 
to decline more rapidly in the post-Bretton Woods era, in 
common with the experience of other developing countries. A 
more detailed look at the South African pattern of FDI, such as 
that in Chapter 4, reveals that it has been sensitive to 
political events in the country, with clear benchmarks in 
1960/61, 1976 and 1986. Relatedly, since 1957 the growth rate 
of real GDP has exceeded that of FDI by some 2,5 per cent 
(Table 4.5 q.v.), reflecting a trend towards "indigenisation" 
rather than "denationalisation", as has occurred in Latin 
America and elsewhere. This process is exemplified by the 
experience of the motor industry, the leading manufacturing 
sub-sector (Black, 1991). According to Bell (1990:63), unlike 
experience elsewhere in other low-volume motor vehicle 
producing countries, such as Argentina, Brazil and Australia, 
local capital has dominated the motor industry since the early 
1960s. 
The international trend towards "new forms" of FDI, such as 
joint ventures, licensing agreements etc, has also had a 
significant impact on FDI in South Africa (see Chapter 4), 
especially as pressure to disinvest has escalated and it has 
become politically expedient for MNCs to replace capital 
investment with less visible means of foreign investment 
(Innes, 1989:229). Thus whilst the capital inflow has slowed 
down or even turned negative, 
broadly) have not necessarily 
trend is illustrated by what 
FDI penetration levels (defined 
fallen proportionately. This 
Bell (op cit) has called the 
"Japanification" of the South African motor industry, which 
dates from 1962. The prevention of outward investment from 
Japan by the Japanese government until the 1980s, resulted in 
the drawing up by South African owned firms of licensing 
agreements with Japanese firms, which were the precursors of 
latter-day "disinvestment". 
Another international trend that has affected South African FDI 
is the declining share of Africa as a whole in the world stock 
of FDI. According to the United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations (1988:25) this share has dropped 
from 6,7 per cent in 1975 to 3,5 per cent in 1985. Although 
these figures do not include FDI in South Africa - South 
African figures are assumed away for political reasons - they 
do show that the continent is becoming marginalised, and now 
that new investment opportunities are available in Eastern 
Europe, there is no reason to believe that this trend will be 
reversed. 
Whereas long term capital predominated in the period up to the 
early 1970's, the increase in public sector final expenditure 
and borrowing requirements in the 1970's and 1980's, as well as 
outflows of short term capital, led to the increase in 
so-called "liabilities related to reserves" or compensating 
finance, and thus to greater reliance on short term borrowing. 
Consequently the shift from direct to indirect investment was 
accompanied by a shift towards short-term liabilities, which 
is what one would expect a priori. 
The declining importance of private sector borrowing since the 
early 1970's, is related to the declining levels of 
profitability of direct investment. In Table 2.3 the average 
rate of return on foreign investment in South Africa is shown 
for different periods. This rate refers to the ratio of 
non-residents' dividend and interest receipts plus their share 
in branch and partnership profits, to total foreign investment 
in south Africa, before providing for non-residents' tax (van 
der Merwe and Bester, 1983:30). These figures are not without 
some controversy (see Chapter 4 below), and other estimates, 
including those of the author, give much higher pre- and 
post-tax rates of return. It is not clear why van der Merwe 
and Bester's figures are so low, especially since they 
represent pre-tax rates of return. 
According to Table 2.3, the average rate of return on total 
foreign investment 
1981, fluctuating 
remained relatively constant from 1957 to 
between 6 and 7 per cent. The rate of 
return on direct investment reached a peak in the period 
1967-71, dropping during the 1970s and 1980s. Declining levels 
of profitability (Nattrass, 1990) help to explain why the level 
of FDI has fallen during this period. The bracketed figures 
for FDI are based on the author's estimates of the rate of 
return to FDI·contained in Table 4.4. These give a somewhat 
different picture for 1977-1981 when rates of return were at 
record levels, probably owing to a high average gold price. 
TABLE 2.3 









IN SOUTH AFRICA. 1957 TO 1981 
Direct Indirect Total 
Investment Investment Investment 
6,5 (12,8) 6,5 6,5 
6,3 (15,5) 6,6 6,4 
7,1 (16,7) 6,7 6,9 
5,5 (14,1) 7,4 6,5 
5,6 (17,8) 8,2 7,0 
(15,8) 
van der Merwe and Bester (1983:31); author's 
Table 4.4. 
From a foreign investor's viewpoint, it is also important to 
distinguish between those rates of return expressed in foreign 
currency and those expressed in rand because of the difference 
between the external value of the commercial and financial 
rands. The financial rate might be termed the risk adjusted 
rate of return, where the premium reflects (a lack of) 
foreign confidence in South Africa. There has effectively 
been a dual exchange rate mechanism in operation since the 
early 1960s, so that from the foreign investor's viewpoint the 
rate of return includes a premium. 
one also has to bear in mind the difference between nominal and 
real rates of return, an added complication when inter-country 
comparisons are made because of different domestic inflation 
rates. Inter-country comparison of rates of return is 
therefore problematic because it is not clear whether the 
domestic (rand) or external (risk-adjusted) rate of return is 
the appropriate means of comparison, nor whether the rates have 
been adjusted for inflation differentials. 
The average annual difference between the external price 
of the commercial and financial rands as a percentage of 
the commercial rand for the period 1974 to 19.90 is given in 
Table 2.4. 
As a result of the changing composition of foreign investment, 
the risk rate has also changed over the years. In the 1960's 
more risk capital in the form of direct dividend yielding 
90 
TABLE 2.4 




















Source: SA Reserve Bank, Quarterl~ Bulletin, 
various issues 
* During 1983 and 1984 the rand was unified. 
I 
investments was attracted, whereas in 
1980's loan capital was relatively more 
towards interest-bearing liabilities is 
the 1970's and early 
important. The trend 
clearly illustrated by 
comparing interest payments accruing to foreigners to the total 
dividend outflow. This debt-service ratio increased from an 
average of 17 per cent between 1965 and 1969, to 174 per cent 
for the period 1980-1988 (S.A. Reserve Bank). 
4. THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
4.1 Geographical Origin6 and Type of Investment 
With the exception of Japan, the countries of origin of foreign 
investment have been those with whom trade links have been 
maintained7 . Since 1956, the major source has been the 
European Economic Community (EEC), followed by the Americas and 
the other European nations. However, the EEC share has been 
steadily falling from 71,3 per cent in 1956 to 49,4 per cent in 
1988, as indicated in Table 2.5. This relative decline can be 
attributed to the rapid increase in the share of the Americas 
from 14,3 per cent in 1956 to 26,9 per cent in 1988. 
A more detailed breakdown of the geographical origin by country 
is difficult to compile since the relevant official statistics 
were published only until 1960. The most up to date, complete 
and consistent figures are probably those contained in Spandau 
(1979:115), and these only go up to 1976, apart from which some 
figures are open to question, having been "calculated" with 
TABLE 2.5 
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF ORIGIN AS AT SELECTED 
YEAR-ENDS. 1956-1983 (%) 
1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1988 
EEC Countries 71.3 68.3 65.5 63.8 57.2 55.1 50.2 49.4 
Rest of Europe 4.9 5.8 7.1 9.1 9.7 12.9 12.8 11.6 
N & s America 14.3 13.8 16.3 17.5 24.0 23.l 25.1 26.9 
Africa 2.6 3.8 4.9 3.8 2.6 2.4 2.3 1.8 
Asia .9 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.0 3.6 3.5 4.5 
oceania .5 .6 .7 .7 .4 .7 .7 .6 
International 
organisations 4.8 5.9 3.3 2.4 3.2 1.6 4.4 4.0 
Unallocated .7 .8 .8 .8 .9 .6 1.0 1.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: "A statistical presentation of South Africa's foreign liabilities and assets, 
1956 to 1981", Supplement to SA Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, June 1983; 
SA Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, September 1990. 
the least square method, using an exponential growth function. 
According to these figures, reproduced here as Table 2.6, 
substantial changes took place in the country-of-origin·pattern 
between 1956 and 1976. Britain's share decreased from 62 per 
cent to 37 per cent, whilst the u S A's share increased from 12 
to 21 per cent, and the unallocated share from 13 to 20 per 
cent. Both Tables 2.5 and 2.6 support the conclusion that the 
geographical origin of total foreign investment has become more 
diversified since the war. 
As far as FDI is concerned, changes in the area-of-origin 
pattern are less marked than in total foreign investment, at 
least when looking at Reserve Bank figures. Table 2.7 shows 
that the share of the EEC countries decreased from a high of 
77,5 per cent in 1961 to a low of 62,6 per cent in 1981, 
therafter rising slightly to 67,8 per cent in 1988. The share 
of the Rest of Europe increased from 3,0 per cent in 1956 to 
8,6 per cent in 1986, dropping marginally to 7,9 per cent in 
1988. The share of North and South America is more or less the 
mirror image of the EEC countries, rising from 15,8 per cent in 
1961 to 25,5 per cent in 1981, and declining therafter to 20,5 
per cent in 1988. The share of the other geographical areas 
has remained largely static at about 4 to 5 per cent of total 
FDI. 
A more detailed FDI country-of-origin 
ascertained by looking at the work done by 
pattern can be 
Rogerson (1982a, 
1982b) and the author on patterns of indigenous and foreign 
TABLE 2.6 
SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN LIABILITIES. BY CREDITORS, 
1956 TO 1976 CRM) 
PERCENTAGE VALUES IN BRACKETS 
Inter-
Year Great USA France Switzer- Germany national others Total 
Britain land Organi-
zations 
1956 1731 342 147 88 - 134 348 2790 
(62) (12) (5) (3) (5) (13) (100) 
1960 1815 347 168 97 - 203 394 3024 
(60). (11) (6) (3) (7) (13) (100) 
1965 2100 . 454 200 150 - 125 369 3398 
(62) (13) (6) (4) (4) (11) (100) 
1970 3202 812 442 337 339 123 563 . 5818 
(55) (14) (8) (6) (6) (2) (9) (100) 
1971 3696 1033 454 402 382 215 851 7033 
(53) (15) (6) (6) (5) (3) (12) (100) 
1972 4126 1348 467 480 433 235 697 7786 
(53) (17) (6) (6) (6) (3) (9) (100) 
1973 4545 1687 507 572 500 208 2361 10380 
(44) (16) (6) (6) (5) (2) (22) (100) 
1974 5062 2429 551 683 1088 205 2761 12757 
(40) (19) (4) (5) (8) (1) (23) (100) 
1975 6490 3121 691 939 1631 230 .3348 16450 
(39) (19) (4) (6) (10) (1) (21) (100) 
1976 7470 4200 795 1080 1877 797 3710 19929 
(37) (21) ( 4) (5) (9) (4) (20) (100) 
Source: Spandau, 1979:116. 
TABLE 2.7 
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY 
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF ORIGIN AS AT SELECTED 
YEAR-ENDS. 1956-1983 (%) 
1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1988 
EEC Countries 76.3 77.5 71.8 70.0 63.8 62.6 66.3 67.8 
Rest of Europe 3.0 3.8 5.7 6.3 7.8 8.3 8.6 7.9 
N & s America 18.7 15.8 19.2 20.8 24.4 25.5 21.5 20.~ 
Africa 1.0 1.8 2.0 1. 7 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.3 
Asia .3 .3 .4 .4 1.3 1.0 1.2 1. 4 
Oceania .7 .7 .8 .7 .8 1.0 .8 .9 
International 
Organisations - - - - - - - -
Unallocated - .1 .1 .1 .2 .1 .4 .2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: "A statistical presentation of South Africa's foreign liabilities and assets, 
1956 to 1981", Supplement to SA Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, June 1983; 
SA Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, September 1990. 
control of South African (and 
Leaving aside problems associated 
Namibian8 ) manufacturing. 
with the type of research 
methodologies necessary to establish foreign ownership and 
foreign-controlled employment in an environment where official 
data is not available9 , Rogerson finds, not unexpectedly, that 
the United Kingdom and the United States were the two leading 
sources of FDI in 1978. As we see in Table 2.8, measured· 
either in terms of the number of firms or by employment, these 
two countries account for an 80 per cent share of FDI in 
manufacturing in 1978, with West Germany in third place. 
The country-of-origin distribution for 1990 reveals that whilst 
the United Kingdom is still the dominant foreign investor, 
(with 47,3 per 
foreign-contro.lled 
cent of firms 
employment) , 
and 59,9 per 
the United States 
cent of 
(13,0 and 
9,8 per cent respectively) has been overtaken by West Germany 
in terms of employment (11,4 and 11,7 per cent respectively). 
This is not particularly surprising in view of the greater 
pressure for disinvestment in the United States during the 
1980's (C. Jenkins, 1985, Chapter 1). Whereas Rogerson found 
17 French manufacturing firms in 1978, we found that French FDI 
was insignificant in 1990 and did not warrant separate 
treatment in the data base for 1990. On the other hand, it was 
decided to separate out the figures for Taiwan, whose share of 
foreign-controlled employment in manufacturing has expanded 
rapidly during the 1980's (Pickles and Wood, 1989:509), and 
constituted 3,3 per cent of the total in 1990. 
I 
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TABLE 2.8 
FOREIGN-CONTROLLED MANUFACTURING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. 1978. 199olO 
1978 1990 
Firms Employment Firms Employment 
Country 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
· Oni ted Kingdom 551 59.2 210,186 55.7 87 47.3 139,550 59.9 
United States 228 24.5 95,818 25.4 24 13.0 22,960 9.8 
West Germany 67 7.2 25,932 6.9 21 11.4 27,330 11.7 
Switzerland 21 2.3 9,583 2.5 14 7.6 8,920 3.8 
France 18 1.9 7,575 2.0 - - - -
Netherlands 15 1.6 10,409 2.8 6 3.2 5,570 2.4 
Taiwan - - - - 9 5.0 7,740 3.3 
Others* 30 3.3 17,596 4.7 23 12.5 21,070 9.1 
Total 930 100.0 377,099 100.0 184 100.0 233,140 100.0 
lf os /1 
* including Taiwan in 1978 and France in 1990. 
Source: Rogerson, 1982a; author's data bank. 
I~ C) I 
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Although definitional discrepancies between Rogerson's data 
base and those of the author are, at face value, minimal, the 
unexpectedly large difference in the number of foreign-
controlled firms identified in the manufacturing sector in 1978 
and 1990 makes one cautious about the comparability of the data 
sets, according to which foreign-controlled employment declined 
by 37,2 per cent between 1978 and 1990. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that as far as the distribution by country-of-origin of 
FDI in the manufacturing sector is concerned, the field remains 
dominated by the United Kingdom. 
For the remainder, it appears that the ·distribution is 
gradually diversifying with the drawing down of United States 
involvement. Broadly speaking, the country-of-origin 
distribution mirrors international experience, with the major 
industrial countries being the chief sources of capital. The 
predominance of the U.K. is a little unusual but this simply 
reflects the strong historical ties between the two countries. 
According to Dunning (1988:80), during the early post-war 
period, first South Africa and Australia and then Canada 
attracted the bulk of new UK direct investment, whereas us 
firms were focusing attention on Canada and Western Europe. 
4.2 Location of FDI in South Africa 
Research into the spatial distribution of FDI in South Africa 
is in its infancy. Only Rogerson (1982a, 1982b) has directly 
addressed this issue. He found (1982a:200) that over half of 
all foreign-controlled employment occurs in the Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area; and that secondary nodes of 
concentration exist in the metropolitan Cape Town, Durban and 
Port Elizabeth regions. Taken together these four regions 
accounted for 83 per cent of foreign-controlled employment in 
1978. This figure is greater (87 per cent) for heavy industry 
(fabricated metals, machinery and equipment; and chemicals, 
rubber and plastics) and smaller (65 per cent) for light 
industry (food, beverages and tobacco; and textiles, clothing 
and leather). According to Rogerson, there seems little 
evidence to support the view that the factors which determine 
the location of FD! are in any way different to those affecting 
locally-owned firms (Yannopoulos and Dunning, 1976:389). 
Statistical tests done by him show that in South Africa the 
spatial· distributions of foreign-controlled and indigenous 
employment are.remarkably similar. Nor does there appear to be 
any great locational variation between foreign firms of 
differing nationalities (1982a:215). 
An interesting exception to this is Taiwanese investment in 
South Africa. As part of the government's regional economic 
policy, industrial incentives have been given to firms located 
in designated decentralization areas (for example, Rosslyn near 
Pretoria, East London, Brits, Rustenberg, Pietersburg and 
Ladysmith). As relative latecomers, the Taiwanese have been 
able to avail themselves of these benefits to a greater extent 
than traditional investing countries. Furthermore, the refusal 
of the authorities to grant permanent resident status to 
Taiwanese nationals until very recently, led many of them to 
set up operations in the homelands, especially those such as 
Ciskei and .Transkei, 
avalable (Rogerson, 
where economic incentives were 
1986; Pickles and Woods, 1989). 
also 
AS· a 
result, virtually all Taiwanese investment is in the homelands, 
and particularly in Transkei, Bophuthatswana, · Venda and 
Ciskei. 
A further reason why the relatively footloose Taiwanese firms 
have set up operations in the homelands is that they benefit 
from the low wages paid in these areas. High levels of 
unemployment, the absence of trade unions, and repressive 
labour legislation mean that wage levels are as much as a third 
and commonly a half of those in the metropolitan areas. In the 
early 1980's, unskilled wages for men in the homelands averaged 
R107 per month, compared with R285 in urban areas. For 
unskilled women the disparity was even greater: R94 per month 
in the homelands and R279 per month in the urban areas (Dewar, 
Todes and Watson, 1984:81). Even without the decentralization 
incentives, labour remains extremely cheap in the homelands, 
though whether this will remain so in the future is an open 
question with the recent legalisation of trade unions in 
Transkei and Ciskei, and mooted changes in the South African 
tax code which will treat trade across the frontiers of the 
TBVC states as exports and imports from South Africa. Should 
the homelands be incorporated into South Africa this tax 
position will presumably fall away. 
4.3 Distribution of FDI by kind of Economic Activity 
Data on the distribution of FDI by kind of economic activity 
has been published by the Reserve Bank for 1980 and 1986 and is 
shown in Table 2.9. From the table it is evident that the 
majority of FDI occurred in manufacturing, finance, insurance 
and business services, wholesale and retail trade and mining 
and quarrying11 . An interesting feature is the fall in the 
relative importance of both mining and quarrying, and of 
manufacturing, and the rise in relative importance of insurance 
and business services between 1980 and 1986. 
Historically, in other middle-income LDCs like Brazil, Turkey 
and Mexico, over 75 per cent of FDI has been in manufacturing, 
but in general this proportion is much lower in other 
developing countries, where extractive industry is more 
important (Reuber, 1973:4; Erdilek, 1982:254-6). However, a 
major change occurred during the 1980s, with a substantial 
worldwide shift in the composition of both the stock and flow 
of FDI 'towards services. By the mid-1980s, about 40 per cent 
of the world stock and half annual flows were in services 
(UNCTC, 1988:4). Whilst most of the growth in services FDI has 
been confined to the developed market economies, some LDCs are 
now participating; especially those offering offshore financial 
havens or flags of convenience. Broadly speaking, Asian 
countries have higher shares of services in total FDI than do 
countries in Latin America. Thus the switch to services in 
South Africa is mirrored in the recent experience of several 
TABLE 2.9 
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY FOR 1980 AND 1986 
1980 1986 
SECTOR 
(Rm) % (Rm) % 
Agriculture, Forestry 103 .8 131 .5 
and Fishing 
Mining and Quarrying 1001 8.1 1484 5.4 
Manufacturing 5046 41.0 10150 36.8 
Electicity, Gas and 9 .o 11 .o 
Water 
Construction 90 .7 82 .3 
Wholesale and Retail 2058 16.7 4535 16.5 
Trade 
Transport, storage 122 1.2 180 .6 
and Communication 
Finance, Insurance and 3802 30.9 10571 38.4 
Business Services 
community Services 6 .o 13 .1 
Other 187 .7 569 .4 
TOTAL 12313 100.0 27551 100.0 
sources: SA Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues; 
"Third Census of Foreign Transactions, Liabilities and 
Assets, 31 December 1980", supplement to SA Reserve 
Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, December 1982. 
other developing countries as indicated in Table 2.10. It is 
also interesting to note that the absolute share of services 
FDI in South Africa lies about mid-way in the spectrum of 
service sector shares amongst LDCs. 
In general, the attitude of host country governments towards 
services FDI is one of caution because it is perceived as 
contributing little to the local economy in terms of exports, 
import substitution and technology transfer. Whether this 
attitude will change in view of the growing awareness of the 
role of modern services in development, is an open question. 
Certainly, there is no doubt that services FDI runs a poor 
second to manufacturing FDI in terms of direct employment 
creation. For example, 1982 data for us outward investment 
indicates that, on average, 2,3 jobs were created for every 
.. 
$100,000 invested in services, whilst in manufacturing, the ·, 
coefficient was 5,3. Although the situation is obviously much 
more complex than such a crude comparison may suggest (owing to 
variations in individual components), both theory and evidence 
support this general conclusion (UNCTC, 1988:454). 
The employment intensity of different types of economic 
activity has implications for the measurement of the importance 
of FDI. For example, the conventional method of measuring FDI 
in terms of stocks and flows can give a totally different 
picture to one that uses assets or output or even employment. 
In the case of the US, the use of assets as a yardstick raises 
the share of services FDI from 37 per cent to 69 per cent, 
,_. 
TABLE 2.10 
SHARE OF SERVICES IN TOTAL FDI AMONGST 
SELECTED LDCS FOR VARIOUS YEARS 
COUNTRY YEAR % SHARE 
Argentina 1981 25 
1985 26 
Brazil 1971 16 
1985 22 
Chile 1973 27 
1983 33 
Mexico 1971 19 
1981 23 
Hong Kong 1981 55 
Indonesia 1977 11 
1985 10 
Korea 1980 23 
1986 27 
Malaysia 1972 37 
1984 40 
Singapore 1970 55 
1981 51 
Taiwan 1985 23 
1986 23 
Egypt 1979 57 
1984 45 
Morocco 1975 48 
1982 54 
Nigeria 1975 20 
1982 37 
Zimbabwe 1982 34 
South Africa* 1980 31 
1986 38 
source: UNCTC (1988:380/1) 
* see Table 2.9 
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almost double: the use of employment, on the other hand, drops 
it to 26 per cent (UNCTC, 1988:371). Measurement, therefore, 
becomes quite arbitrary, and can lead to some confusion 
(R. Jenkins, 1987:10). 
In the case of South Africa, we have chosen to focus attention 
on the manufacturing sector despite the fact that in terms of 
financial stocks it was slightly smaller than services in 1986 
37 as opposed to 38 per cent - partly because the theory 
suggests manufacturing FDI is more important to development, 
and partly because there is far more information both 
nationally and internationally on manufacturing. Furthermore, 
t 
manufacturing is the most highly penetrated kind of economic 
activity (21 and 12 per cent in 1980 and 1986 respectively) as 
compared with services (11 and 8 per cent) (see Table 2.11). 
Analytically, it does not matter which sector is the larger 
because the issues are, to a greater or lesser degree, the same 
for each: Manufacturing and services combined received 75 per 
cent of all inward FDI by value in south Africa in 1986. 
4.4 Distribution of FDI by Manufacturing Industry Group· 
More detailed information on manufacturing for 1978 and 1990 is 
shown in Table 2.11 which is constructed from Rogerson (1982b) 
and the author's data base. It shows the industry breakdown 
of foreign-controlled employment according to Standard 




THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN-CONTROLLED EMPLOYMENT 
BY INDUSTRY GROUP. 1978 AND 1990 
1978 1990 
SIC.Group Employment .9-'. 0 Employment 
Food, beverages 42,637 11.3 14,060 
and tobacco 
Textiles, clothing 33,092 8.8 38,790 
and leather 
Wood and wood 5,468 1.5 1,470 
products 
Paper and paper 16,298 4.3 3,450 
products 
Chemicals, rubber 70,100 18.6 69,020 
and plastics 
Non-metallic 20,570 5.5 21,350 
minerals 
Basic Metals 18,263 4.8 4,50d 
Fabricated metals, 
machinery and 169,076 44.8 80,200 
equipment 
Other Manuf ac- 1,595 .4 300 
turing 
TOTALS 377,099 100.0 233,140 













Although there may be problems C';Jmparing the absolute 
employment figures because of variations in the data bases, the 
industrial mix of foreign-controlled employment in 1978 and 
1990 is not dissimilar. Foreign control is concentrated in the 
heavy industrial sectors of chemicals, rubber and plastics, and 
fabricated metals, machinery and equipment. In 1978 these two 
accounted for 63,4 per cent of total foreign-controlled 
employment, and in 1990, 64 per cent, although the respective 
shares of the two sectors differ considerably. In the light 
industrial sectors it is noticeable that foreign-controlled 
employment has become more concentrated in textiles, clothing 
and leather, which has increased from 8,8 per cent to 16,6 per 
cent. One suspects that this is largely owing to the increase 
in Taiwanese investment in South Africa since 1978 (see Table 
2.8). In general, the distribution of FDI by 'industry group is 
uneven and highly concentrated in three or four sectors. 
This matches international experience elsewhere, although 
country specific factors also play a role. For example, 
between 1953 and 1976, 83 per cent of FDI in Greek 
manufacturing occurred in heavy industry (Parris, 1981:99). It 
also corroborates the theory 
oligopolistic industries 




technology-intensive products and economies of scale. The 
increase in FDI in textiles is probably related to low labour 
costs, tariff protection and government subsidies during the 
1980s. 
According to the theory outlined in Chapter 1, in the case of 
domestic distortions, foreign investment is likely to be 
immiserising if it goes to capital-intensive tariff-protected 
industries. From Table 2.11 we can see that FDI has 
unquestionably flowed to capital-intensive industry, but, 
interestingly, studies of effective rates of tariff protection 
in South Africa (Holden, 1974; Holden and Holden, 1978), show 
that these industries have received less effective protection 
than more labour-intensive ones. "An early study of effective 
tariff protection (Holden, 1974) shows an average level of 15 
per cent on goods for domestic consumption, 6 per cent on 
intermediate goods and 2 per cent on capital goods in 1963/64" 
(Holden, 1990a:262). 
on the other hand, a more recent study done by the Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis (see Holden, 1990a) reaches less clear 
cut conclusions for 1984/5. According to their calculations of 
effective rates of protection (see Table 2.12) those industries 
with the highest rates were synthetic resins, plastics and man-
made fibres, other manufacturing, paint and other chemical 
products, other plastic products, rubber products and footwear. 
These industries are principally of intermediate capital 
intensity. The lowest rates of effective protection occurred 
in tobacco products, machinery, printing and publishing and 
other transport equipment; a decidedly mixed bag in terms of 
capital intensity. 
TABLE 2.12 
EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR 1984/85 (%) 
Meat, Dairy Products and Fish Processing 
Grain, Sugar and Animal Feeds 
Other Processed Food 
Beverage Industries 
Tobacco Products 
Wool Scouring, Cotton·Ginning and Dyeing 
Spinning, Weaving and Knitting of Textiles 
Clothing 
Leather and Leather Products 
Footwear 
Wood and Wood Products 
Furniture 
Pulp, Paper and Paper Board 
Printing and Publishing 
Fertilizers and Pesticides 
Synthetic Resins, Plastics and Man-Made Fibres 
Other Basic Chemicals · 
Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Preparations 
Soaps and Toiletries 
Paint and Other Chemical Products 
Rubber Products 
Other Plastic Products 
Glass and Glass Products 
Other Non-Metallic Products 
Iron and Steel Basic Industries -
Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Industries 
Other Fabricated Metals 
Machinery other than Electrical 
Electrical Machinery 
Motor Vehicles and Parts 
Other Transport Equipment 

































Source: Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, Pretoria, 
in Holden (1990a). 
It is thus difficult to generalize with any great confidence 
about the relationship between capital intensity and effective 
tariff protection. Nevertheless, McCarthy (1988) estimates 
that the effective protection afforded manufacturing averages 
30 per cent - much higher than Holden's estimate - and it is 
accurate to say that manufacturing as a whole is more capital-
and import-intensive than either agriculture or mining (see 
Table 2.9). This increases the likelihood that immiserizing 
growth owing to the presence of domestic distortions in the 
form of tariffs could have occurred. Fortunately, foreign 
profits have generally been taxed (see Chapter 5) which reduces 
this probability, though the scope for transfer pricing 
suggests that taxation of (reported) foreign profits is a less 
important factor than it might otherwise be. The increased 
reliance on export subsidisation is also a potential source of 
immiserization as it imposes an implicit tax on imports. Thus 
both import substitution and export promotion are potentially 
suspect trade strategies given capital-intensive importables, 
at least where import tariffs and export subsidies are present. 
In the pre-war period when most FDI went into mining, it (FDI) 
resembled the typical vertically integrated, export based 
"extractive" model of FDI, with no forward and few backward 
linkages. Since the war, however, FDI has resembled much more 
the "tariff-jumping" type, with MNC's opting to serve local 
markets rather than exporting, though with the decline in the 
value of locational advantages in the post 1976 era, the trend 
has rather been to replace production with licensing. It is 
not clear why FDI is more prominent in heavy industry, which is 
less protected than light industry, but this may be related to 
the need for sophisticated technology and skills, in which 
MNC's have a comparative advantage over local firms. 
As far as foreign distortions (only possible in the large 
country case) are concerned, whether FDI has caused the terms 
of trade to deteriorate sufficiently to cause immiserization 
is an empirical question which calls for further research, but 
the initial impression is that this has not occurred to any 
great degree because the FDI-dominated sectors (see Table 2.15) 
are relatively unprotected, and trade policy is now applied 
more selectively to allow large reductions in import tariffs 
to export-oriented firms. This reduces the distinction 
between impo~t and export sectors (Holden, 1990b), and, 
therefore, the effect of FDI on the terms of trade is less 
clear cut. 
In practice, governments often (and perhaps unwittingly) take 
action to ameliorate any adverse movements in the terms of 
trade, through import restrictions, taxation, exchange control 
regulations and so forth. Furthermore, the measurement of the 
terms of trade is ambiguous (Helleiner, 1972). At least three 
different terms of trade (commodity, factor and income) are 
commonly identified, each method of measurement giving a 
different result. The problem of isolating foreign investment 
from other influences affecting the terms of trade is an added 
complication. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the movement of the terms 
of trade remains important to South Africa, especially because 
the single most important export is gold, the price of which is 
significantly influenced by both economic and political 
considerations, and which is consequently prone to 
unpredictable fluctuations. The importance of the gold price 
is illustrated in Figure 2.3 which shows the terms of trade 
including and excluding gold. As can be seen, the effects of 
the gold price have masked the underlying decline in the 
economy's competitiveness. In particular, it has masked the 
accelerating rise in the cost of imported capital equipment, 
which has increased fivefold since 1966 (Gelb, 1991:20). 
Although the Reserve Bank now publishes annual figures for the 
terms of trade, this data is insufficient to isolate the effect 
of foreign investment. The evidence from Figure 2.3 for the 
period 1960 to 1987 supports Marais' (1960) conclusion that 
movements in the terms of trade are influenced mainly by 
changes in export prices. Foreign investment, and especially 
FDI, has been a peripheral influence only. As van der Spuy 
Heyns (1967:159) comments: 
"The effect of foreign investment on South Africa's terms 
of trade is, therefore, uncertain and cannot be assessed 
quantitatively. For even if there is an adverse 
movement in the commodity terms of trade, the factoral 
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Although it may not be possible to isolate the effect of 
tariffs and FDI on the terms of trade, Holden (1989:17) has 
estimated that over the period 1978 to 1987 the terms of 
trade effect on economic welfare (as measured by changes in 
GDP) was 0,81 per cent per annum, which is a relatively 
insignificant magnitude compared with, say, movements in 
the gold price or real exchange rates (see Holden, 1989). 
4. 5 Distribution 0 1f FDI in Manufacturing by. Employment 
Group 
The sectoral distribution of foreign-controlled employment 
by employment group is given in Table 2.13. It is clear 
from these figures that foreign-controlled employment is 
concentrated in large firms: for example only 3 720 
people were employed in the 51-100 group whilst 63 ooo 
people were employed in the 1001-3000 group. This accords 
with the theory that MNC's will be large oligopolistic 
structures, and corroborates Rogerson's (1982a:202) 
findings that: 
"the smallest foreign enterprises, those employing less 
than 250 workers, account for 59 per cent of all 
(foreign) enterprises but provide only 12 per cent of 
total (foreign-controlled) employment. Medium-sized 
enterprises, in the range 250-999 employees, contain 
one-third of enterprises and 36 per cent of (foreign-
controlled) employment. The greatest proportion of 
foreign-controlled employment occurs in the top 9 per 
cent, or largest enterprises, those employing over 1000 
workers." 
TABLE 2.13 
FOREIGN-CONTROLLED EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT GROUP SIZE. 1990 
Employment Group Size 
SIC Group 51- 101- 301- 501- 1001- 3001- Total 
100 300 500 1000 3000 5000 5000+ FE 
Food, beverages and tobacco 160 3,800 800 1,800 7,500 - - 14,060 
Textiles, clothing and leather 240 1,350 500 5,200 1,500 10,000 22,000+ . 38,790 
Wood and wood products - 520 450 500 - - - 1,470 
Paper and paper products 100 1,050 800 - 1,500 - - 3,450 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 2,220 9,700 7,500 12,600 12,000 20,000 5,000+ 69,020 
Non-metallic minerals - 750 900 7,200 7,500 - 5,000+ 21,350 
Basic Metals 100 400 - 1,000 3,000 . - - 4,500 
Fabricated metals, machinery 900 6,300 7,600 15,400 30,000 15,000 5,000+ 80,200 
and equipment 
Other Manufacturing - 300 - - - - - 300 
Total Foreign Employment 3,720 24,170 18,550 48, 700 . 63,000 45,000 35,000+ 233,140 
FE/DE% 2.5 7.4 9.5 18.7 42.2* - .,. 21.3 
Source: Author's data bank; Census of Manufacturing, 1985 
* The Census of Manufacturing does not break down employment groups above 1000 employees. 
This figure thus represents all employment in firms of 1000 employees or more. 
This is further illustrated by comparing foreign-controlled 
employment (FE) with domestic- (or indigenous) controlled 
employment (DE). In the smallest employment group, firms 
employing between 51 and 100 workers., FE is only 2, 5 per cent 
of DE. This proportion steadily increases, and in the largest 
group, firms employing more than 1000 workers, FE constitutes 
42,2 per cent of DE. For the manufacturing sector as a whole, 
21,3 per cent of total employment in 1990 occurred in foreign-
controlled enterprises. This proportion is significantly less 
than Rogerson's (1982b:125) estimate that "28 per cent of all 
manufacturing employment in the country occurs in foreign-
controlled enterprises". 
The sectoral distribution of foreign-controlled employment by 
country of origin is shown in 
differences in the country 
Table 2.14, 
pattern of 
where some striking 
sectoral investment 
emerge. It is noticeable, for example, that the distribution 
between countries in the leading sector, fabricated metals, 
machinery and equipment, is relatively normal, compared to the 
second biggest sector, chemicals, rubber and plastics, where 77 
per cent is concentrated in UK firms. 
whole is uniformly distributed across 
British investment as a 






per cent of 
employment is in fabricated metals, 
machinery and equipment; or compared with Taiwanese investment 
where 95 per cent of foreign-controlled employment is in 
textiles, clothing and leather. 
TABLE 2.14 
FOREIGN-CONTROLLED EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR AND 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. 1990 
SIC Group U.K. U.S. Germany Switzer- Nether- Taiwan others Total 
land lands 
Food, beverages and tobacco 9,210 1,850 - - - - 3,000 14,060 
Textiles, clothing and leather 25,450 - - - - 7,340 6,000 38,790 
Wood and wood products 1,370 - - 100 - - - 1,470 
Paper and paper products 1,550 1,600 - - 150 - 150 3,450 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 52,880 8,780 2,950 1,420 1,500 - 1,490 69,020 
Non-metallic minerals 12,000 8,400 150 800 - - - 21,350 
Basic Minerals 1,500 - - 3,000 - - - 4,500 
Fabricated metals, machinery 
and equipment 35,290 2,330 24,230 3,600 3,920 400 10,430 80,200 
other Manufacturing 300 - - - - - - 300 
Total 139,550 22,960 27,330 8,920 5,570 7,740 21,070 233,140 
Source: Author's data bank. 
Similarly, in 1990, us firms controlled nearly 4 times as much 
employment in chemicals, rubber and plastics, and in non-
metallic minerals than in the most heavily penetrated sector, 
fabricated metals, machinery and equipment. German, Swiss and 
Dutch investment is concentrated in heavy industry, Taiwanese 
in light industry, and the remainder (France and Spain, amongst 
others) shows no industrial bias. The sectoral specialisation 
of various countries reflects the international pattern of 
comparative advantage, though as one would expect, the 
exogenous political factors of disinvestment -and sanctions have 
distorted this pattern. This helps to explain why the us has 
only got 10 per cent of its investment in the broad engineering 
sectors as of 1990. Other studies (Watts, 1980; Rogerson, 
1982a) confirm that enterprises of particular countries tend 
to specialise in characteristic industrial groups. 
5. THE PENETRATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The question of foreign penetration is a complex one. Although 
relatively easy to measure, the extent of FDI stocks and flows 
is not necessarily a reliable indicator of foreign domination 
(see Section 2.3.3 above). Even when there is little FDI in 
the economy, a country may be dependent-on external forces, and 
vice versa. This ambiguity must be seen against the background 
of the broader dependency 
to developing countries12. 
debate, a concern no longer confined 
Related issues that arise include 
the host country's potential loss of sovereignity and autonomy 
and technological dependence. How one defines foreign 
penetration is crucial to the outcome of the debate about 
dependency. Even so, precisely what constitutes an undesirable 
level of foreign penetration is an open question. Economic 
analysis has contributed little to such shifting, nebulous 
concepts, though that is not to say they do not exist. We will 
return to these issues in Chapter 5 below. Our concern for the 
moment is to outline the extent of FDI in the South African 
economy. 
One way to measure the penetration of FDI is to compare it with 
the value of gross domestic fixed capital stock. Unfortunately 
we lack a detailed breakdown of data on the value of FDI at the 
industry group level for manufacturing. We only have data on 
this at the broad level of kind of economic· activity for the 
whole economy, and only for 1980 and 1986. This information is 
conveyed in Table 2.15 which shows that the level of FDI 
penetration in 1980 was greatest in manufacturing (21,0 per 
cent); wholesale and retail trade (18,2 per cent); and 
finance, insurance and business services (11,3 per cent); with 
mining and quarrying (8,7 per cent) occupying fourth place. 
The same sectors show the greatest FDI penetration in 1986, but 
more interestingly, all sectors show a much lower degree of FDI 
penetration. The overall level of penetration for the whole 
economy drops from 6,5 per cent to 4,1 per cent. Manufacturing 
nearly halves to ~ ~ cent; wholesale and retail trade 
drops by nearly a third to 13,0 per cent; and finance, 
TABLE 2.15 
FIXED CAPITAL STOCK AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ; 1980 AND 1986 
1980 1986 
Fixed FDI Fixed FDI 
Economic Activity Capital capital* 
Stock (Rm) Rm % Stock (Rm) Rm % 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 9,419 102 1.1 21,626 116 .5 
Mining and.Quarrying 10,934 953 8.7 35,209 1,420 4.0 
I 
Manufacturing 20,555 4,308 21.0 56,104 I 
6,708 12.0 
Electricity, Gas and Water 14 ,641 9 .1 46,632 11 .o 
Construction 1,392 74 5.3 3,042 45 1.5 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 8,238 1,503 18.2 21,289 2,762 13.0 
Transport, Storage & Communication 25,726 88 .3 66,409 141 .2 
Finance, Insurance & Business Services 31,007 3,510 11.3 88,531 7,218 8.2 
Community Services 42,456 76 .2 114,593 83 .1 
Total 164,367 10,623 6.5 453,436 18,504 4.1 
* In constant 1985 prices adjusted by the average annual percentage change in prices. 
source: c. Jenkins (1986:97); "Third Census of Foreign Transactions, Liabilities and Assets, 
31December1980", supplement to SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, December 1982. 
insurance and business services are down by a quarter, to 8,2 
per cent. 
In other words, the level of FDI penetration across the whole 
economy declined sharply in the early 1980's, presumably owing 
to disinvestment. There is no evidence to suggest that this 
trend has been reversed since then. In any event, none of the 
figures suggests that FDI in any sector is great enough to 
secure foreign domination or to induce foreign "dependence". 
Even if this were so, disinvestment would paradoxically prove 
to be beneficial in the long run, at least in terms of 
dependency arguments. 
Another way to measure the penetration of FDI is to take the 
number of foreign firms relative to the total number of firms 
(Parris, 1981:121). This works best when done on a 
disaggregated level where it is possible to control for 
exogenous factors, such as size, labour intensity, etc. On the 
whole, however, the actual number of firms is a poor yardstick, 
and better proxies can be found at the firm level as long as 
the data is available. Such proxies include comparisons of 
foreign and indigenous net worth, assets, net income and 
employment. Of these, employment is the only real variable, 
the others being expressed in changing money values. 
Furthermore, owing to the natural reluctance of firms to 
disclose financial information about their activities, 
statistics relating to these nominal measures are more likely 
to be unreliable. This is an academic issue in the case of 
South Africa, because data that would allow financial 
comparisons does not exist. Fortunately, though, we can use 
employment as our proxy, along the lines indicated by Rogerson 
(see Section 2.3 above). 
On this basis, Table 2.16 has been constructed for the 
manufacturing sector, differentiating between foreign- and 
domestic-controlled employment by industry group for 1978 and 
1990. Given the differences in the data bases for 1978 and 
1990 alluded to above, comparisons must be treated with 
caution. Nevertheless, both sets show that FDI penetration is 
greatest in the sectors chemicals, rubber and plastics, and 
fabricated metals, machinery and equipment, information which 
is corroborated by Venter (1989:150). The overall level of FDI 
penetration is lower in 1990, a finding that broadly 
corroborates the inferences drawn from Table 2.15 above for the 
economy in general, and manufacturing in particular. Also 
noticeable is the large drop in penetration in food, beverages 
and tobacco, and in paper and paper products. Textiles, 
clothing .and leather, on the other hand, showed an increase of 
nearly one fifth from 12,6 per cent in 1978 to 15,0 per cent in 
1990. 
It is difficult to be precise about the causes of the general 
decline in average penetration levels but this period has, of 
course, been characterised by disinvestment and the growth of 
joint ventures including new forms of FDI that involve little 
or no original capital investment, which would partly account 
TABLE 2.16 
FOREIGN-CONTROLLED AND DOMESTIC-CONTROLLED EMPLOYMENT, 






SIC Group Foreign Total Total 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 42,637 159,317 21.1 14,060 211,518 6.2 
Textiles, Clothing and Leather 33,092 230,281 12.6 38,790 219,497 15.0 
Wood and Wood Products 5,468 73,594 6.9 1,470 55,781 2.6 
Paper and Paper Products 16,298 59,633 21.5 3,450 83,555 4.0 
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics 70,100 56,359 55.4 69,020 . 94,964 42.1 
Non-Metallic Minerals 20,570 64,942 24.3 21,350 64,459 24.9 
Basic Metals 18,263 94,270 16.3 4,500 105,603 4.1 
Fabricated Metals, Machinery & 
169,076 229,340 42.4 I 80,200 237,568 25.2 Equipment 
Other Manufacturing 1,595 16,004 9.1 300 20,320 1.4 
Total 377,099 982,840 27.7 233,140 1,093,265 21.3 
* Fiqures refer to 1985 employment levels. 
Source: Rogerson, 1982b; author's data bank; Census of Manufacturing, 1985, Table 4.1. 
for the drop in the proportion of foreign-controlled employment 
from 27,7 per cent in 1978 to 21,3 per cent in 1990. 
Information on licensing agreements, which may give some 
indication of the extent to which joint ventures have grown, is 
extremely hard to come by. The Department of Trade and 
Industry, which vets the transfer of technology, does not keep 
useable statistics on the number of patents, trade marks, 
designs and copyright agreements taken out from foreign 
sources. In general, studies of FDI penetration ignore this 
aspect when making inter-country comparisons (see Table 2.17). 
one possible proxy for the extent of technology transfer, and 
consequently an indicator of "dependence", is the value of 
annual royalty payments, as reflected in Reserve Bank figures 
(see Table 4.3). A possible complication in the use of these 
figures as a measure of techology transfer, is the current 
incentive that foreign-controlled firms have to load the 
payments of royalties, etc. in lieu of capital disinvestment at 
the lower financial rand rate, in cases where they wish to run 
down their South African assets. 
Although the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) sets strict 
guidelines for the payment of royalties13 , and monitors firms' 
compliance with these guidelines for the Reserve Bank, royalty 
payments have escalated rapidly in nominal terms, especially in 
the 1980s, and have increased as a proportion of total profits 
(see Table 4.3 columns 1 and 2). Whilst this escalation may be 
the result of increased technology transfer, it is impossible 
to be sure. Venter (1989:149) reports that of the 245 United 
States MNCs commercially active in South Africa at the end of 
1987, over 30 per cent were involved only through contracts, 
licensing or distribution agreements, and franchising or other 
arrangements. However, it is difficult to place this in 
perspective without cross-sectional and time series data. 
The figures for the proportion of FDI in fixed manufacturing 
capital stock and of foreign-controlled employment in total 
manufacturing employment can be compared with those in Table 
2.17 which gives the share of manufacturing industry controlled 
by foreign firms in selected Third World countries. South 
African manufacturing is decidedly less penetrated by FDI than 
; 
any country in Latin America or Africa. It is more comparable 
with Asian countries, where penetration levels are much lower 
on the whole. On the basis of these figures, allegations that 
South Africa is in danger of becoming a "branch plant" economy 
(Rogerson, 1982b:133) seem misplaced, especially given the 
trend of FDI penetration over the last fifteen years. 
On the other hand, in the South African situation where the 
existing pattern of FDI shows relatively strong penetration of 
the intermediate and capital goods sector, this increases the 
country's dependence on foreigners, especially in the field of 
technology. 
In much of the literature on economic development, domestic 
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Source: R. Jenkins (1987:10); Tables 2.15 and 2.16 
establishment of indigenous technological capabilities in 
developing countries (Stewart, 1977; Coleman and Nixson, 1986). 
Production, and in particular, exports of capital goods from 
developing countries are therefore frequently interpreted as an 
indication of the growing technological capability of the Third 
World (Fransman, 1986; Baark, 1991). However, empirical 
research conducted during the last two decades has called into 
question the classic view that dependence on foreign technology 
is one of the principal restraining factors on development. 
This research has focused attention on the economic and 
technological feasibility of domestic capital goods production 
in developing countries. The emerging consensus is that the 
viability of such production is circumscribed by global 
technological imperatives (Kaplinsky, 1985), and that more 
emphasis needs to be put on the diffusion and acquisition of 
foreign technology (Amsden, 1991). 
This suggests that foreign technology can play a vital role in 
expanding domestic capital goods production via what Amsden 
refers to as the learning and assimilation process. Although 
the production of machine tools in South Africa was comparable 
in terms of volume of output and product range with, for 
example, Taiwan and South Korea in the early 1970s, since the 
mid-1970s output growth has been far slower in South Africa 
than in any of the NICs, particularly those in Asia (Kaplan, 
1991:182). This is illustrated in Figure 2.4. As a 
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a high level and has shown no tendency to decline over the past 
two decades (Kahn, 1991:68). 
According to the figures in Table 2.18, over half of south 
Africa's domestic expenditure on machinery is devoted to 
imported machinery, and this proportion is also high in the 
category motor vehicles and transport equipment. When this 
high level of import penetration is considered alongside the 
high expenditure elasticity of imports (see Table 2.19), it is 
obvious that capital goods and domestic investment are 
extremely sensitive to the business cycle. At the same time, 
the very low price elasticity of machinery imports demonstrates 
a high dependence on foreign technology. While a 1983 survey 
indicated that South African manufacturing was becoming less 
reliant on foreign technology, the extent of dependence remains 
considerable and no less than 84 per cent of new technology 
embodied in machinery is imported (Black, 1991a:161). 
This high level of penetration cannot be easily reduced unless 
the local production of capital goods can be increased, but 
this is not possible without access to the necessary 
technology, which is owned and controlled by MNCs. On the 
other hand, according to Kaplan (1987, 1991), the lack of state 
support for the machine tool industry and the character of the 
South African business cycle are the major factors constraining · 
its development, rather than technological weakness or limited 
market size. He argues that increased state aid to the capital 
TABLE 2.18 
IMPORT PENETRATION RATIOS (SIC CATEGORIES) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Food 9.7 11.3 12.7 6.0 7.7 
Beverages & Tobacco 4.5 5.3 4.0 2.4 4.9 
Textiles 37.8 30.2 20.8 15.8 15.8 
Clothing 10.8 14.6 10.1 6.7 7.2 
Footwear 3.4 8.4 10.5 8.6 10.4 
Wood & wood produts 25.0 19.7 18.7 12.0 9.3 
Paper & paper prods 23.4 24.3 17.9 16.4 13.6 
Chemicals 25.0 25.2 16.5 15.1 15.1 
Metals & metal prods 21.1 17.1 16.5 7.0 11.1 
Non-metal mineral prods 22.8 17.1 12.6 6.3 20.0 
Rubber products 21.4 20.2 19.3 22.8 20.6 
Machinery 50.3 57.0 52.3 50.l 52.1 
Motor vehicles & 37.1 39.2 34.5 31.4 30.0 
transport eqipment 
Source: Kahn (1987). 
TABLE 2.19 
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goods market in the form of direct subsidies, and an end to the 
recurrent problems on the balance of payments caused by 
capital flight, are the principle solutions to the retardation 
of the local capital goods industry. At the same time, the 
expansion of the domestic market via changes in the pattern of 
demand, and in export markets via a "niche" approach will 
enable greater economies of scale to be reaped. This is 
especially important in the case of such core technologies as 
microelectronics (Baart, 1991). A strong case can also be made 
for higher effective rates of protection for local technology-
intensive industry and for an end to discriminatory input 
pricing that subsidizes exports of, for example, quality steels 
and electronic components, at the expense of local consumption. 
The usual measures of FDI penetration, such as those in Table 
2.17, are potentially misleading indicators of dependence. A 
more accurate representation of dependence should also look at 
the structure of imports, the price and expenditure 
elasticities of import demand, and the size of the capital 
goods industry in relation to that found in comparable 
countries. South Africa is more highly penetrated than is at 
first apparent, especially if, as Kahn (1991:68) argues, the 
figures for import penetration understate the true picture 
because they do not reflect the large proportion of imported 
inputs in locally produced capital goods~ 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The growth of the manufacturing sector is the single most 
important structural economic change to have occurred in South 
Africa during the twentieth century. After the war, this 
expansion was financed from a number of sources, of which FDI 
was a crucial component, providing not only finance but other 
resources such as technology and skills. Despite fluctuations, 
total foreign investment continued to grow in real terms until 
1985 after which it declined owing to reduced profitability and 
politically inspired disinvestment. 
As far as FDI is concerned, since 1969 it has shown a long-term 
tendency to decline as a proportion of total foreign 
investment. The country-pattern of FDI ownership is dominated 
by South Africa's traditional trading partners, especially the 
United Kingdom which has over one half of the total. Its 
spatial distribution is remarkably similar to that of 
indigenous industry, whilst its distribution according to kind 
of economic activity shows a shift away from manufacturing 
towards the financial sector, though there are some 





in foreign-controlled enterprises, 
the largest sector. Within 
manufacturing we find that FDI is highly concentrated in heavy 
industry, and that foreign-controlled employment has dropped 
significantly during the 1980s. There seems some evidence that 
FDI has been influenced by tariffs, which raises the 
possibility that immiserizing growth may have occurred, 
especially when transfer pricing is included in the equation. 
Apart from the misallocation of resources implied by such a 
domestic distortion, movements of the terms of trade have had a 
strong impact on welfare given the openness of the economy. 
However, it appears that these movements have been only 
marginally (if at all) affected by the pattern of FDI . 
• 
The level of FDI penetration as measured by employment and as a 
percentage of gross domestic fixed capital stock declined in 
the 1980s, but the dependence of manufacturing industry on 
foreign technology remains unaltered. The underdevelopment of 
the capital goods industry remains a worrisome feature of the 
industrial landscape. 
But it would be a mistake to believe that this underdevelopment 
can be remedied overnight by cutting off access to foreign 
technology. In fact, driven by international technological 
imperatives, including the erosion of comparative advantage 
owing to low labour costs (Baark, 1991), the opposite is true. 
The accumulation and diffusion of technology is a crucial 
component in the growth and export performance of developing 
countries. Amsden (1991) argues that late industrialisers are 
"learners" and "assimilators" rather than technological 
innovators. This implies that access to foreign technology is 1 
critical to development, at least in the initial phases. 
Obviously domestic capital goods production needs to be 
increased in order to reduce imports. To this end, FDI needs 
to be encouraged, especially joint ventures (appropriately 
monitored) . 
The underdevelopment of the capital goods industries in 
developing countries is a function of the global technology 
market of which MNCs are merely agents. The lessons of the 
newly industrialised countries (Black, 1991) suggest that the 
ability to rectify this problem rests on the capacity to 
assimilate foreign technology and make efficient use of it. 
The level of FDI penetration in South Africa is low by 
international standards, even when technology is included (see 
Chapter 3). Plenty of scope therefore exists for the promotion 
of FDI and of technology transfer. Selective protection of 
infant industries, market augmenting measures, and assistance 
in technology acquisition appear to be three broad areas where 
economic policy has met with some success in newly 
industrialised countries. Whilst not suggesting for a moment 
that we can replicate the South East Asian experience wholesale 
in South Africa, the central role accorded technology in late 
industrialisation is there for all to see. 
Endnotes: 
1. Whilst there is no evidence that indigenous African 
miners knew of or exploited the diamond deposits along 
the Vaal River or at Dutoitspan and Colesberg Kopje 
(later to become Kimberley), it was the evidence of 
previous generations of indigenous miners and metal 
workers which provided the clues as to the presence of 






a 67 per 
1937). 
copper was mined at O'Okiep in Namaqualand in 
returns were insufficient to attract foreign 
It was locally generated capital which 
the copper- mining industry in the nineteenth 
(The Newmont Mining Company of America brought 
cent interest in the O'Okiep Copper Company in 
3. It should be noted that the issue of foreign investment 
in the gold mines of the Transvaal Republic, and the 
question of political control over the mines, was a major 
reason for the South African War of 1899 - 1902. Foreign 
investment in South Africa was also a contentious 
political issue at the end of the nineteenth century (see 
du Plessis, 1970:180). 
4. "Real", in the sense used here, means adjusted for 
inflation. Whilst it is recognised that fluctuating 
exchange rates wili affect the rand value of foreign 
assets and liabilities in different ways, because of the 
different currencies and stocks of inward and outward 
investment involved (SARB, Quarterly Bulletin, Dec.1989, 
p.53), one can still arrive at a common rand value in 
nominal terms and then deflate it. Indeed, it is 
difficult to know how else to value foreign assets and 
foreign liabilities. 
5. Under the Bretton Woods system, balance of payments 
deficits were settled by Central Banks drawing from their 
dollar reserves. The system's demise in the early 1970s 
led to the emergence of the private international credit 
market (Eurocurrency market). Under the new 
international monetary regime, it became possible for 
countries with current account deficits to delay the 
necessary internal macroeconomic adjustments by recourse 
to this market. This they naturally did - leading to the 
massive build up of debt and the debt crises that 
followed. 
The surge of lending to the United States in the 1980s 
had its origin in the twin problems of expanding US 
budget and current account deficits, and the concomitant 
high level of us interest rates. 
6. Although no attempt is made to do so here (because it is 
only obliquely relevant to a study of host country 
interests), it is possible to measure the intensity of 
outward investment flows by adapting the analysis of 
trade intensity along the lines suggested by Pangestu 
(1980, 1985) and used by Hill (1988). The resulting 
investment intensity index provides a useful means of 
gauging the relative importance of investment flows. The 
index measures the share of one country's investment in 
another as a proportion of the latter's share of total 
investment in (say) developing countries. Formally, the 
index Oji is given by 









the intensity of direct investment in 
country j from country i. 
direct investment in country j by country i 
total direct investment in j 
total direct investment from (developed) 
source countries to developing countries. 
total direct investment from country i to 
developing countries. 
An index of 100 indicates that the share of direct 
investment by country i in country j out of i's total 
investments in developing countries. Indices greater 
(lesser) than 100 illustrate shares· that are higher 
(lower) than would be expected on the basis of the 
investing country's share of all outflows to developing 
countries. · 
7. Until recently, the Japanese government did not permit 
outward Japanese investment, but Japanese investment in 
South Africa is also specifically outlawed. However, 
this ban does not include licensing, franchising and 
other 'new forms' of joint ventures between Japanese and 
South African firms. 
8. Official Reserve Bank figures for foreign investment as 
well as those of the major investing nations incorporate 
data for Namibia with that for south Africa. With the 
independence of Namibia this practice will presumably 
cease, but from a South African perspective this will be 
of little practical significance given the small amounts 
involved. 
9. Measuring foreign ownership and control is a problematic 
exercise at the best of times. The dynamic nature of 
commerce, the practice by firms of avoiding official 
paperwork, and their understandable reluctance to divulge 
information relating to ownership and control, are some 
of the obstacles which need to be overcome in measuring 
FOI. In the end, when trying to find out if a particular 
firm is indigenous or "foreign" it may be necessary to 
use "informed guesswork", after having traced ownership 
and control, which are themselves nebulous concepts, 
through the labyrinth of interlocking companies that 
characterise the structure of modern business. 
Ultimately, the definition used is perforce arbitrary. 
10. Although both Rogerson and the author used the Bureau of 
Market Research's (unpublished) Industrial Register to 
provide information on the industrial classification and 
size of establishments, because this register does not 
contain information on ownership (only geographical 
location), it was necessary to merge it with an 
alternative list of foreign firms known to be operating 
in South Africa, in order to arrive at a more complete 
picture of the manufacturing sector. Unfortunately the 
alternate lists used in 1978 and 1990, whilst they are 
themselves based on identical primary sources, define a 
foreign-controlled enterprise in different ways. 
Rogerson compiled his own list from a number of sources 
including the Dun and Bradstreet series "Who Owns Whom". 
The author, on the other hand, relied on lists of foreign 
firms provided by the Investor Responsibility Research 
Centre (IRRC) (1877:1988). 
Rogerson defines a foreign-controlled enterprise as 
either a subsidiary or associate of a foreign company, 
where the terms "subsidiary" and "associate" are based on 
the Dun and Bradstreet definition used in their series 
"Who Owns Whom". Subsidiaries are defined as "a company 
in which another (the parent) either holds more than half 
in nominal values of the equity share capital or is a 
member and controls the composition of the board of 
directors, or one which is a subsidiary within these 
terms of a company which is in turn a subsidiary ·of 
another" (Dun and Bradstreet, 1978/9: xi). Associated 
enterprises are those "in which another or a subsidiary 
of that other (the senior associate) holds a substantial 
interest of not more than half in nominal value of the 
equity share capital" (Dun and Bradstreet, 1978/9: xi) 
(emphasis added). It is not made clear what constitutes 
a "substantial interest". Conceivably the use of these 
two definitions could cover the entire universe of 
foreign firms with any contacts in South Africa, i.e. 
subsidiaries and the rest, which is unsatisfactory and 
unhelpful. As a working attempt to define FDI this 
definition is too loose and too vague. c. Jenkins and 
McGrath (1985:34) are mistaken in believing that this 
constitutes a "strong definition". 
The IRRC (1988:3), on the other hand, define a company 
"as having direct investment in South Africa if it owns 
10 per cent or more of an active South African subsidiary 
or affiliate", which seems prima facie a stronger 
definition than that used by Rogerson, though we cannot 
be sure. The IRRC figures for employment are 
unfortunately incompatible with both the Rogerson figures 
and those of the author because they only represent those 
firms in which the international parent has a majority 
interest, i.e. only subsidiaries in terms of the Dun and 
Bradstreet definition. 
The South African Reserve Bank definition of FDI (see 
chapter 4) is considerably stronger than that used by the 
IRRC or Rogerson: viz, the ownership of 25 per cent or 
more of total issued voting stock or comparable ownership 
or voting rights (van der Merwe and Bester, 1983:23). 
The IRRC (1988:4) merged all known lists of firms 
operating in South Africa including the 1987 edition of 
Dun and Bradstreet Ltd's Principal International 
Businesses; the Spring 1987 edition of Toyo Keizai 
Shinposha Ltd's Japan Company Handbook; and the 1987 
editions of Dun and Bradstreet Ltd's Who Owns Whom, 
Australia and Far East, Who Owns Whom, Continental 
Europe, and Who owns Whom, United kingdom and Republic of 
Ireland. Information on U.S. and Canadian firms with 
links to South Africa was inter alia obtained from Dun 
and Bradstreet Ltd's Who owns Whom 1986, North America, 
the National Register Publishing Co's 1986/87 
International Directory of Corporate Affiliations, and 
the March 1987 update of the Unified List of U.S. 
Companies with Investments or Loans in South Africa and 
Namibia, published by The Africa Fund. 
11. Comparisons with earlier periods are problematic because 
the method of classification changed· after the Third 
Census of Foreign Transactions, Liabilities and Assets 
published in 1982. since then, financial holding 
companies have been classified under the financial sector 
irrespective of the activities of their subsidiaries. 
Compared with earlier periods, this has the effect of 
reducing the share of manufacturing and increasing that 
of finance, insurance and business services (q.v.). 
12. Many industrialised nations are today worried about 
inward.foreign investment flows. Countries like Canada 
(57 per cent) and Australia (36 per cent) exhibit very 
high FDI penetration ratios (Wheelwright, 1980). In 
Belgium FDI is responsible for 25 per cent of GDP and 
total sales, 18 per cent of employment and 30 per cent of 
exports (Parris, 1981:101). During the 1980s the United 
States saw its position change from being the leading 
source of FDI to becoming the largest recipient (UNCTC, 
1988:6). 
13. Royalty payments are subject to a maximum fee as a 
percentage of the net ex-factory price of 4 per cent in 
the case of consumer goods, and 6 per cent in the case of 
intermediate and final capital goods. These maxima 
include all payments for know-how, trademarks, etc. The 
DTI also stipulates that agreements should not unduly 
restrict the export of licensed products. 
CHAPTER 3 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
.1. INTRODUCTION ; AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
MANUFACTURING SINCE 1945 
Historically, the manufacturing sector in South Africa has 
experienced significant growth relative to the rest of the 
economy. This is evident from the figures in Table 3.1 below. 
TABLE 3.1 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GDP AT FACTOR COST BY 
KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1911-1989 
Agriculture, Mining and 
Year Forestry and Quarrying Manufacturing 
Fishina 
1911 21.1 27.6 3.8 
1920 22.2 18.3 7.3 
1930 14.2 .. 15.6 9.3 
1940 12.7 18.8 12.4 
1950 17.7 13.5 16.4 
1960 12.3 14.2 18.7 
1970 8.2 10.2 23.6 
1980 6.9 22.9 22.6 
1989 5.7 12.3 24.2 .. 
Source: Union Statistics for 50 Years and S.A.R.B. 
Quarterly Bulletin, various issues. 
During the post-war period the share of manufacturing in GDP 
has increased from 16,4 per cent in 1950 to 24,2 per cent in 
·----~-----------------------
1989. The growth rate of output and employment has not been 
constant over this period. Since the early 1970s, the economy 
has undergone fundamental structural change with major 
implications for the growth rate of output and employment. It 
has become usual to divide the post-war period into two 
sub-periods, the former characterised by steady economic 
growth, and the latter by economic stagnation. For example, 
the annual real economic growth rate decreased from 5,5 per 
cent per annum between 1960 and 1974 to 1,9 per cent per annum 
between 1974 and 1985. The number of jobs created in the 
formal sectors of the economy dropped from 157 000 to 64 000 
annually in these sub-periods (van der Berg, 1989). Although 
the strong distinction between these sub-periods has been 
questioned by T. Moll (1991), all commentators agree that the 
economy has been underperforming since the 1960s. 
In 1986 fewer jobs existed in manufacturing than in 1980. At 
the same time, the trend towards more capital intensive 
production techniques reflects the negligible growth in labour 
productivity, which contributed to the overall decline in 
multi-factor productivity in manufacturing of 2,4 per cent 
between 1970 and 1986 (McCarthy, 1988; du Plooy, 1988). 
According to van der Berg (1989): 
"Some of the causes of the increasing capital-intensity 
in South Africa during the 1970s were factor price 
distortions, particularly rapid increases in the real 
cost of labour, low interest rates (cost of capital), 
the tendency towards overvalued exchange rates 
favouring capital imports, imports of often 
inappropriate technology from developed countries, and 
an unstable labour force, at least in the perception of 
management, detracting from the attractiveness of using 
labour in the production process" (p.194). 
Industrialisation in South Africa has followed the conventional 
pattern of transition from consumer goods to intermediate and 
capital goods, or from light to heavy industry (Hoffman, 1958; 
Sutcliffe, 1971). Table 3.2 shows that since the war (1946) 
the share of light industry (as defined by Chenery and syrquin 
(1984) and McCarthy (1988)) in manufacturing value added and 
employment declined from 55,9 per cent to 36,8 per cent and 
54,8 per cent to 48,2 per cent respectively. The smaller 
decline in employment, reflects the relative labour-
intensiveness of light manufacturing. 
TABLE 3.2 
MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED AND EMPLOYMENT 1946 - 1982 
Light Industry Heavy Industry 
Year 
Value Added Employment Value Added Employment 
% % % % 
1946 55.9 54.8 44.1 45.2 
1960 49.0 53.7 51.0 46.3 
1970 42.7 50.2 57.3 49.8 
1982 36.8 48.2 63.2 51.8 
Source: McCarthy (1988:11). 
Table 3.3 gives a sectoral breakdown of the increase in value 
added and employment in manufacturing from 1970 to 1982. 
Though the sectors Leather and leather products and Footwear 
TABLE 3.3 
GROWTH IN REAL MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED 




Sector Added Employment 
Food 4.0 2.9 
Beverages 7.2 4.0 
Tobacco Products -5.7 .o 
Textiles 2.6 1.3 
Clothing 5.0 3.8 
Leather and products 13.6 2.0 
Footwear 13.5 2.5 
Wood and products 3.7 2.0 
Furniture 4.3 3.2 
Paper and products 2.8 1.4 
Printing and publishing 3.6 3.1 
Chemicals 5.7 4.2 
Rubber and plastics 7.9 4.0 
Non-metallic minerals 2.3 1.2 
Basic Iron and Steel 2.7 3.0 
Non-ferrous metals 8.5 4.2 
Metal products 4.0 3.3 
Machinery 6.8 4.0 
Electrical machinery 8.9 5.0 
Transport Equipment 5.7 4.2 
Other industries 2.8 2.7 
Total Manufacturing 4.6 3.1 
Values deflated with respective production price indices 
Due to rounding, columns do not add up to 100.0 
Source: Mccarthy, 1988, p.12 


























recorded the highest average annual growth in output, their 
contributions to the growth of total manufacturing employment 
and real value added are exceedingly modest. On the other 
· hand, the chemical and machinery industries made important 
contributions to increases in real value added (15,7 and 12,7 
per cent respectively) and employment (8,8 and 10,8 per cent 
respectively). In fact, light industry contributed only 27,9 
per cent and 38,6 per cent to increases in output and 
employment from 1970 to 1982 .. 
The increasing share of heavy industry in the growth of 
manufacturing output and employment has not reduced imports. 
For example, ·as a percentage of GDP imports were on average 27 
per cent between 1950 and 1955; whereas the figure for the 
period 1980 to 1984 was 24 per cent (McCarthy, 1988). The 
reason for this is that the fast growing industries of the 
post-war era like chemicals, machinery and metal products have 
a high import content. 
Furthermore, as we pointed out in Chapter 2, the continued 
reliance on foreign technology manifests itself in the 
inability to develop a local capital goods industry that could 
reduce this import dependence. Efforts to accomplish this goal 
must incorporate the developm~nt of an indigenous technology 
sector. At the same time this is not possible without access 
to foreign technology -
copied (Amsden, 1991). 
which can be purchased or borrowed and 
Foreign technology is the key to 
improving international competitiveness, thus boosting export 
growth and enabling the economies of scale that the production 
of modern core technologies like microelectronics require 
(Amsden, 1985; Baark, 1991; Kaplinsky, 1991). In this way, the 
domestic capital goods industry can be developed by "piggy-
backing" foreign technology. 
2. RESOURCE TRANSFER EFFECTS 
2.1 The Provision of Capitai 
The most obvious and immediate impact of FDI on a host country 
is the inflow of capital. For those countries where capital is 
in short supply this is a most important effect. But although 
MNCs have been responsible for injecting capital into host 
countries, the quantities involved are often smaller than 
imagined, and the consequences are unpredictable. For example, 
the privileged access of MNCs to financial resources at home 
and abroad, may crowd local firms out, and not all MNC 
investment involves the transfer of capital because funds can 
be raised locally on the money and capital markets, and through 
internal financing via the retention of profits. 
Table 3.4 (column 1) shows that with the exception of 19~7, 
there have been inflows of FDI every year since 1957, when 
records were started. Expressed as a percentage of annual 
gross domestic fixed investment (GDFI) it appears that FDI 
has made a very modest contribution to the financing of GDFI. 
On average its annual unweighted contribution is only 7,3 per 
cent, with a high of 17,6 per cent in 1968 and a low of -3,1 
per cent in 1987. The pattern of FDI inf lows is shown in 
Figure 3.1. 
The conclusion that capital inflows have played only a minor 
financing role is reinforced by the data on the financing of 
foreign firms contained in Table 4.2 below, which shows that 
since 1957, foreign-controlled firms have retained a relatively 
high. proportion of their net profits (between 30 and 76 per 
cent), with the notable exceptions of the years 1961, 1987 and 
1988 which coincided with periods of unusual uncertainty. 
". 
According to the Reserve Bank figures in Table 4.3 below (see 
Chapter 4), share premium retained profits and reserves have 
been the major source of capital formation in MNCs since 1957, 
accounting for 86,3 per cent of the total. This is an 
inordinately large proportion, especially in a developing 
country that needs foreign capital inflow. In a sense, it is a 
reflection of the early onset of the debt cycle (Stewart, 1985; 
Williamson and Milner, 1991:307-309) referred to in Chapter 4 
below. It is also much larger than that reported for other 
countries. Manser (1973), for example, finds that on average, 
external sources of finance form thirty to forty per cent of 
subsidiaries' overall financing, a conclusion supported by Lall 
and Streeten (1977) and Westphal et al (1979). The bias 
towqrds internal financing in South Africa is explained by the 
senescence of FDI, a decline in investor confidence since the 
1960s, unpredictable currency fluctuations and the sometimes 
poor conduct of stabilisation, trade and industrial policies 




































FDI AND GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED INVESTMENT 
1957-1988 (Rm) 
Gross Column 
FDI* Domestic . 
Inf low Fixed Column 
Investment ~ 0 
65 936 7.0 
115 1073 10.7 
73 1042 7.0 
42 1061 3.9 
21 1068 2.0 
92 1072 8.6 
63 1302 4.8 
102 1611 6.3 
178 1977 9.0 
260 2084 12.5 
162 2219 7.3 
407 2316 17.6 
426 2620 16.2 
383 3061 12.5 
462 3177 14.5 
514 3739 13.7 
344 5027 6.8 
514 6158 8.3 
404 8110 5.0 
659 9221 7.1 
303 9478 3.2 
409 10235 4.0 
751 12125 6.2 
1995 16209 12.3 
1581 19964 7.9 
1034 22459 4.6 
945 24498 3.8 
2098 26209 8.0 
849 28715 2.9 
829 28707 2.9 
-989 31497 -3.1 
480 39311 1.2 
1 
2 
Source: "A Statistical Presentation of South Africa's Foreign 
Liabilities and Assets, 1956 to 1981" supplement to 
Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, June 1983; Reserve 
Bank Quarterly Bulletin, various issues. 
* FDI is defined to include both retained earnings and direct 





FDI'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE FINANCING OF 
GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED INVESTMENT 
63 68 73 78 83 
Y E A R 
Source: Table 3.4 
88 
Apart from its implications for growth and the balance of 
payments, the reluctance of foreign investors to transfer 
direct capital (as opposed to technology) to South Africa in 
recent times raises the problem of the generation of 
imperfections in the local capital market referred to in 
Chapter 1. Fortunately, the South African capital market is 
well developed (Blumenfeld, 1988) and no evidence exists that 
MNCs have favoured status over local firms. Indeed, as a 
result of the growth of "new forms" of FDI in South Africa 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the distinction between foreign and 
local firms is less clearcut. The use of foreign technology is 
not confined to MNCs, so that the efficiency gains are 
widespread. 
The debate about the impact of foreign investment on growth is 
characterised by widely divergent viewpoints and an obvious 
lack of consensus (Todaro, 1989). The results of 
investigations into this relationship are largely arbitrary 
because they are often pre-determined by the choice of model. 
For this reason, and also in view of the relatively small 
contribution of capital inflow and especially FDI to gross 
domestic fixed investment, no attempt has been made to apply a 
dual gap-type methodology nor to estimate its impact on 
domestic savings and investmen~. Such exercises have been done 
for South Africa before in order to estimate the impact of 
total foreign investment, including non-FD!. The tests of the 
relationship between foreign investment and domestic savings 
reported by Suckling (1975) and McGrath and Jenkins (1985) 
both suggest that foreign investment has a strongly negative 
impact on savings. suckling finds a marginal propensity to 
consume out of foreign investment of 43 per cent (p.318), 
McGrath and Jenkins, 24 per cent (p.27). These results show 
that the inflow of foreign investment has increased the capital 
stock by an amount less than that indicated by published 
figures. In other words, capital inflows have been used for 
consumption purposes (see Papanek, 1972), thus reducing their 
impact on growth. 
More recently Smit and Pellisier (1991) used both a potential 
production function model and the Bureau for Economic 
Research's macroeconomic model of the South African economy to 
estimate this relationship. The results of both models, albeit 
different, . suggest that the growth elasticity of foreign 
capital flows is low. In the former model, a change of 6 per 
cent in foreign capital flows (in terms of GDP) results in a 
0,8 to o,9 per cent change in average real growth per annum. 
In the latter highly sophisticated model, this elasticity was 
only marginally higher. For example, a 3 per cent change in 
capital flows (in terms of GDP) resulted in a 0,6 per cent 
change in average growth. 
Although the purpose of the authors was to illustrate future 
growth patterns given various assumptions about capital 
inflows, the models are based on historical data. Both models, 
as well as similar exercises contained in Smit (1991), reach 
the conclusion that the quantitative impact of foreign capital 
inflows on South African economic growth is, and by implication 
··---------------------------------
has been, quite limited, at least since the 1960s. Blumenfeld 
(1988) and Stoneman (1988) also reach the conclusion that given 
historical capital:output ratios in south Africa, a steady 
growth rate of 7 per cent per annum would be required to 
generate sufficient domestic savings with which to finance 
sufficient investment to contain unemployment. In other words, 
their conclusion supports the view that the marginal efficiency 
of capital (including foreign capital) is low. Blumenfeld also 
argues that since the mid-1950s, South Africa has on average 
generated sufficient domestic savings to finance most domestic 
investment. "Since 1970, for example, the ratio of gross 
domestic savings to gross domestic investment has averaged 
almost 95% (p.114). Bell (1990), too, argues that: 
"Some estimates of our need for foreign c~pital to 
achieve high rates of growth are in my view gross 
exaggerations. In developing countries foreign direct 
investment has generally been a consequence, rather 
than a cause, of rapid industrialisation. Rapidly 
growing economies have in fact depended relatively 
little on foreign capital, compared to domestic 
savings". (p.22). 
This picture of foreign investment is supported by the findings 
of the author's survey (see appendix 2). Of the 29 foreign-
controlled firms from whom responses were received, only 13 or 
45 per cent were initially financed entirely by transfers from 
parent firms overseas, and of the remainder, one half (8) 
reported that they were initially financed entirely by local 
debt and equity. The other 8 firms were initially financed by 
a combination of local and foreign sources. The point here is 
to illustrate the minor role of capital inflows in FDI capital 
formation. However, it is interesting to note that in each 
case where firms were initially financed from abroad, this 
involved the setting up of new facilities rather than the 
acquisition of existing facilities, a situation that is clearly 
preferable to the reverse. The 6 firms that were established 
via acquisition were all funded locally. Furthermore, 
consistent with observations elsewhere (Cohen, 1975; 
Hellenier, 1989), amongst the 27 firms that have added 
productive capacity since start-up, 14 or 52 per cent financed 
this entirely from local sources, mainly by incurring onshore 
debt or by reinvesting earnings. Only 7 firms raised equity. 
Another element in the financing of any firm is the 
availability of foreign borrowing. According to a UNCTC study 
in 1988 (p.138) about 12 per cent of Latin America's foreign 
debt in 1982 was accounted for by debts of affiliates and 
subsidiaries of MNCs. No figures on this are available for 
South Africa, although this type of borrowing (indirect foreign 
investment) is subject to specific exchange control. 
Experience gained during the exchange control liberalisation 
period of 1981-82, has shown that it is prudent to monitor this 
type of borrowing for balance of payments purposes. 
In the case of foreign-control~ed firms, exchange control also 
imposes restrictions on local borrowing according to the 
following formula (Standard Bank, 1988:7): 
50% + (South African participation x 5o%) of effective capital3 
(Non-resident participation ) 
A fully foreign-owned company is thus limited to local 
borrowing of 50 per cent of effective capital. This percentage 
increases as local participation grows. In this way, MNCs are 
encouraged to enter into joint ventures and some of the rents 
accruing to the MNCs (owing to ownership of technology, etc.), 
are captured domestically, although Rogoff (1983:59) argues 
that this is a fairly lax regulation. In some countries, such 
as Me~ico, India and the Republic of Korea, the government 
actually requires that a cert~in portion of capital be raised 
locally (UNCTC, 1988:139). MNCs on the other hand, will be 
keen to borrow locally as a hedge against devaluation or any 
other unforeseen difficulty. 
Since the declaration of the moratorium on foreign debt in 
September 1985, and the capital sanctions which followed, it is 
self-evident that local subsidiaries and affiliates have been 
less able to borrow off-shore. Where this situation places 
MNCs at a disadvantage relative to indigenous competitors, · 
provision exists in the exchange control regulations to waive 
the limits on local borrowing, under certain circumstances. 
Likewise, where local funds are cheaper, 
MNCs, the authorities are prepared to 
(Standard Bank, 1988:7). 
thus disadvantaging 
be more flexible 
One reason why the authorities wish to limit the extent of 
local borrowing, is to limit the exposure of local banks to 
foreign investors who may attempt to repatriate funds and 
assets to their home countries, with or without the exchange 
control approval. Legally, temporary excess 
facilities are not normally permitted to 
local borrowing 
finance higher 
dividends or other withdrawals by non-residents; and directors' 
fees, management fees, licences and royalties are all governed 
by exchange control regulations. But this governance cannot, 
of course, prevent illegal practices such as transfer pricing, 
repatriations of capital assets, etc. Hence the need to place 
a limit on local exposure, especially as it appears that there 
has been extensive capital flight from South Africa since the 
early 1970s in excess of outflows identified by official 
statistics (Kahn, 1991b; Smit and Mocke, 1991). 
Local borrowing is also restricted 
subsidiaries to raise local equity. 
in order to encourage MNC 
Presuming that this equity 
is purchased by residents, the profits (and any monopoly rents) 
will stay in the country. Non-residents can only transact 
equity vi~ the financial rand. There is little information on 
the extent to which local equity has been raised by MNCs. On 
the basis of data published by Union Acceptances Limited 
(1974), Tomlinson (1975) concluded that MNCs are very 
conservative in their gearing practices. As can be seen in 
Table 3.5, the average. ratio of long term finance to 
shareholders' funds for samples 
manufacturing and financial sectors 
low. 
of MNCs in the mining, 
in 1959 and 1969 was very 
TABLE 3.5 
GEARING OF SAMPLES OF FOREIGN-CONTROLLED FIRMS IN MINING, 
MANUFACTURING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES. 1959 AND 1969 
Ratio of long term 
Number in Sample finance to share-
Sector holders' funds % 
1959 1969 1959 1969 
Mining 67 71 14,0 8,9 
Manufacturing 111 320 22,4 25,9 
Financial Services 36 58 5,7 9,1 
Source: Union Acceptances Limited, Economic and Financial 
Review, U.A.L., February 1974, p.6 in Tomlinson, B., 
The Role of Private Foreign Investment and Multi-
national Corporations in the Economic pevelopment 
of South Africa, unpublished MBA thesis, UCT, 1975. 
Prima facie, it thus appears that MNCs or their subsidi.aries 
are more l~kely to rely on equity than on borrowing (either 
local or offshore) as a means of finance. On the other hand, 
these figures are now quite dated, and there is considerable 
variation in the gearing of the different sectors. 
Manufacturing, in particular, appears to use debt to a much 
greater degree than either mining or financial services. 
Nevertheless, it appears on balance that capital inflows are of 
secondary importance to the .financing of MNCs, which says a 
great deal about the financing ability of local financial and 
capital markets. 
2.2 The Provision of Technology 
The United Nations Commission on Transnational Companies 
(UNCNTC) (1983:162-3) defines technology as follows: 
"Technology may be embodied in the form of capital 
goods, such as machinery, equipment, and physical 
structures; or it may be disembodied in such forms as 
industrial property rights, unpatented know-how, 
management and organisation, and design and operating 
instructions for production systems. Foreign direct 
investment has traditionally been one of the most 
important channels of technology transfer as it 
involves the physical reiocation of entire production 
systems, combining in a single package capital goods 
and a number of the forms of disembodied technology." 
Studies of the determinants of economic growth, such as those 
undertaken by Denison (1967), have typically concluded that 
the largest single contributing factor is technological 
progress, as opposed to capital accumulation, improved 
education or any other specific factor. Technology is 
analogous to capital in that resources currently devoted to 
investment in making technological improvements are expected 
to permit larger output to be realised in the future. 
However, there is a very important difference between capital 
and technology, d~riving from the public-good characteristics 
of the latter (Williamson and Milner, 1991). There is no 
universal or perfect solution to the problem of public-good 
provision but one possibility is to have the state provide the 
service in question, another is to create a patent system in 
order to provide the incentive to overcome free riding. In 
practice, most societies use a variety of ways to ensure a 
continued supply of technology, including these two options. 
It is the public-good characteristics of technology that are 
responsible for the fact that present-day developing countries 
have the chance of making the transition from a subsistence 
economy to affluence so much more rapidly than did the first· 
industrial countries. In itself, this is an enormous 
advantage, but it does not mean that developing countries face 
no problems of access to suitable technology. For LDCs with 
limited resources domestic production of technology is not 
economically feasible, and t~ey must acquire it by purchasing 
or imitating it (Singer, 1970-1971; Stiglitz, 1987; Amsden, 
1989; Baark, 1991). The crucial role of FDI is to provide 
foreign technology and capital goods more cheaply than it 
would cost to develop them at home (Sender and Smith, 1986). 
According to Dicken (1986:362) three issues are especially 
important in evaluating the technological impact of MNCs on 
host countries: 
11 1. The extent to which technology is transferred 
both within the bounds of the TNC and to other -
domestically based - enterprises. 
2. The appropriateness of the technology transferred 
- both processes and products. 
3. The costs to the host economy of acquiring the 
technology." 
The existence of a particular technology within a MNC does not 
guarantee that its benefits will be widely diffused through a 
host economy. This depends on the extent to which the 
technology is made available to potential users outside the 
MNC either directly, via linkages with indigenous firms, or 
indirectly via 'demonstration' effects. Such diffusion 
immediately runs up against the problem of property rights. 
The public-good nature of technology, i.e. zero marginal costs 
of production once it is fully developed, dictate that 
continued private production requires some degree of monopoly 
which, in the technology market, is given form by patents. 
This is, of course, the essence of internalization, and 
provides a key rationale for the MN Cs existence. 
Consequently, MNCs tend to locate the bulk of their 
technology-creating activities - research and development - in 
their home countries or in other industrial countries where 
they can guard it. Lall (1974:10) has made this point as 
follows: 
"Even if it is admitted that TNCs transfer the best 
production technology, they do not transfer the 
capability to generate new technology to affiliates in 
the Third World. They transfer 'know-how' (production 
engineering) and not 'know-why' (basic design, 
research and development)." 
It is much more likely that · the MNC will transfer technology 
to a host country if the intention is to serve the host 
country market itself. This places the host country in a· 
relatively stronger bargaining position and as Reuber 
(1973:188) puts it: 
"Because of the relatively stronger bargaining position 
of the host country, it can insist on more R and D 
activity being carried on locally. And because of its 
interest in local demand and cost conditions and its 
long-term commitment, the firm has a greater incentive 
to take advantage of the gains to be obtained from 
,having research activities in intimate association 
with the host-country environment." 
In contrast, there is far less incentive for MNCs engaged in 
foreign production for exports to transfer technology to the 
host country because the production is destined for world 
markets where the dominant technologies are of ten more 
compatible with home country research and development. While 
this tends to be true for both developed and less developed 
host countries (Hood and Young, 1976), research and 
development by MNCs tends to be less represented in the 
latter. 
In the case of LDCs a major issue governing the impact of MNC 
technology transfer is its "appropriateness" in terms of local 
factor endowments (and prices) and local needs (Stewart, 1977; 
Soete, 1985; Dahlman et al, 1987; Meth, 1990). The 'factor-
proportions problem' is also important in LDCs and a wide 
range of literature has emerged on the subject (Eckhaus, 1955; 
Higgins, 1958; Streeten, 1971; Stewart, 1978, 1974; Singer, 
1975; Marsh et al, 1983; Amsden, 1985; Soete, 1988). The 
transfer of "inappropriate" technology exacerbates the factor 
proportions problem. For example if capital-intensive 
technology is transferred by MNCs then this places severe 
limits on the degree of lab6ur absorption possible. Local 
entrepreneurs are then faced with a limited range of 
relatively capital-intensive production techniques and are 
unable to substitute their own technologies because of what 
Singer (1970-71:64) has called the system of international 
j 
technological dualism II the fact that knowledge is 
accumulated by the richer countries, in the richer countries 
and in respect to the problems of the richer countries". The 
role of "inappropriate" technology in exacerbating the factor 
proportions problem was explained in Chapter 1. 
Apart from aggravating the unemployment problem the intro-
duction of excessively capital-intensive technology may worsen 
existing income inequalities, encourage local firms to operate 
similar inappropriate production processes via the "demon-
stration effect", and bias production towards inappropriate 
types of consumption for which the technology has been 
developed (Edwards, 1985; Kaplan, 1991). 
In the light of these problems, it is obvious that the degree 
to which MNCs adapt their technology to suit local economic 
conditions in host countries is a crucial factor. There is 
much disagreement about the extent to which this occurs 
(Kirkpatrick et al, 1984). Firstly, Hood and Young (1979) 
point out that there are several factors that work against 
adaptation : technologies appropriate to conditions in LDCs 
may not exist; distortions in the price of goods and factors 
may encourage the use of too much capital in relation to 
labour; small markets and mo~opoly advantages may reduce the 
incentive to find appropriate technologies; and skilled labour 
may be scarce in LDCs. 
Secondly, Lall and Streeten (1977:72) make a distinction 
between adaptability and adaptation. They maintain that much 
of the technology in "high-tech" industry cannot be changed to 
suit LDCs' endowments but that other 'low' and peripheral 
technology is more adaptable, although at some cost. However, 
it seems that MNCs have not attempted in any significant way 
to adapt their technology, save some scaling down of produc-
tion runs to adjust to smaller markets. They also report no 
evidence that MNCs are any better or worse than locally owned 
firms when it comes to adaptation. 
Apart from the same general reasons stated by Hood and Young 
for the lack of any major modification of transferred tech-
nology, Lall and Streeten point out that it is on the basis 
of possessing technology (inappropriate or otherwise) that 
MNCs have become multinational, and that asking them to modify 
it is tantamount to asking them to relinquish those assets 
that underpin their existence. In other words, MNCs have 
little incentive to adapt their technology. The problem of 
inappropriate technology is thus merely a part of the wider 
question of the appropriateness of private ownership. 
Thirdly, there are considerable differences between industries 
in relative capital- and labour-intensity. Textiles, footwear 
and food processing are some ·examples of relatively labour-
intensive industries. If there is limited scope for techno-
logical adaptation in a particular industry this need not be 
an accurate reflection of the entire host country economy. 
Empirical studies have not always produced clear cut results, 
especially those done on a cross-sectional or inter-industry 
basis (R. Jenkins, 1990). Support for the notion that only a 
limited degree of adaptation takes place comes from 
Reuber (1973, ch.6) who reports that in a study of 78 MNCs 
drawn from a range of industries and countries, process 
technology was unchanged in 73 per cent of cases and 
quality-control systems in 83 per cent. Courtney and 
Leipziger (1975) found that in six of eleven industries 
studied, technology differed between MNC affiliates in LDCs 
and industrialised countries, but not in a systematic manner : 
in the other five industries there were no significant 
differences in factor-intensity. Yeoman (1976) found that the 
amount of adaptation varied significantly between industries, 
suggesting intrinsic differences in technology. All three of 
these surveys suggested that MNCs only make adaptations that 
are cost effective and are usually related to market size. 
Such conclusions have also been reached in other studies by 
Morley and Smith (1977) and Strassmann (1968). 
On the other hand, not all share this view. In a recent work, 
Lall (1985) claims that the appropriateness debate has been 
conducted at a fairly high level of abstraction, taking as 
given that MNCs transfer unadapted technology from developed 
to developing countries. 
"At the micro-level, 
new application of 
adaptive effort. 
He claims (p.74) that: 
this premise is unfounded. Every 
a technology entails considerable 
The core process may not be signi-
ficantly altered, but changes in scale, 
outputs, automation, etc., may constitute 
10-60 per cent of total project costs". 
inputs, 
between 
The question still remains, how do MNC input choices compare 
with those of local firms. After a valuable literature survey 
of this issue, Caves (1982:269) (see also Marsh et al, 1983; 
R. Jenkins, 1990) reaches the conclusion that: 
" numerous studies have found differences between 
technologies chosen by, local firms and foreign 
subsidiaries, although only a few have controlled for 
many of the factors that might explain why the 
differences occur. When there is little or no control 
for industry mix, for example, a sufficient 
explanation for greater capital intensity in MNE 
plants will be their tendency to populate more 
capital-intensive industries than native enterprises. 
Even with reasonably good controls for industry mix 
(and perhaps other variables), the results are still 
somewhat divergent". 
Several reasons why MNCs might face different factor prices to 
domestic firms have been suggested. Wells (1973), Mason 
(1973) and Biersteker (1978), for example, find that MNCs are 
more capital intensive and pay higher wages, which suggests 
that unlike local firms MNCs are not influenced exclusively by 
local factor costs. Pack (1976), on the other hand, argues 
that MNC managers are more alert to ways of cutting costs by 
substituting labour for capital than those of locally-owned 
firms. Other studies have s~ggested that the oligopolistic 
nature of MNCs reduces their incentive to adapt technology 
despite the loss of potential efficiency gains (Yeoman, 1976; 
White, 1976). 
The second major issue in the appropriateness debate relates 
.to the kinds of products transferred by MNCs to developing 
countries (Helleiner, 1975). In the drive to create global 
markets, MNCs attempt to introduce their products throughout 
the developing world, creating particular types of demand 
patterns, and shaping consumer tastes and preferences that may 
not accord with LDC development goals. This problem is 
intrinsic to the pursuit of profit, and without some 
regulation it is arguably detrimental. Radical theorists such 
as Radice (1975) argue that this creates technology 
"dependence" which can only be explained by the theory of 
imperialism. Lall and Streeten (1977:71) say that the problem 
is: 
" that the use of scarce resources for the production 
of goods which are over-differentiated, over-packaged, 
over-promoted, over-specified and within the reach of 
only a small elite, or, if bought by the poor, at the 
expense of more essential products, is not conducive 
to 'national welfare'." 
In other words, the private values represented by market 
prices do not reflect social values, causing socially 
inefficient levels and mixes of output to occur. The problem 
is to decide exactly what constitutes social value or 
'national welfare'. There can, for example, be different 
criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of technology (see 
Eckhaus, 1977 for an extensive discussion) such as: 
11 1. maximization of net output, consumption and of 
the rate of growth and employment, 
2. 
3. 
minimization of regional 
payments deficits and of 
distribution, 
imbalances, balance of 
inequality in income 
maximization of economic and political 
independence and self-reliance, of resource 
productivity and improvement in the quality of 
life" (Erdilek, 1982). 
Another aspect of the appropriateness issue relates to the 
environmental and safety dimension of MNC activity. Little 
evidence exists as to whether MNCs export technologies to LDCs 
that are environmentally obje~tionable or unsafe, but a recent 
study by Pearson (1985) raises serious questions and suggests 
that host governments should be far more stringent in their 
regulation of environmental and safety standards. The chief 
problem with this is that host governments often do not have 
sufficient information to effectively police MNCs. 
These warnings about the "appropriateness" of technology do 
not mean that there has been no adaptation of products for LDC 
markets and conditions. Lall (1985:74) argues that: 
"Product ranges of TNCs in developing countries are 
very different from those in advanced countries, and 
new products are developed specifically for developing 
countries conditions. There is no evidence that TNCs 
lag behind local firms in generating 'appropriate' 
technology in this limited sense." 
There are also many cases ·where transfers of unadapted 
technology to LDCs have had a markedly beneficial effect on 
them, including those in agriculture and health care. Lall 
(1985) takes this argument still further. He argues that the 
debate over "appropriateness" is now largely academic because 
LDC policy makers have perforce opted for modern technology 
owing to global competition. Therefore, 
"Technological progress in the advanced world continues 
to produce more efficient products and processes, 
whose deployment would raise productivity in 
developing as well as developed economies, generally 
regardless of different factor prices" (p.73). 
The third major issue in evaluating the technological impact 
of MNCs on LDCs relates to the costs of acquiring the 
technology. As already intimated, the technology 'market' 
differs in several respects from a normal commodity market. 
Firstly, the expense of its development and commercialisation 
mean that initial (fixed) costs are high, causing its 
ownership to be highly concentrated. Secondly, the intrinsic 
"publicness" of technology implies that private production of 
it can only be economic if underpinned by secrecy and 
enforceable property rights. Thirdly, technology is often 
only one part of the overall package of attributes that a MNC 
transfers to a host country, and it is difficult to separate 
the technology from the other parts of the package. Fourthly, 
information about the product is asymmetrically distributed 
between the MNC and the host country which cannot know all 
there is to know about the technology until it has been 
purchased - by which time it ~s too late. Lastly, LDCs have 
little capacity to substitute technology of their own. They 
are, to some extent, in the position of having to pay what the 
market will bear. The technology market is thus far from 
competitive. It is characterised by bilateral monopoly, where 
the "equilibrium price" is not set by market forces but by 
bargaining power, a situation where LDCs are at a grave 
disadvantage. 
An assessment of the cost of technology presupposes that it 
can be measured against alternative ways of acquiring the same 
technology. The major alternatives are: 
11 1. Initiative where the LDCs construct plants 
chiefly imitating the technology in the Des. 
2. Contractual where a LDC obtains capital and 
know-how usually through licensing. 
3. Joint venture where foreign firms collaborate 
with the home industries and could agree with 
minority holdings in assets. 
4. Subsidiaries where the foreign companies set up 
wholly- or partly-owned subsidiaries with the 
host country exercising little or some influence. 
5. Turn-key projects where the whole plant is 
transferred along with all the different stages 
of production to the point of final consumption 
through the marketing and distribution of the 
final products" (Ghatak, 1986:150). 
The choice of form is strongly influenced by the policy of the 
host government and the market to be serviced, but it also 
depends on the type of technology, the market power and 
corporate policy of the MNC, and the need of the LDC to 
acquire sophisticated technology. The cost will depend 
greatly on the form of transfer chosen and of the bargaining 
power of the parties. The eventual price will lie between the 
low marginal cost of transferring the technology (but see 
Teece, 1976) and a higher price that would drive the buyer to 
other sources. Within these two limits there is no price 
which a priori could be considered more or less appropriate. 
The alleged problems associated with the cost of transferred 
technology are, firstly, that the royalties and licence fees 
charged by MNCs are too high; secondly, that tie-in clauses 
in technology contracts require the licensee to purchase 
capital equipment and intermediate parts from the parent 
company, when such items coulq have been obtained more cheaply 
elsewhere; and thirdly, that technology contracts often 
prohibit the export of commodities manufactured with that 
technology (Hood and Young, 1979:201; R. Jenkins, 1989). 
However, these criticisms cannot be ascribed purely to MNC 
avarice, and are more a reflection of the public-good peculia-
rities of the technology market, in particular the patent 
system (Johnson, 1972; Williamson and Milner, 1991). 
Patenting is a common procedure for transferring technology 
and often includes restrictive clauses. It is alleged that 
patents are taken out merely to block competition which has 
the effect of preventing cheaper imports and more efficient 
local production. For example, an UNCTAD (1972) study found 
that in Peru only one per cent of the total number of patents 
granted were exploited betw~en 1964-79. But non-use of 
patents per se does not automatically imply abuse of the 
system. Non-use may simply reflect non-viability (Penrose, 
1973). In a study of 250 contracts for technology transfer 
in Latin America, Viatsos (1975) found that 81 per cent of 
them prohibited exports totally and 5 per cent incorporated 
other export restrictions. Of indigenously owned firms, 92 
per cent of the contracts prohibited the exportation of 
commodities produced with foreign technology. Two-thirds of 
the contracts for which information was available included 
tie-in clauses, or similar contractual restrictions. It would 
appear, then, that the transfer of technology under such 
circumstances seriously affects the net benefits available to 
host countries. On the other hand, Lall and Streeten 
(1977:69) point out that with the growing stock of unpatented 
(and unpatentable) knowledge, growing global markets and 
increasing importance of marketing vis a vis technology in 
securing oligopolistic market shares, the importance of 
patents in a number of leading industries is declining 
sharply. This point is supported by Evans' (1986) study of 
the transformation of the Brazilian computer industry. 
In a useful case study of the 
Kirim (1985) has investigated 
Turkish pharmaceutical industry 
the role that patents play in 
LDC economic development. Kirim presents evidence that there 
is no simple and straightforward relationship between patents 
on the one hand and technological dependence and retardation 
of industrialisation on the other. The choice of pharma-
ceuticals is also interesting in view of the industry's 
reputation for transfer pricing (see, amongst others, Vaitsos, 
1974; Lall, 1980; UNCTAD, 1975; Katz, 1973; O'Brien, 1974). 
Kirim finds that contrary to the expectations of advocates of 
the patent system, its absence since 1961 has not adversely 
influenced the flow of FDI into Turkey, but neither has.it led 
to the _development of domestic technology. It has resulted in 
the growth of locally-owned drug firms but they are no more 
competitive than the MNCs. No evidence was found that non-use 
of patents ipso facto implies a loss of competitive 
efficiency. 
It would be wrong to see the technology aspects of MNC 
operations as separate or separable from the wider problem of 
public good provision. Th~ transfer of technology, its 
appropriateness and cost are al-1 bound up in legitimate market 
processes. The question ultimately is to what extent the 
market needs regulation and supervision in order to bring 
private and social costs closer into line, assuming that some 
measure of social welfare costs can be agreed on. 
Some idea of the role of technology in South Africa is provided 
by the Reynders Commission (1972) which drew a 10 per cent 
sample from a register of licensing and know-how agreements 
kept by the Department of Industries since the late 1960s. The 
sample revealed that 93 per cent of such agreements pertained 
to the manufacturing sector and 27 per cent of all agreements 
in the sample related to the machinery and equipment sector (8 
per cent electrical and 19 per cent non-electrical). The us 
was the major supplier of tech~ology and accounted for 34 per 
cent of agreements while the UK accounted for 26 per cent and 
West Germany 13 per cent. A feature of the agreements which 
was of great interest to the Commission was the restriction on 
exports which they contained. All the agreements stipulated 
tha·t licensees could not export outside Africa, al though most 
of them acknowledged that Africa and especially Southern Africa 
constituted South Africa's "natural market". According to the 
Commission: 
"none of the agreements provided for export outside 
African territories ... in 30 per cent of the cases the 
sales territory was restricted to the Republic; in 5 
per cent to the Republic and Namibia; in 56 per cent to 
the Republic, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Rhodesia, 
Angola and Mozambique; in 4 per cent to the Republic 
and to all countries south of the Sahara, and in 5 per 
cent to the whole of Afrtca" (1972:171). 
Like the Reynders Commission in 1972, the author's survey found 
that the role of technology is often circumscribed by various 
constraints written into licensing and know-how agreements. 
These constraints reduce the net social benefits to be derived 
from technological transfer because they prohibit certain types 
of remunerative commercial activity, like exports to certain 
markets, etc. This is true of both locally-controlled and 
foreign-controlled licensees. Even when foreign-ownership is 
100 per cent, these restrictions are often enforced. Of the 21 
locally-controlled firms (78 percent) who were licensees, 14 or 
just over half, said that they were subject to export 
restrictions (in the main to South and Southern Africa) and/or 
sourcing restrictions, where they had to purchase inputs from 
specified suppliers abroad. 
On the whole, replies from foreign-controlled firms were more 
complex, owing to differences in the degree of foreign-
ownership. 5 firms, all 100 per cent foreign-owned, reported 
free and unrestricted access to parent company technology and R 
and D, with no restrictions on the use to which they could put 
this knowledge. The remaining firms all said that they were 
subject to some form of export restriction or tie-in clause, in 
the same way as locally-controlled firms. A greater number of 
foreign than local respondents were not prepared to disclose 
the nature of their technological links with overseas 
companies. 
The fact that 78 per cent of locally-controlled firms were 




in view of 
that when 
the debate over 
technological 
dependence is included, estimates of penetration levels will be 
much greater, especially in those sectors like chemicals, 
rubber and plastics, and fabricated metals, machinery and 
equipment, where licensees are concentrated. 
The issue of technological dependence is central to an under-
standing of the constraints on economic development in LDCs. 
The significance of FDI lies in its role as a provider of the 
necessary technology to · enable host-country production of 
capital goods. Only in this way can import dependence be 
reduced (see Michaely, 1974; Amsden, 1989). 
The Reynders Commission did not explicitly make a finding on 
South Africa's dependence on foreign technology, but a survey 
by the University of Natal in 1973 (Nattrass and Brown, 1977) 
revealed a heavy dependence on foreign technology in the 
manufacturing sector (see Table 3.6). 74 per cent of the 
sample claimed that 90 per cent or more of the technology being 
used was of foreign origin, and 62 per cent of respondents used 
techniques that embodied 100 per cent foreign technology. Only 
10 per cent of the sample used processes embodying less than 50 
per cent foreign technoiogy. The study, however, failed to 
show any significant differences in the degree to which 
foreign- and locally-controlled firms were dependent on foreign 
technology. 
TABLE 3.6 
THE DEGREE OF UTILISATION OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY 
AMONGST SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING FIRMS : 1973 
Percentage of Responding Firms 
Foreign 
Technology Used Number cumulative Percentage Cumulative 
who used Freauencv who used Freauencv 
Exclusively 
Foreign Technology 
= 100 per cent 169 169 62 62 
over 90 II II 32 201 11 74 
over 80 II II 23 224 8 79 
over 75 " II 7 231 2 81 
over 50 II II 25 256 9 90 
over 25 II " 8 264 3 93 
over 0 II II 7 271 3 96 
Exclusively Local 
= o per cent 11 11 4 4 
Source: Nattrass and Brown, 1977. 
A survey by Black in 1983 revealed that although dependence on 
foreign technology was declining, it was still high in the 
manufacturing sector, with no less than 84 per cent of new 
embodied technology being imported (Black, 1985:155). This 
continued dependence is a primary result of the retardation of 
the local capital goods industry noted in Chapter 2. 
In order to ascertain the degree of reliance on foreign 
technology of both locally- and foreign-controlled firms, the 
author's survey used the proportion of plant and equipment 
imported as an indicator, rather than ask respondents how they 
felt about the issue, which was the approach used by the 
University of Natal survey. Although our approach thus covers 
only embodied technology, other parts of the survey relate to 
, disembodied technology. 
From Figure 3.2 it can be seen that only 8 per cent of local 
and 4 per cent of foreign respondents were using 100 per cent 
imported plant and equipment; 24 and 28 per cent of local and 
foreign respondents respectively were using more than 90 per 
cent imported plant and equipment; 84 per cent of both local 
and foreign respondents were using more than 50 per cent 
imported plant and equipment; and so on. Whilst this sample 
illustrates very clearly the substantial extent to which all 
manufacturing firms rely on imports of plant and equipment, 
this reliance is significantly less than that found by the 
Natal survey in 1973, even allowing for the fact that firms may 
not have been asked for quite the same information. This 
serves to confirm Black's 1983 finding that dependence on 
foreign technology, though high, is declining. 
FIGURE 3.2 
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It is often hypothesized (Reuber, 1973; Scerri, 1988) that MNCs 
make greater use of foreign technology than indigenous firms 
but there is no evidence of this in our survey as Figure 3.2 
shows. If any bias does exist towards importing plant and 
equipment, locally-owned firms are the guilty parties. 
Furthermore, when asked 
modifications to imported 
whether they make any 
technology in order 
adaptations or 
to suit local 
conditions, 62 per cent of foreign and only 41 per cent of 
local respondents reported that they did. 
Amongst 
smaller 
those that did make 
number of local 
changes, nearly a half of the 




in firm size the remainder citing reasons as 
different factory configurations, road conditions 
Surprisingly, only one local respondent changed 
because of differences in factor prices. A similar pattern is 
found among those foreign respondents who made changes to 
imported technology. Just under half gave firm size as the key 
variable. Most of the others stated that local specifications 
or customer requirements were important. 
that factor prices played any role. 
Very few reported 
These results suggest that firm size is the most important 
determinant of choice of production technique. On the other 
hand, 90 per cent of foreign and 70 per cent of local 
respondents are using more capital per worker than in the past. 
A breakdown of the reasons for this increasing capital 
intensity reveals that higher labour costs and the need for 
more stringent quality control were the most important factors 
responsible for this trend. The shortage of skilled manpower, 
inflexible production techniques and labour unrest were less 
important factors. There was no significant difference between 
foreign and local respondents (see Figure 3.3). 
Conventional theory often ascribes 
deepening in the 1970s and 1980s to 
the observed capital-
artificially low interest 
rates and overvalued exchange rates. However, our respondents 
did not identify these fac:tors, perhaps because of their 
macroeconomic nature, although they did say that higher labour 
costs were significant, which is the other side of the coin. 
It is also important to note that the effects of low interest 
rates and overvalued exchange rates was largely offset by the 
deterioration in the import price index during the 1970s (see 
Table 3.7), especially that component relating to machinery 
for which the import price elasticity is very low. 
Furthermore, the devaluation of the Rand during the 1980s 
raised the cost of imported capital goods still further (Black, 
1990) thus restraining more rapid capital-deepening. 
FIGURE 3.3 
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR INCREASING CAPITAL INTENSITY 
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Source: Gelb, 1991. 
Often .there is no longer the option to switch between capital 
intensive and labour intensive techniques because of the 
imperatives of international competitiveness, at least for as 
long as the domestic economy is fully integrated with the world 
economy. Because most modern technology has been developed in 
a capital-intensive, high-labour-cost environment, there are 
often no viable labour-intensive alternatives (Stoneman, 1988). 
The Reynders Commission also provided some indication of 
research and development (R and D) activities in South Africa. 
An indication of the relative insignificance of South African-
generated technology is given by figures for the export of such 
technology, "Overseas marketing of South African technological 
services under royalty, licensing, copyright and patent 
agreements is still extremely limited and earnings from this 
source amounted to only Rl million during the period 1966 to 
1970 11 (p.172). According to Fransman (1980:31), in 1968/9 27 
per cent of total R and D expenditure was undertaken by the 
private sector, compared with 60 per cent in the U.K. (in 
1967/8), and 69 per cent in the U.S. Of this expenditure, 52 
per cent went on mining, 42 per cent on manufacturing, 3 per 
cent on services, and 3 per cent on agriculture. 
This picture of the pattern of R and D expenditure is 
supplemented by Scerri (1988:115) who reports that in 1981 the 
manufacturing sector was the largest absorber of R and D 
expenditure - 37 per cent of all R and D expenditure in the 
natural sciences. The importance of the public sector as a 
source of R and D is underlined by the data in Table 3.8, which 
lists the relative contribution of different R and D performers 
to total R and D expenditure within specific industries. This 
data can be compared with that in Table 3.9, which ranks R and 
D intensity across industries, as measured by the ratio of R 
and D expenditure to sales revenue. As can be seen, the value 
placed on such activity in the private sector seems to be 
relatively low. In particular, the low ratios reported for 
industries usually associated with a high technology component, 
namely rubber products, plastic products, fabricated metal 
products, chemicals (other than industrial) and motor vehicles, 
is a notable feature. Scerri (1988:114) suggests two factors 
which may account for this phenomenon; the presence of large 
economies of scale in the required R and D process; and a high 
incidence of foreign ownership and control at enterprise 
level. Both factors, he argues, would induce a heavy 
dependence on imported technology. 
TABLE 3.8 
PERCENTAGE SHARES !N TOTAL APPLIED R AND D EXPENDITURE 





and public research education 
corp. business labs. inst. 
Machinery, except electrical 98 1 - 1 
Textiles 87 1 - 12 
Basic iron and steel industries 87 11 - 2 
Non-ferrous metal basic industries 85 1 7 7 
Electrical machinery_ 85 13 - 2 
Transport equipment, except motor vehicles and parts 72 28 - -
Industrial chemicals 69 29 - 2 
Wood and wood products 65 23 1 11 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery 45 54 - 1 
Beverages and tobacco 43 22 34 1 
Rubber products 40 60 - -
Non-metallic mineral products 32 67 - 1 
Food 30 49 17 4 
Chemical products, except industrial chemicals 20 68 - 12 
Paper and paper products 18 78 - 4 
Motor vehicles and parts 12 87 - 1 
Plastic products n.e.c. 7 84 - 9 
Printing, publishing and allied industries - 16 84 -
Leather and leather products - 1 97 2 
Footwear - - 100 -
Source: Scerri, 1988. 
TABLE 3.9 
APPLIED R AND D EXPENDITURE AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF SALES 
Industry 1966 1983 
Electrical machinery 0.20 2.09 
Machinery, except electrical 0.05 1.35 
Industrial chemicals 2.49 1.16 
Transport equipment, except motor vehicles and parts 0.30 0.45 
Non-ferrous metal basic industries 0.14 0.40 
Basic iron and steel industries 0.24 0.27 
Leather and leather products 0.17 0.23 
Non-metallic mineral products 0.40 0.21 
Textiles 0.10 0.15 
Wood and wood products 0.21 0.15 
Rubber products n.a. 0.11 
Plastic products n.e.c. n.a. 0.11 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery 0.08 0.10 
Chemical products, except industrial chemicals 0.11 0.10 
Beverages and tobacco 0.03 0.09 
Food 0.06 0.09 
Paper and paper products 0.09 0.08 
Motor vehicles and parts 0.02 0.06 
Footwear 0.05 0.03 
Printing, publishing and allied industries 0.01 0.01 
Source: Scerri, 1988. 
The hypothesis that MNCs are more likely to have access to the 
results of foreign R and D expenditure and consequently are 
less likely to undertake such expenditure in host countries 
than indigenous firms (the so-called branch plant hypothesis), 
is not supported in the case of South Africa by the evidence 
from the 1973 University of Natal survey. This survey 
confirmed that a very small proportion of resident 
manufacturers engage in Rand D activity, but that there was no 
significant difference in R and D expenditure between foreign 
and local firms. Table 3·.10 shows that less than one third of 
both local- and foreign-controlled firms undertook R and p, and 
90 per cent or more felt that it was cheaper to import such 
information than to develop it locally. Though, as McGrath and 
Jenkins (1985:40) and Kahn (199la) point out, foreign firms may 
be more important than these results indicate, as they may 
supply capital goods embodying foreign technology to both 
locally- and foreign-controlled firms. 
TABLE 3,10 















Source: Nat tr ass and Brown, 1977. 
Firms who believed it 
cheaper to import 







Evidence from our survey (see Table 3.11) is that 58 per cent 
of foreign and 74 per cent of local respondents carried out R 
and D activities in 1991. This level of activity is 
considerably more than observed before, and confirms the view 
that the level of technological dependence is dropping. The 
difference between the number of local and foreign respondents 
doing R and D suggests that ownership is a relevant factor in 
the source of R and D, in contrast with the Natal survey. 
TABLE 3.11 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE BY OWNERSHIP 
AND SECTOR. 1991 
R and 
< 1% 
F % L % 
Textiles 7 5 
Chemicals 7 -
Machinery 20 15 
Other 7 10 
Total 41 30 
Fn = 15 = 58% of sample 
Ln = 20 + 74% of sample 
D Expenditure as a 
Expenditure 
1% < > 3% 3% < 
F % L % F % 
- - .... 
33 15 -
20 20 7 
- 5 -
53 40 7 
% of Total 
> 6% = 






Figures may not add up to 100% because of rounding 








This difference is emphasized by the breakdown of R and D 
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure. The 
resulting distribution shows that on average foreign-controlled 
firms spend considerably less on R and D than locally-
controlled firms, with 94 per cent of foreign-controlled firms 
and 70 per cent of locally-controlled firms spending 3 per cent 
or less of total expenditure on R and D. Only one 
foreign-controlled firm reported R and D expenditure of 
greater than 3 per cent, in contrast to 6 locally-controlled 
ones that did, including 2 which spent as much as 10 per cent. 
The sample of firms that did R and D is too small to infer 
much about industry-specific influences on R and D expenditure, 
other than to note that this expenditure is higher in chemicals 
and machinery than in, say, textiles. This finding confirms 
the ranking of R and D expenditure as a percentage of sales 
given in Table 3.9. 
Meth (1991) has put forward an intriguing argument about South 
Africa's capital goods output and associated technological 
dependence. Dividing the output of capital goods into "core" 
and "peripheral" machines, he argues that "a country which 
imports more peripheral capital goods is less 'dependent' on 
foreign technology than one which imports more core capital 
goods - even though the ratio of total capital imports to GDP 
might be the same in both countries" (p.295). 
20 to 30 per cent of total capital goods 
Since only some 
imports in South 
Africa are core capital goods, the remainder being essentially 
service, i.e. peripheral capital goods, he argues that 
"manufacturing 'dependence·' on foreign technology is a lot less 
severe than commonly believed" (p.295). He maintains that 
because all but the most self-sufficient industrialised 
countries have to import peripheral capital goods, it is wrong 
to include them in any meaningful definition of dependence. 
Only core machines matter,. and in this regard South Africa does 
rather less badly than conventional definitions of capital 
goods dependence suggest. 
In brief, the technological impact of FDI on South African 
development can be evaluated in terms of the transfer, 
appropriateness and cost of ~oreign technology. On the first 
issue, evidence suggests that the transfer of technology is 
often 1 circumscribed by various constraints written into 
licensing and know-how agreements, and that a high proportion 
of local firms are foreign licensees, which suggests that the 
benefits of foreign technology are constrained and that the 
level of FD! penetration is greater than suggested prima facie. 
FDI is most important in its role as a 
and every effort should be made 
restrictions, whatever form FD! takes. 
provider of technology, 
to ease conditionality 
On the question of appropriateness, the current prevailing view 
(Amsden, 1985) is that the criterion here is international 
competitiveness rather than domestic resource endowments. The 
"right" technology is that which minimizes costs (for south 
Africa see Meth (1991)). However, our survey found no support 
for the view that MNCs make greater use of foreign technology 
than indigenous firms, and significantly it found that MNCs are 
more likely to adapt imported technology to suit local 
conditions. Neither was there any evidence to support the 
hypothesis that MNCs are less likely to engage in R and D. But 
what our study did confirm was the high, albeit declining, 
dependence of both foreign and local firms on foreign 
technology. 
This dependence is directly related to the third issue in the 
evaluation of the role of technology, that of cost. Given the 
underdevelopment of the South African capital goods industry, 
resident firms are given little option but to import their 
capital goods requirements. This makes comparisons of 
alternative ways of acquiring technology problematic but it is 
interesting to note that our survey indicated a greater 
willingness among local firms to undertake R and D than has 
been found heretofore. Clearly there exists a need to reduce 
imports of capital and intermediate goods, but this cannot be 
done until local substitutes are available at equivaient cost. 
The policy implications of this are examined in Chapter 5 below 
but cost minimizing forms of technology transfer (which is 
necessary for the expansion of the capital goods sector) need 
to be . thoroughly examined. Amongst such forms are licensing 
contracts and joint ventures (see Oman, 1989) which have both 
been operated successfully in South Africa in the past. In 
view of the continuing perception that South Africa is a high 
risk country, capital inflows associated with FDI are likely to 
remain small. In order to acquire foreign technology, 
greater emphasis needs to be placed on licensing and joint 
ventures. As we pointed out above in section 2.1, FDI has 
historically not been a large proportion of gross domestic 
fixed investment: The critical contribution of FDI has 
rather been the provision of technology. 
3. EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS 
McGrath and Jenkins (1985) have provided a succinct overview of 
the importance of FDI in generating new employment 
opportunities. They write (p~41): 
"Not only do new inflows establish new enterprises, but 
they have indirect effects on employment. If the 
economic activities of foreign-controlled companies add 
either to total income in a country, or to the host 
government's revenue, - or to the foreign exchange 
reserves, they will stimulate employment. Local 
competitors are likely to increase their employment if 
the presence of the foreign affiliate induces them to 
become more efficient and so grow faster, or if they 
are shown the way to a more efficient allocation of 
work and resources by sub-contracting out to a greater 
extent. Employment is also likely to be increased if 
the foreign-controlled operations have considerable 
linkages into the domestic economy". 
The issue of linkages is d~alt with in the next section. This 
section examines the employment patterns and practices of 
foreign- and locally-controlled firms in South Africa. 
In Table 2.16 it was shown that a high proportion of total 
manufacturing employment is subject to foreign control, 
although this declined from 27,7 per cent in 1978 to 21,3 per 
cent in 1990. Working from capital stock figures, and assuming 
the same capital : output ratio for both locally- and 
foreign-controlled firms in each sector, McGrath and Jenkins 
(1985:42) estimate that depending on the definition of control 
used, the proportion of employment subject to foreign control, 
for the economy as a whole, varies between 15 and 25 per cent. 
These estimates understate the employment impact of FDI because 
they do not include indirect employment generated via linkages 
with local industry. 
Whilst it is not feasible to arrive at an accurate figure for 
indirect employment, some indication of this is revealed in our 
survey. Unfortunately only 10 foreign respondents were able to 
give estimates for employment linkages, so the sample is not 
representative. Those firms that did respond were the large 
ones, both in terms of their employment size and in terms of 
their indirect employment impact. In particular, firms in the 
motor industry reported strong employment spin-offs, which is 
not surprising since one-eighth of total employment and output 
is said to originate in this industry (Black, 1991a). For 
example, two such firms reported that more than 250 local 
suppliers, distributors and competitors had come into being as 
a result of their activities, representing some 15 000 plus 
jobs. The fact that smaller firms did not respond to questions 
on indirect employment does not imply that their linkages are 




such information. on balance, then, FDI makes a 
contribution to employment in South Africa, 
if indirect employment is taken into account. 
A particular focus of attention in the South 




did not seem to be very 
Prior to the 1970s these practices 
different from those of locally-
controlled firms. There is also some debate as to whether any 
change in this pattern has occurred since then (Salmon, 1977; 
Holland, 1989). In 1973 a British parliamentary inquiry into 
thes~ practices revealed little difference in respect of racial 
segmentation of the occupatio~al ladder, and the Natal survey 
of the same year found no significant difference in attitudes 
towards trade unions and the works committee system (Nattrass 
and Brown, 1977). Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly 
to be found in the legal and social constraints on all firms 
operating in South Africa at the time, e.g. statutory job 
reservation, closed shop agreements, government opposition to 
certain trade unions, etc. Added to this is the fact that a 
large part of management of foreign-controlled firms is made up 
of local recruits,_ who most probably have the same management 
style as those in locally-controlled firms. our survey 
revealed that in 1990 on average 88 per cent of local senior 
management positions in foreign-controlled firms were filled by 
local personnel. 
the As a result of anti-Apart~eid pressure, 
practices of foreign-controlled firms came 
scrutiny in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in 
"codes" of practice being adopted by many, 
employment 









European Economic Community Code of Conduct and the U.S. 
Sullivan Code which late~ became known as the Statement of 
Principles for South Africa. These codes vary in their minimum 
requirements, but usually specify the recognition of the rights 
of workers to have trade union representation, the adoption of 
wage policies to achieve certain minimum levels, the desegre-
gation of factories wherever possible, the implementation of 
equal pay for equal work, the development of training 
programmes for black workers, and the improvement of fringe 
benefits and employees' living conditions (so-called social 
responsibility programmes) (McGrath and Jenkins, 1985). At its 
high point of anti-Apartheid pressure in 1987 the campaign to 
monitor the employment practices of foreign-controlled firms 
included not only the E.E.C. and Sullivan Codes, but also ones 
from Australia, Japan and Canada, apart from a U.S. State 
Department Code for non-Sullivan signatories (Paul, 1989:463). 
Although these were not always mandatory, most firms followed 
them because of the threat of hostile public opinion. As the 
country moves towards the New South Africa, this pressur~ is 
waning rapidly. 
In an effort to gain some clarity on the impact of the codes, 
and to identify ownership differences in attitudes towards 
trade unions and wage determination, our survey asked 
respondents several questions on their employment and labour 
relations practices. The size of the sample precludes any 
analysis at the sectoral or firm size level, but as Table 3.12 
shows, marginally more foreign-controlled firms reported no 
production losses at all owing to industrial action in the last 
5 years. on the other hand, 
controlled firms also reported 
a larger proportion of foreign-
heavy (more than 10 per cent, 
and in some cases as much as 25 per cent) losses of production. 
On the strength of this bimodal disparity, foreign-controlled 
firms in general cannot be argued to have been subject to any 
more pressure from trade unions than local firms, though in 
specific cases, especially in the motor industry, this has been 
the case, perhaps because of differences in management 
attitudes, both locally and abroad (Bell, 1990). That strikes 
have become an intrenched feature of the industrial landscape 
is shown by the fact that more than half of all firms have lost 
some production for this reason in the last 5 years. 
5 locally-controlled and 6 foreign-controlled firms said that 
they had no recognition agreements with trade unions. 
According to McGrath and Jenkins (1985:44) "an unforeseen spin 
off of the recognition of· Black trade unions by MNCs is that 
trade unions abroad, acting ·in sympathy with South African 
workers, can exercise substantial pressures on the parent 
company abroad, for worker rights in South Africa". This may 
account for differences in management style in specific cases 
(Adler, 1990). 
TABLE 3.12 
PRODUCTION LOSSES AND INDUSTRIAL ACTION BY 
OWNERSHIP. 1985-1990 
% of Production Lost 
= 0 
< 1 
1 < > 5 
5 < > 10 
10 < 
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The effect of the codes on real wages is impossible to 
determine for the economy as a whole. Venter (1989:165) has 
made crude estimates of the average increase in wages derived 
by black, "coloured" and Asian employees of U.S. MNCs who were 
signatories to the Statement of Principles for South Africa 
(SPSA) (also known as the Signatory Association), previously 
the Sullivan Code. According to him, the average wage 
increased in nominal terms from R342.8 in 1984 to R2 317.3 in 
1987, i.e. overall by Rl 059.5 per year per worker, while 
expenditure on community services increased from Rl80.6 to 
Rl 257.8 per year per worker. These are significant amounts 
but they are clearly limited to a small section of the 
workforce. 
In our survey firms were asked what proportion of their total 
budget was allocated to social responsibility programmes, such 
as educational and housing projects. The average percentage 
allocated by MNCs was 2.6 per cent, with 5 (20 per cent) of 
them reporting nil expenditure and 3 (12 per cent) reporting as 
much as 10 per cent or more. The average percentage allocated 
by indigenous firms was 1,5 per cent, with 4 (20 per cent) 
reporting nil expenditure, and 7 (25 per cent) refusing to 
divulge this information. These results suggest that 
foreign-controlled firms spend more on social responsibility 
programmes than their local counterparts. 
This climate of awareness and expectation has occurred at the 
same time as the rise in black real wages in the non-
agricultural sectors (excluding domestic service) (Hofmeyr, 
1990). The codes of conduct have contributed to the various 
upward pressures on black real wages noted during the 1970s and 
1980s (Knight and McGrath, 1987). Firms were asked to rank the 
importance of trade union pressure, codes of conduct, shortages 
of skilled labour and the eradication of job reservation, in 
wage determination over the last 10 years. The results of this 
are shown in Figure 3.4 All firms agreed that trade union 
pressure and codes of conduct pressure were the most important 
factors, followed by the shortage o,f skills and the eradication 
of job reservation. The impact of the codes was marginally 
stronger than trade union pressure in the case of MNCs, but 
what is most surprising is that locally-controlled firms were 
pressurised by the codes of ~onduct, which did not directly 
apply to them. This suggests that as a result of demonstration 
effects (Holland, 1989), the overall benefits of the codes are 
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This finding is consistent with the observations of Paul 
(1989:468) 
Signatory 
that those companies which withdrew from the 
Association through change of ownership ha,ve 
generally maintained their corporate social responsibility 
programmes. Disinvestment has not therefore put a stop to 
social activism and many locally-controlled firms now also 
operate their own programmes of social responsibility based on 
either their own criteria or those, for example, published by 
the Urban Foundation or the Cape Town City Council (Salmon, 
1977). Although MNCs all seem to agree that the Codes are an 
inefficient and ineffective way of pressurising the government 
(di Norcia, 1989), they do seem to have had an impact on 
industrial practices and wage determination. 
However, in view of all the other powerful forces acting on 
employment and labour relations, like increasing unemployment, 
economic growth, capital deepening, trade unionism and the 
eradication of Apartheid in the labour market, it is impossible 
to assess the direct contribution of the codes to increases in 
black real wages. Broadly speaking, the increase in black real 
wages in the post-war period has, according to Hofmeyr (1990), 
been caused by demand factors arising from economic growth and 
by the release of pent-up labour market pressures on the supply 
side, following the implementation of the recommendations of 
the Wiehahn Commission (1979) in the 1980s. 
As far as employment is concerned, Knight (1977) has estimated 
elasticities of substitution of black labour for other factors, 
including non-black labour, in the manufacturing and mining 
industries. According to his results the elasticity of 
substitution is positive but less than unity, which indicates 
that black employment will fall by a smaller proportion than 
black wages rise. At the same time, an increase in the amount 
of capital (including foreign capital) will reduce employment 
but by less than the increase in capital. 
4. LINKAGES INTO THE LOCAL ECONOMY 
In his review of MNCs, domestic enterprises and industrial 
structure in host developing countries, Lall (1978) identifies 
two broad sets of relationships, both of which are important 
for understanding the impact of FDI on host economies and for 
the formulation of policy. As he puts it (p.217): 
"The 'direct' relationships that TNCs strike up with 
local suppliers or purchasers (backward and forward 
'linkages' in the Hirschman (1958) sense) can consti-
tute powerful mechanisms for stimulating (or retarding) 
economic, and particularly industrial, growth in LDCs. 
The 'indirect' effects.that the entry and operations of 
TNCs may have on local industrial structure, conduct 
and performance may be equally important TNCs may 
change the nature and evolution of concentration; they 
may affect the profitability and growth of indigenous 
firms; they may alter financing, marketing, 
technological, or managerial practices of the sectors 
that they enter; they may, by predatory conduct, drive 
domestic firms out of business; and so on". 
Defined in this way, the concept of linkages is clearly 
different from a normal transaction in a competitive market 
because it includes externalities created for domestic industry 
L_ 
by the entry of TNC investment. This raises the serious 
problem of operationality, i.e. in. practice it is simply not 
practicable to measure linkages on such a broad definition. 
Furthermore, the concept of linkages suffers acutely from the 
problem of "as compared with what?" (Caves, 1982:272). 
However, bearing these constraints in mind, and focusing mainly 
on the "direct" relationships, the concept of linkages is a 
useful tool for examining the extent to which foreign 
affiliates are integrated into the local economy. 
Colman and Nixson (1986:343) write that: 
"It is usually argued that TNCs will establish few 
linkages with domestic firms. The highly centralised 
global structure of the TNC and the integrated nature 
of its global operations, its use of capital-intensive 
technologies and the nature of the final product, taken 
together lead many economists to argue that TNCs create 
a virtual 'enclave' in the host economy, integrating 
the 'modern', TNC-dominated sectors of the host economy 
with the international economy". 
Sunkel (1973), the radical Chilean economist, characterises 
this process as one of transnational integration and national 
disintegration. This view is most characteristic of MNCs 
operating in extractive industries and in export-oriented 
assembly activities such as those found in export processing 
zones. 
Backward linkages, created when new supplier industries provide 
inputs for foreign subsidiaries, and forward linkages, created 
when firms are established which use the MNC's product as an 
input, are potentially just as important to development as the 
provision of capital and technology. It is generally believed 
on theoretical grounds (Hirshman, 1958; Lall, 1978; Caves, 
1982) that backward linkages are more significant than forward 
linkages, and most empirical studies of linkages have looked at 
backward linkages only, distinguishing between import-
substituting and export-oriented MNC investment. 
Amongst the ways of measuring the extent of backward linkages 
is a method using the conce~t of retained yalue (Mikesell, 
1970; Murray, 1975; Thoburn, 1977) which expresses retained 
value added as a percentage of the total value of exports 
(R. Jenkins, 1987). Where this percentage is very low then the 
industry is regarded as an enclave. However, several authors 
have argued that there is a general tendency for retained value 
to increase over time, rendering the classical picture of a 
foreign-dominated enclave inaccurate, as subsidiaries.mature 
and their purchases of local inputs increase (Safarian, 1966; 
McAleese and McDonald, 1978). The problem with this concept is 
that it is usually not operational because the information 
required is unavailable in a usable form. 
Broadly speaking, a review of the literature reveals a 
consensus that although "the vast bulk of FDI in LDCs has gone 
into protected import-substituting 
1978:218), this type of FDI has been 
beneficial linkages, 
usually associated 
mainly owing to 
with small or 
activities" (Lall, 
inefficient in creating 
the economic limitations 
industrially backward 
economies. Balasubramanyam (1984) argues that where export-
oriented MNCs are exposed to the keen winds of international 
competition they will be more efficient, and pass onto the 
local economy greater benefits. 
It has been argued above (see Chapter 2) that although levels 
of FDI penetration in South Africa are not high by 
international standards, the country's heavy reliance on 
foreign technology increases this penetration. Apart from the 
issue of technological dependence, the extent of linkages is 
also crucial to the level of penetration. A Board of Trade and 
Industry (BTI) investigation into the use and availability of 
subcontracting firms, revealed that "subcontracting is not 
widely practised in South Africa and that a sufficient infra-
structure of subcontracting firms does not exist" (BTI Report 
Number 2614:162). It seems, then, that there is room for 
concern about the degree of MNC integration into local 
manufacturing, particularly since FDI is concentrated in the 
highly import-intensive capital goods industry. 
Apart from using retained value as a measure of MNC 
integration, one can also estimate the extent of backward 
linkages which according to Hirschman (1958) give more 
impetus to development than forward ones for individual 
sectors using the ratio of value added to total output as a 
proxy (Parris, 1981:141); a high ratio indicating weak linkages 
because inputs from other sectors are relatively small. But 
although this ratio can be calculated from the Input-output 
tables it is of limited value owing to its neglect of the 
absolute size and importance of individual sectors. In fact, 
value added may be a more appropriate measure of a sector's 
-contribution to production than this ratio which focuses purely 
on linkages. A high value added in itself is more desirable 
than a low one, ceteris paribus. 
In any event, Parris' hypothesis - that given a high level of 
penetration, the degree of integration is inversely related to 
the ratio of value added to total output is untestable for 
South Africa because we .lack sufficient detail about 
penetration at the sectoral level. 
clearer picture of MNC 1inkages in 
asked respondents questions relating 
forward linkages. 
In an attempt to get a 
south Africa our survey 
to both backward and 
The conventional view that the vast bulk of FDI in LDCs has 
gone into protected import-substituting activities rather than 
into export-promoting industry is exemplified by the sectoral 
distribution of FDI in South Africa, though FDI has not 
necessarily followed the pattern of effective protection within 
import-substituting industry (see Chapter 2). 
The evidence presented in Table 3.13 suggests that foreign-
controlled firms have a greater propensity to import than 
locally owned firms, particularly in the sectors textiles, 
clothing and leather, and fabricated metals, machinery and 
equipment. The average propensity to import of all locally 
owned firms in the sample is 20 per cent, as compared with the 
46 per cent of foreign-controlled firms. Although these 
figures perhaps overstate this difference because of the equ~l 
weighting of each sector in the calculation of the overall 
average, it is nonetheless an indication that foreign-
controlled firms have weaker integration into the local economy 
than domestically-controlled firms. 
TABLE 3.13 
MEAN PERCENTAGE OF INPUTS IMPORTED BY OWNERSHIP 
AND SECTOR 1991 
Textiles, clothing and leather 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 


















In the case of forward linkages, Table 3.14 presents evidence 
on the mean percentage of output exported according to owner-
ship and sector. As would be expected the figures are 
considerably lower than those for imports, both because the 
sectors surveyed were import-oriented, and because manufac-
turing is a net importer. ~lthough the relative differences 
between foreign- and locally-owned firms are large, the 
absolute differences are small, with the partial exception of 
the sector Others. The overall averages are 7 and 11 per cent 
for local and foreign firms respectively. If anything, local 
firms have marginally stronger forward linkages than do foreign 
firms. 
TABLE 3.14 
MEAN PERCENTAGE OF OUTPUT EXPORTED BY OWNERSHIP 
AND SECTOR 1991 
Ownership 
Local Foreign 
Textiles, clothing and leather 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 















Some idea of the types of linkages which have been created by 
MNCs may also be derived from a survey conducted by c. Jenkins 
(1986:151). As far as backward linkages_ are concerned, with 
the exception of one firm, all foreign affiliates interviewed 
indicated that, in value terms, at least 50 per cent of their 
inputs were imported. This figure is much lower when measured 
by weight (around 20 per cent), owing at least partly to 
weight-based local content regulations at the time. On the 
output side, MNCs appeared to.market very little outside South 
~frica, both because of the country's political isolation and 
uncompetitiveness. c. Jenkins concludes that "FDI in the 
manufacturing sector does not appear to have resulted in the 
development of strong linkages. The most well-developed 
linkages into the local economy tend to be those that probably 
do not contribute very much to the gross domestic product : all 
MNCs interviewed tend to make use of local transport, local 
advertising agencies, local architects and engineers, etc." 
(p.152). 
The creation of linkages can provide a stimulus to economic 
development and growth. According to many studies (Killick, 
1973; Parris, 1981; R. Jenkins, 1987) FDI's contribution to 
this objective has not been satisfactory. This, it is argued, 
is because many functions of the firm are retained in the 
parent company or in other affiliates and subsidiaries. On the 
other hand, some studies have found that MNCs have stronger 
linkages than their local counterparts (Willmore, 1976, 1986). 
The evidence for South Africa is ambiguous. As we know, the 
manufacturing sector as a whole is dependent on foreign 
technology to an unhealthy degree, and with the exception of 
minerals beneficiation, the contribution of manufacturing to 
total exports is small. But there is no evidence, apart from 
Table 3.13 (the results of which may not be representative), 
to support the view that ownership is a factor in the 
comparative performance of firms. As long as the local capital 
goods industry remains stunted, the linkages of all 
manufacturing firms will remain 
similarities will perforce predominate 
differences. 
weak, and behavioural 
over possible ownership 
5. MARKET STRUCTURE AND PROFITABILITY 
A major issue which divides opinion on MNCs is the extent to 
which large international firms are essentially competitive in 
nature or whether they represent substantial concentrations of 
economic power (R. Jenkins, 1987, 1989). A related question is 
whether FDI serves to increase competition or to monopolize 
those industries in host countries in which it takes place. 
Newfarmer (1979) argues that the question of competition is of 
such importance that it constitutes the major dividing line 
between those theorists in favour of FDI and those against. 
The reason why the extent of competition is regarded as so 
important is that it focuses attention on whether MNCs earn 
economic rents at the expense of host countries. This is a 
meaty theoretical issue, which often frames dependency theory 
critiques of FDI, since by implication, ownership and profits, 
the touchstones of capitalism, are called into question. In 
practice, this is an empirical issue but the evidence on trends 
in international competition is rather 
Dunning, 1981). Part of the reason for 
existence of a correlation between highly 
mixed (Lall, 1980; 
this is that the 
concentrated market 
structures in developing countries and the presence of MNCs 
implies nothing about causality. Other factors may equally 
well be responsible for this relationship, and we have no idea 
what the "alternate position" would have been had FDI not 
occurred. 
The neoclassical view regards it as almost axiomatic that FDI 
leads to a reduction in concentration, i.e. increased 
competition in host countries. 
degree of competition tends to 




over time the 
because the 
or because 
demonstration effects make local firms more competitive 
(Vernon, 1977). This competition keeps profits down, and where 
above, average returns are earned, this is owing to the owner-
ship of intangible assets ra~her than to market power. MNCs, 
in other words, are not an important source of market imperfec-
tions in host countries. 
In contrast, neo-marxist and dependency interpretations believe 
that MNCs have considerable market power, which they abuse to 
earn higher than average rates of prof it. This enables them to 
replace local competition over time. The question is, do MNCs 
in fact earn higher profits than local competitors, and if so, 
are Qifferential prof it rates explicable in terms Of industrial 
structure and risk adjustment. 
There are major problems in carrying out such an analysis, the 
principal one being the opportunities that MNCs have for 
transfer pricing. Thus the declared profits of a subsidiary do 
not necessarily reflect the true contribution of that 
subsidiary to the global profitability of the parent company. 
In the South African context this problem is aggravated by the 
existence of a dual exchange rate that provides added 
incentives for transfer pricing. Indeed, some commentators 
(Smit and Mocke, 1991; Kahn, 1991a) have seriously challenged 
the accurateness of official figures for prof it repatriation 
(see Chapter 4). This same dual exchange rate also 
"artificially" boosts the profits of new FDI (in terms of 
external currencies), which makes profitability comparisons 
between locally- and foreign-owned forms more complicated. 
Intra-firm trade permits subsidiaries to ~ransfer undeclared 
(and untaxed) profits out of a country through overpayments for 
intra-company imports, or underpricing of similar exports. 
Transfer pricing may respond to country tax differentials, to 
local shareholdings, to exchange controls, to risks of 




subsidiaries also commonly make various service 
parent firms such as management, technical and 
trademark fees, royalties, etc. These payments should be 
treated as an element of profit, and rates of return must 
reflect this. Thirdly, the measurement of profitability is 
ambiguous, in an accounting sense. 
clear how fixed assets transferred 
It is, for example, not 
within the organisation, 
especially if they are second hand, are to be valued. Nor is 
it always clear how technical know-how from the parent company 
has been capitalised as part of the capital transferred. 
Periodic revaluations of assets necessitated by inflation also 
complicate the situation (Langdon, 1981). Fourthly, as 
Chudnovsky (1973) has illustrated in the Columbian context, the 
ratio of debt to equity (the gearing ratio) can have a critical 
impact on the profitability of FDI, which is one reason why 
host country governments impose local borrowing ceilings. 
It is common knowledge that there is a very high level of 
economic concentration in South 
(Du Plessis, 1978; Tregenna-Piggott, 
African manufacturing 
1976). Fourie and Smit 
(1989) have shown that there is a tendency towards increased 
concentration, especially in those sectors where FDI levels are 
high. However, they also find that the extent of relative 
concentration is lowered significantly by foreign competition, 
which suggests that FDI in the manufacturing sector is a force 
for competition rather than concentration, if it has any 
influence at all. 
On the other hand, Tregenna-Piggott (1976) calculated that the 
welfare loss arising from monopoly was highest in the 
fabricated metals, machinery and equipment sector (between 28 
and 31 per cent of output) and in the chemicals, rubber and 
plastics sector (about 24 per cent). As we know from Chapter 2 
above, these sectors are subject to a high degree of foreign 
control. Welfare losses owing to monopoly were lowest in the 
wood and wood products sector (0,2 per cent), basic metals (1,0 
per cent) and textiles, clothing and leather sector (between 
1,7 and 1,9 per cent). These sectors have little FDI. 
Furthermore, Rogerson (1978a) calculated that foreign-
controlled manufacturing plants were on average over four times 
the size of their locally-controlled counterparts. 
We are left with a picture cf market 
that although FDI is more dominant 
structure which suggests 
in those sectors where 
welfare losses owing to concentration are high, these losses 
would be even greater without competition from foreign-owned 
firms. Furthermore, the high concentration is related to 
industry factors such as market size, unit costs, etc. rather. 
than ownership. The dominance of foreign firms in heavy 
industry is in turn related to their technological superiority 
in what is, after all, the technology-intensive end of the 
industrial spectrum. 
On the question of profitability, the rates of return 
calculated in Chapter 4 below do not provide support for the 
neo-marxist view of exploitation. Indeed, the acceptance 
(albeit ~eluctantly) of many MNCs during the 1970s and 1980s 
that they had a social responsibility beyond the realm of 
profit seeking, illustrates that they do not fit this 
conception. Furthermore, Nattrass (1990:108) has calculated 
that "the net rate of profit in the south African manufacturing 
sector has been on a strong decline over the post-war period, 
falling from 44 per cent in 1948 to 9 per cent in 1986'', a 
decline of some 80 per cent. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
While the primary and obvious consequence of FDI is the 
transfer o~ capital from one country to another, these inflows 
have numerous implications, both positive and negative, for the 
host economy. In this chapter we have examined the role of FDI 
in the manufacturing sector, focusing on the post-war expansion 
of manufacturing, the provision of foreign capital and 
technology, the employment and labour relations effects of FDI, 
the role of linkages, and the impact of FDI on market structure 
and profitability. 
It emerges that despite the manufacturing sector's growth, its 
average propensity to import has not declined because the fast 
growing industries of the post-war era like chemicals, 
machinery and metal products have a high import content. This 
high import content is related to the country's continued heavy 
reliance on imported capital goods and technology. 
Retained profits and reserves have been the major source of 
capital formation in MNCs since 1957, accounting for 85.3 per 
cent of the total. This is a particularly worrisome feature 
for a developing country that is short of investment capital, 
because it implies that little capital has actually been 
transferred. It is also much larger than 
for other developing countries. Less than 
that often reported 
one half of the 
foreign-controlled firms in our survey sample reported that 
they were initially financed from. overseas. Our results also 
indicate that foreign-controlled firms are usually conservative 
in their gearing practices. 
All manufacturing firms display a considerable dependence on 
foreign technology and R and D, but there is no evidence of any 
difference in this dependence between foreign and locally-
controlled firms. Our survey results confirm the earlier 
results of Black (1985), that this dependence though still 
high, is dropping. The survey results also show that 
foreign-controlled firms were at least as willing as their 
local counterparts to modify techniques of production to suit 
local conditions. Interestingly, from an "inappropriate 
technology" viewpoint, very few firms in either ownership group 
cited factor price differentials as an important factor in 
their decisions to modify imported technology. Most gave firm 
size as the key variable. At the same time though, 
significant capital deepening has occurred across the board. 
This capital deepening, however "appropriate" or 
''inappropriate", increases the economy's dependence on capital 
goods imports, given the under-development of the local capital 
goods industry. 
According to our survey, there is an increased awareness 
amongst all firms of the need to pursue Rand D locally, though 
foreign-controlled firms spend significantly less on R and D 
which contradicts the findings of the University of Natal 
study. A marked feature of licensing agreements, found in both 
the Reynders sample and ours, is that licence-holders in South 
Africa are often overly circumscribed in where they can market 
their output. 
By dividing the capital goods industry into "core" and 
"peripheral" processes, Meth (1991) argues that this key 
industry is less dependent on imports than is commonly 
believed. The central issue in the technological dependence 
debate as it relates to FDI is not whether foreign-controlled 
firms behave differently to local ones, but that given the 
public-good features of technology that give rise to the system 
of patents, and the dominance of industrial countries in 
technology production, neither group has any option but to 
import most of their plant and equipment. 
MNCs in South Africa currently employ about one-fifth of total 
manufacturing employment, a drop of nearly a quarter in the 
last fifteen years. In addition, although linkages are weak, 
there are probably another one-fifth who are indirectly 
affected. However, as the recent disinvestment has indicated, 
ownership is not always relevant to employment. In the case of 
several large U.S. disinvestors like GM and IBM, their 
acquisition by local owners has not affected their operations, 
other than (ironically) to make them more profitable (Bell, 
1990). 
The impact of the codes of conduct are difficult to ascertain, 
partly because many locally-owned firms have also adopted 
social responsibility programmes. This may, however, be 
grounds for arguing that a demonstration effect is present. As 
far as wages are concerned, during the 1970s and 1980s many 
powerful forces were acting on them, such as economic growth, 
capital deepening, increasing unemployment, trade union 
activity, etc. This makes it difficult establishing the extent 
of the impact of FDI on wages. Any impact that FDI has had on 
wages, has also been limited by 
economy. Our results indicate 
have a greater propensity to 
weak linkages into the local 
that foreign-controlled firms 
import than local ones, but on 
average all firms import a great deal, mainly because there are 
no local substitutes. The strongest linkages are to be found 
in services, which contribute little to employment. 
Although welfare losses arising from industrial concentration 
are greatest in those sectors where FDI penetration is 
greatest, this does not necessarily imply causation. The 
extent of competition has historically not been a major concern 
of the authorities and the available evidence shows that 
manufacturing rates 
South Africa are not 
return in other 
of return (see also Chapter 4) on FDI in 
exceptionally divergent from rates of 
developing countries, especially if 
adjustments for political risk are taken into account, 
manufacturing profitability has also declined by 80 per cent 
since 1948. Whilst it is common knowledge that there is a high 
level of concentration in South Africa, it has been suggested 
that the openness of the economy is an important countervailing 
influence. This openness refers not only to imports but also 
to FDI, which, on our survey results, appears to have a higher 
average propensity to import anyway. On balance, therefore, 
we have argued that FDI is a force for rather than against 
competition. In this respect, FDI is desirable. In any event, 
concentration. can be monitored and regulated if needs be. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most discussed effects of FDI on host countries is 
its effect on the balance of payments. By providing foreign 
exchange it may fill a foreign exchange gap, by producing 
products that were previously imported it contributes to import 
substitution, and by producing exportable goods it earns 
foreign exchange. On the other hand, MNC's may restrain 
exports, increase imports and resort to transfer pricing, as 
well as repatriate capital, interest and profits, all of which 
are likely to reduce foreign exchange earnings. 
In one sense it may be asked 
effects should be considered 
effects, because the balance 
macroeconomic relationships 
whether balance of payments 
separately from 
of payments is 




macroeconomic policy instruments such as the exchange rate and 
monetary and fiscal policy .(Johnson, 1970). However, in 
practice, countries often feel seriously constrained in the use 
of various adjustment mechanisms, and balance of payments 
effects become important - even if this results in second-best 
solutions to any problems concerning FDI (Chenery and Strout, 
1966). 
supply 
This is especially true of developing countries where 
rigidities, economic dualism and high external 
dependence often . curtail the efficacy of macroeconomic policy 
instruments (Adelman and Chenery, 1966). For this reason we 
believe that the separate study of balance of payments effects 
is valid, and no attempt is made to examine any indirect costs 
of adjustment associated with them, which arise when 
expenditure-reducing and expenditure-switching policies cause 
changes in real income levels. 1 We are not so much interested 
in how the balance of payments constraint has affected the 
South African economy (for which see Kahn (1991a)), as how FDI 
has affected the balance of payments. 
2 • THE THEORY 
The operations of MNC's on the balance of payments may be 
divided into two parts: a financial effect on the capital and 
factor income accounts; and a trade effect on the current 
account. As far as the financial effect is concerned, the net 
outcome will depend on the rate of capital inflows relative to 
the rate of interest and amortisation repayments on foreign 
liabilities. It is well known, at least amongst economists, 
(Streeten, 1970; Stewart, 1985; Williamson and Milner, 1991) 
that there exists a "foreign investment or debt cycle", in 
which for any given investment, the inflow will initially 
exceed the outflow, but that over time the flow of capital will 
become negative, thus creating problems for the balance of 
payments. This cycle is particularly noticeable in the case of 
direct investment, which, though not necessarily associated 
with the need for repayment, as such, usually represents a 
single initial injection and nothing further to offset future 
repatriation of profits and dividends. As long as a host 
country is borrowing capital at a positive rate of interest it 
must eventually expect the "basic transfer" 2 to be negative 
unless, according to the Domar (1957) rule, the rate of growth 
of the debt exceeds the rate of return on it. 
Generally speaking, the inflow of capital from the MNC parent 
represents only a part of the total foreign investment. The 
remainder is financed through local borrowing and by the 
reinvestment of profits (retained earnings). According to Hood 
and Young (1979), a study by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1975) using a sample of U.S. affiliates for the period 1966 -
1972, found that only 45 per cent of funds were obtained 
externally. On the other hand, profit is determined by the 
total investment in the affiliate, and whilst reinvestment of 
profits reduces the current burden on the balance of payments, 
it increases the base on which profits are repatriated, thus 
increasing the burden on the balance of payments in the longer 
term. According to Hirschman (1969:20) "it is likely that 
dividend remittances may be a multiple of capital originally 
bought into the country". 
A related problem - the so~called "Streeten dilemma" - concerns 
the trade-off between persistent balance of payments problems, 
and the alienation of a host country's capital stock to foreign 
interests. Streeten (1970:7) has pointed out that: 
"Since foreign investment must grow at a rate above the 
rate of return on foreign investment, if profit 
remittances are not to exceed new capital flows, and 
since the rate of return on the existing foreign capital 
stock is almost certainly greater than the rate of 
growth of the host country, the host country faces a 
choice between, on the one hand, a slow rate of growth 
of foreign investment and consequent balance of payments 
problems; and on the other, assuming a constant ratio 
between capital and output for foreign and for domestic 
capital, an increasing .alienation of the country's 
capital stock to foreigners". 
The only solutions to this dilemma are to reduce the rate of 
return on foreign investment, say via taxation; to increase 
the rate of growth of the ho.st country; to introduce foreign 
exchange restrictions on factor payments; or some combination 
of these policies. 
Following Parris (1981), the necessary condition for obtaining 
net positive FDI balance of payments financial effects can be 
expressed as follows: 
N > (1 - j)Bi + T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 1) 
where: 
N = annual new direct investment from abroad, net of 
capital repatriated overseas 
B = the value of foreign-owned local enterprises at the 
beginning of each year 
j = the proportion of total foreign prof its that is not 
repatriated, but reinvested locally 
i = the after tax rates of return on FD! 
T = annual disguised profits through transfer pricing. 
In order to avoid the alienation problem alluded to by 
Streeten, i.e. to keep the share of foreign-controlled capital 
constant, or decreasing, the following condition must hold: 
A > 
where: 
N + ji 
B 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
A = rate of growth of locally-owned firms 
(2) 
In one sense then, A is the determining factor - the way out of 
the Streeten dilemma at least in the short run, because if 
the rate of growth of locally-owned firms is high enough, 
alienation will not occur even if net capital inflows are 
large. However, in the long run if the Domar criteria are met, 
which means that N/B must remain positive and grow 
cumulatively, alienation is inescapable because A simply cannot 
also grow cumulatively. 
In addition to the financial effect of FD! on the balance of 
payments, one should also include its trade effects via its 
contribution towards export promotion and import substitution. 
The net impact of FD! in this case will be all additional sales 
made possible by the investment project, minus imported inputs, 
subject to the following conditions: that all resources 
employed in the project were previously unemployed; that all 
sales were either exports or import substitutes; and that all 
additional income generated was saved (consumption remaining 
constant), or alternatively that the marginal propensity to 
import is zero (Streeten, 1970). 
Taking both the financial and trade effects into consideration, 
we can show the impact of· FDI on a host country's balance of 
payments by using the following model employed by Parris 
(1981). The initial impact on the balance of payments of a 
given investment project is: 
Bo= Io+ EGO+ MSGo - MIO - LFo - PRo - Do ..........•..•. (3) 
where: 
B = balance of payments for a given year owing to the 
specific investment project 
. I = the initial inflow of foreign exchange owing to this 
investment 
EG = exports of the product yielding foreign exchange 
MSG = reduction in imports of substituted goods 
MI = imports of raw materials and intermediate inputs used in 
production of output 
LF = foreign labour and royalty payments 
D = annual amortization of the initial investment that is 
annually repatriated 
PR = repatriated profits (including disguised profits) 
t = time period 
o = initial time period 
The effect of the FDI on the balance of payments depends on the 
magnitude of these variables. If the initial inflow (I) is 
small and exports (EG) are minimal, whilst the remaining items 
are all considerable, the effect may be negative. In this case 
we have: 
Bt =It - Mit - LFt - PRt - Dt ......•......•..••..•..•..• (3a) 
Bt < 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 3b) 
After the initial inflow in year one, the impact of the FD! is 
as follows: 
Bt = EGt + MSGt - Mit - LFt - PRt - Dt ..................•. (4) 
The effect will be positive or negative depending on whether 
the sum of exports (EGt) and import substitution (MSGt) is 
greater or smaller than the sum of imported inputs (Mit), 
foreign factor payments (LFt and Dt) and repatriated profits 
(PRt>· The total impact of the investment over the life of the 
project will be: 
n n 
~ Bt = I 0 + ~ (EGt + MSGt - Mit - LFt - PRt - Dt) •....•. (5) 
t=l t=l 




< :E ( Dt + PR +. LF t ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) 
t=l 
the burden of ensuring that FDI has a positive impact on the 
host country's balance of payments falls entirely on its net 
contribution to exports and import substitution. In other 
words, in this partial equilibrium model, the trade effect must 
exceed the financial effect to ensure net benefits in the long 
run. Expressed algebraically if: 
n n 




L Bt > 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ( 8) 
t=l 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1 Method of Analysis 
In order to establish whether FD! has had a positive or 
negative financial effect on South Africa's balance of 
payments, it is necessary to examine the pattern of capital 
inflows, profit and interest outflows, amortization and factor 
payments, and retained earnings. 
I 
Fortunately, most of this 
information can be gleaned from Reserve Bank publications. 
Estimation of the trade effects is less clear cut. In the case 
of both exports and imports, it is possible to broadly identify 
those manufacturing sectors which have a high concentration of 
foreign-ownership, and to measure their contribution to trade. 
The procedure used in the measurements of the effect of FDI on 
exports and import substitution is, firstly, to take the ratio 




. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
where: 
Mj = direct imports into sector j 
(9) 
Qj = total supply of sector j = direct imports into ~ector j 
plus gross production value (GPV) of sector j, where GPV 
= intermediate domestic inputs into sector j (Qij) plus 
value added. 
Secondly, in order to estimate the total import content of 
sector j, we must also consider indirect imports which are the 
imports of sectors i that supply sector j with intermediate 
inputs: 













input coefficients (aij) 
Mi = share of imports in total supply of inputs 
Qi 
This information is contained in the Input-output Tables for 
South Africa. 
All manufacturing sectors will be ranked according to these 
values, and this information will be compared to the . 
concentration of foreign-ownership by sector. In this way it 
is possible to build a fairly accurate picture of import 
content and import substitution by sector, on the one h~nd, and 
the degree of foreign-ownership and the relationship between 
them, on the other. 
A similar exercise using the same method can be done for 
exports, to establish the relationship between export 
performance and the degree of foreign-ownership in different 
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where: 
EGj = exports of sector j 
Qj = total output of sector j 
_________________________________________________ ....... 
All manufacturing sectors will be ranked according to these 
' values, and this information will be compared with the 
concentration of foreign-ownership by sector. 
3.2 Financial Effect 
According to equation (3), the net financial effect of FDI on 
the host country's balance of payments depends on the magnitude 
of capital inflows (I), amortization (D), repatriated profits 
(PR) and foreign labour and royalty payments·(LF). It is of 
particular interest whether I.> D +PR+ LF in the short run, 
and whether the long run trend is positive or negative. This 
is especially important to South Africa since the current 
account has often been in deficit over the last thirty years 
(see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). This deficit has had to be 
financed by net capital inflows (both direct and indirect 
investment), by changes in SOR allocation and by changes in 
gross gold and foreign reserves. Figure 4.1 shows the 
movements of the current and capital accounts since 1960. 
Because the two accounts are not completely offsetting, there 
have been significant changes over time in the level of both 
net and gross reserves. Gross reserves include net reserves 
and liabilities related to reserves, which indicate the Reserve 
Bank's policy reaction to changes in net reserves (Kahn, 
199la:64). These changes in net reserves are shown in Figure 
4.2. It can be seen that since 1970 there has been a greater 
tendency for net reserves to be negative, and for the pattern 
of change to become less stable. 
TABLE 4.1 
SOUTH AFRICA'S NEED FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL, 
AS REFLECTED IN THE BALANCE ON THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1962-1989 (R MILLIONS) 
Demand for 
Financing of Balance of current Account 
Foreign 
Capital . Year . Net Capital 
Balance on Inf low 
Current (2) ( 3) 
Account (1) 
1962 313 -84 
1963 172 -86 
1964 -60 -29 
1965 -316 275 
1966 -26 166 
1967 -195 176 
1968 47 487 
1969 -283 218 
1970 -868 582 
1971 -1057 818 
1972 -90 449 
1973 -52 -46 
1974 -998 899 
1975 -1813 1926 
1976 -1630 1110 
1977 465 -810 
1978 1330 -797 
1979 2880 -2472 
1980 2818 -2282 
1981 -3974 846 
1982 -3696 3085 
1983 -451 -291 
1984 -2602 -388 
1985 5087 -9231 
1986 6114 -6097 
1987 5995 -3069 
1988 2728 -6546 
1989 3108 
(1) a minus indicates a deficit 





























(3) changes in liabilities related to reserves are not 
included in this table. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
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NET AND GROSS RESERVE CHANGES 













II • I 
More specific information on the financing of foreign-
controlled firms between 1957 and 1988 is given in Table 4.2. 
Column 1 gives annual total profits (after tax). These figures 
are calculated as the sum of columns 2 (retained profits and 
reserves) and 3 (repatriated profits), i.e. the annual change 
in the stock of share premium, reserves and undistributed 
prof it plus annual dividends and branch prof its remitted 
abroad. Columns 4 and 5 are self-explanatory. Unfor-
tunately, Reserve Bank figures do not allow us to distinguish 
between amortization and repatriated profits, but this is not 
an analytical problem from a global balance of payments 
viewpoint. 
It is evident from Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 that a relatively 
high proportion (52 per cent on average) of after-tax total 
profits was retained between 1957 and 1988. This proportion 
appears to be sensitive in the short run to political events 
with minimum turning points in 1961, 1977 and 1987. Despite 
this variability, the lorig term trend is upwards during the 
1960s and 1970s, and downwards in the 1980s. 
The figures presented in Table 4.3 allow us to examine the net 
annual financial impact of FDI since 1957. The net FDI inflows 
in column 4 are calculated as the sum of columns 1, 2 and 3. 
Noticeable is the consistently negative net position. Clearly, 
the FDI base was already large enough in the late 1950s to 
generate substantial profits, which, even though only partially 
repatriated, were large enough to generate a negative basic 
TABLE 4.2 
FINANCING OF FOREIGN-CONTROLLED FIRMS IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. 1957-1988 (Rm) 
Total Retained Repatriated % of % of 
Year Prof its Prof its Profits Prof it Prof it 
(after tax) Retained Repatriated 
) 
1957 146 53 93 36.3 63.7 
1958 167 76 91 45.5 54.5 
1959 129 39 90 30.2 69.8 
1960 150 50 100 33.3 66.7 
1961 148 25 123 16.9 83.1 
1962 183 80 103 43.7 56.3 
1963 191 85 106 44.5 55.5 
1964 224 99 125 44.2 55.8 
1965 278 128 150 46.0 54.0 
1966 299 175 124 58.5 41.5 
1967 272 120 152 44.1 55.9 
1968 438 263 175 60.0 40.0 
1969 500 287 213 57.4 42.6 
1970 438 226 212 51.6 48.4 
1971 522 347 175 66.5 33.5 
1972 584 376 208 64.4 35.6 
1973 535 281 254 52.5 47.5 
1974 635 449 186 70.7 29.3 
1975 448 245 203 54.7 45.3 
1976 809 525 284 64.9 35.1 
1977 596 298 298 50.0 50.0 
1978 824 436 388 52.9 47.1 
1979 1254 733 .521 58.5 41.5 
1980 2463 1871 592 76.0 24.0 
1981 2170 1274 896 58.7 41.3 
1982 1587 764 823 49.2 50.8 
1983 1734 761 973 43.9 56.1 
1984 2456 1798 658 73.2 26.8 
1985 1445 859 586 59.4 40.6 
1986 2188 1053 1135 48.1 51.9 
1987 591 -712 1303 -120.5 220.5 
1988 1754 365 1389 20.1 79.2 
Source: McGrath and Jenkins (1985:37) 
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND FACTOR PAYMENTS 
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY, 1957-1988 (Rm) 
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transfer, given the relatively small inflow of direct long term 
private capital after 1957. Also interesting is the 
substantial increase in royalty payments, particularly in the 
1980s. 
This negative basic transfer has added to the burden of 
financing the balance of payments which corroborates Kahn's 
(1991:75) finding that, in general, 
have of ten been substantial . enough 
factor service payments 
to bring about current 
account deficits, despite almost persistent surpluses on the 
trade account. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
The Department of Trade and Industry sets and monitors strict 
guidelines for the value of royalty payments in an attempt to 
prevent exploitation by foreign licensors (DTI, 1991). This 
watchdog role extends to advising the Reserve Bank, who are 
concerned to prevent MNCs loading royalty payments as a method 
of disinvestment. Assuming that the DTI and the Reserve Bank 
have been successful, 
payments (apart from 
argument put forward 
observations of Innes 
last fifteen years has 
the increasing nominal value of royalty 
reflecting inflation) reinforce the 
in Chapter 2, as well as the 
(1989), that the "disinvestment" of the 
been a sham exercise involving the 
replacement of foreign product~on with licensing, distribution, 
franchising and marketing agreements. 
For comparative purposes, Figure 4.5 shows the breakdown of 
factor payments, including non-FD! interest payments, which 
FIGURE 4.4 
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rose rapidly in the 1970s, and at a faster rate than 
repatriated profits and royalty payments. As Kahn {1991a:75) 
has pointed out: 
II these payments have tightened the balance of 
payments constraint by placing a substantial additional 
burden on the current account. Even at the height of 
the debt crisis in 1985-6, South Africa maintained its 
commitment to allow free flows of interest and dividend 
payments. In this way the capital shortage came to be 
compounded, for net exports have to finance not only 
capital repayments but also net debt servicing and 
dividend payments". 
Apart from the burden of factor payments on the current account 
balance, in recent years it appears that significant transfer 
pricing and exchange control evasion has occurred. Both Smit 
~nd Macke {1991) and Kahn (199lb) have presented estimates of 
this capital flight from South Africa. A problem intrinsic to 
the analysis of capital flight is that of definition (see 
Williamson and Lesard, 1987). Neither Smit and Mocke nor Kahn 
are able to resolve this problem, and we are left unable to 
distinguish between resident and non-resident capital flight, 
and between short and long term capital flows. In short, 
although both studies show that large-scale private capital 
outflows have occurred, at times amounting to as much as 10 per 
cent of gross domestic fixed investment {Kahn, 1991:29), it is 
not clear to what extent MNCs ~ere involved, although they are 
clearly better placed institutionally to take advantage of the 
potential for transfer pricing (Natke and Newfarmer, 1985; 
UNTNC, 1985), and some evidence does exist that this is the 
major channel for exchange control evasion {Kahn, 1991b:9; 
Financial Mail, 1989:25). Whatever the precise figures, the 
subtraction of capital flight (estimates range from $12 billion 
to $22 billion for the pe~iod 1970-88) and trade misinvoicing 
(estimated at more than $20 billion for the period 1970-85) 
from foreign exchange reserves impose a considerable further 
burden on the balance of payments. 
Despite the evidence of the inefficiency of exchange controls 
presented in these studies mentioned above, this does not 
constitute grounds for abolishing them. The fact that they are 
porous is not undesirable. The marginal costs of ensuring zero 
leakages would clearly be greater than the marginal benefits of 
the extra rand retained domestically. A familiar argument is 
that the existence of controls raises the cost of FDI in South 
Africa (Meyer and Vorhies, 1991) by restricting disinvestment. 
However, the evidence shows that the major concern of direct 
foreign investors is not exchange controls (since this 
investment is inherently long term) but the general economic 
climate and other measures such as double taxation that reduce 
the rate of return on their investments. The intensification 
of exchange controls after 1961 did not lead to a decrease in 
FDI, whilst their lifting in the mid-1980s coincided with major 
disinvestment. This is not to say that exchange controls have 
no effect on foreign investment decisions, but they are only a 
small part of a much larger picture. 
Following equation (1) above~ since the basic transfer is 
negative after 1957, the conditions necessary for obtaining a 
·D..§t. positive balance of payments financial effect are not met. 
However, using the growth rate of real GDP as a proxy for the 
growth rate of locally-owned firms in equation (2), according 
to Table 4.4 (last column), alienation of the domestic capital 
stock was only significant from about 1966 to 1976, and again 
in the early 1980s. This trend was rapidly reversed by 
disinvestment after 1985, and as a result, in terms of this 
measure, the average penetration of foreign capital dropped by 
2,5 per cent between 1957 and 1988. In terms of the "Streeten 
dilemma", the country has avo~ded the alienation of its capital 
stock to foreign interests, but at the expense of a continuous 
net leakage of foreign exchange via the factor income account. 
Figure 4.6 shows the growth rate of real GDP and the growth 
rate of FDI. Where the growth rate of FDI exceeds that of real 
GDP, the FDI trend line above that of real GDP. This is 
equivalent to alienation in the respective periods, and is 
indicated in the last column of Table 4.4 as a negative 
percentage. Although FDI is generally thought to be less 
sensitive to political factors than indirect investment, at 
least in the short run, it is interesting to note that the 
growth rate of net FDI (see column 6 in Table 4.4) was either 
negative or very low in the periods known to be affected by 
civil insurrection. This is not to say that eonomic factors 
such as overvalued exchange rates, large fiscal deficits, 
negative real interest rates and rates of return have no impact 
on foreign investment (Smit and Mocke, 1991; Smit, 1991) but as 
far as flows associated with FDI are concerned, it does seem 





























































































































































































































































































Source: SA Reserve Bank Ouarterl¥ Bulletin, various issues; 
SA Statistics 1986, Central Statistical Service 
Notes: - Net FDI (N) includes royalty payments 
- The value of FDI (B) is taken to be long term non-bank 
private sector direct investment, excluding debentures, 
mortgages and other 
- The rate of return (i) is calculated in Rand terms as total 
profits (after tax) plus royalties, divided by B 
- * a minus sign indicates alienation 
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in both the short and long term. Whilst it might be expected 
that the financial rand mechanism would insulate the capital 
account from the vicissitudes of capital flight, both factor 
payments and direct long term private capital inflows are very 
sensitive to political sentiment in South Africa and abroad. 
In contrast, real rates of return seem to have played only a 
minor role in the determination of the FDI pattern over the 
last thirty or so years. .Only when the commercial rand premium 
over the financial rand is adqed to real rates of return does 
any correlative pattern emerge with factor payments and direct 
long term private capital inflows, which is hardly surprising 
since this premium reflects political expectations. The 
commercial rand premium (see Table 2.4) is often regarded as a 
measure of foreign business confidence, i.e. risk. Figure 4.7 
shows how the annual average commercial rand premium has moved 
since 1974 when·records were started. Notable are the peaks in 
1976 and 1986. 
According to Table 4.4 the average real (as opposed to 
financial) post-tax rate of return on FDI between 1957 and 1988 
was 15,7 per cent, which is considerably higher than the 6,2 
per cent calculated by Van der Merwe and Bester (1983:31) for 
1956 to 1981. Our figures are more consistent with those 
published by the U.S. Departme~t of Commerce in their Survey Qf 
Current Business, according to which the average rate of 
return on U.S. FDI in South Africa between 1960 and 1980 was 
16,1 per cent (C. Jenkins, 1986:89). Table 4.5 gives yet 
FIGURE 4.7 
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Source: Table 2.4 
another comparison of overall South African rates of return and 
those of U.S. FDI abroad for the early 1980's. 
TABLE 4.5 
A COMPARISON OF SOME RATES OF RETURN, 1980-85 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
South Africa 30,5 ~3,2 13,5 13,8 17,0 9,2 
U.S. FDI in 
Latin America* 18,8 15,8 7,6 2,4 5j4 10,0 
U.S. FDI in 
other LDCs* 41,3 40,9 29,9 22,5 23,8 18,6 
Source: Transnational Corporations in World Development: 
Trends and Prospects (1988), UNCTC, p.82. 
* including petroleum 
Whilst South African rates of return between 1980 and 1985 are 
consistently higher than those on U.S. FDI in Latin America, 
they are consistently lower than those on U.S. FDI in other 
less developed countries. 
Three features stand out from this analysis. Firstly, FDI 
inflows and factor payments are more sensitive to political . 
than economic events, depend~ng of course on how "political" 
and "economic" are define~. Secondly, despite the operation of 
exchange controls designed to protect net reserves and the 
external value of the rand, the steady leakage of net FDI via 
the current account continues to be a significant burden on the 
balance of payments. The extent 
worrying feature but we cannot 
of capital flight is 
be sure to what 
also a 
extent 
noq-residents are involved. Thirdly, the limited inflow of 
private long term capital after 1956, coupled with the free 
flow of factor payments, contrived to push the country into a 
negative basic transfer, at least as far as FDI is concerned. 
3.3 Trade Effect 
According to the theory presented above, in the long run in the 
absence of exchange controls the burden of ensuring that FDI 
has a positive impact on 
falls entirely on its 
a host country's balance of payments 
contribution to exports and import 
substitution. In the case of South Africa, where the financial 
effect is markedly negative, this imposes a further bq~den on 
the performance of net exports, especially since it is often 
argued that few viable further opportunities for import 
substitution remain (Reynders, 1972). Unfortunately it is not 
possible to be quantitatively precise about the relationship 
between FDI and foreign trade, but a picture can be drawn of 
those sectors where concentration of foreign-ownership is 
highest and this can be compared with a corresponding picture 
of imports and exports. 
As noted in Chapter 2 above, foreign-ownership is concentrated 
in intermediate and heavy industry, particularly in chemicals, 
rubber and plastics, fabricated metals, machinery and 
equipment, and non-metallic minerals. This concentration can 
be compared with the pattern of imports given in Table 4.6 
TABLE 4.6 
TOTAL IMPORT-INTENSITY* BY MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 
1971 AND 1985 
1971 1985 
SIC Sector 
% ~ 0 
311 Food Processing 9.1 11.5 
313 Beverage Industries 8.5 11.4 
314 Tobacco Products 21.0 8.9 
321 Wool and Textiles 57.1 26.9 
322 Clothing 29.5 9.6 
323 Leather & leather products 36.3 18.7 
324 Footwear 20.8 22.6 
331 Wood and wood products 30.8 14.7 
332 Furniture 8.4 3.9 
341 Pulp and Paper 34.1 26.3 
342 Printing and Publishing 21.9 28.2 
351 Fertilizers, plastics 50.3 30.1 
and petroleum 
352 Chemical products 30.9 33.1 
355 Rubber products 30.0 20.6 
356 Other plastic products 29.2 17.1 
362 Glass and glass products 44.6 37.6 
369 Non-metallic minerals 12.3 12.9 
371 Iron and steel basic 27.2 9.8 
industries 
372 Non-ferrous metal 19.4 9.7 
industries 
381 Metal products 20.1 16.6 
382 Machinery, except 143.1 129.8 
electrical 
383 Electrical machinery 71.8 88.1 
384 Motor vehicles 100.8 61.4 
385 Transport Equipment 72.0 153.1 
386 Other Manufacturing 106.9 88.5 
Average All Manufacturing 41.4 35.6 
Source: Input-output Tables, 1971, 1985, Government Printer, 
Pretoria. 
* See equations 9 and 10 and Appendix 3 
which gives the ratio of total imports to sectoral output for 
1971 and 1985. 
The most import~intensive sectors in both 1971 and 1985 lie at 
the heavy end of the industrial spectrum; namely, all types of 
machinery, motor vehicles and transport equipment. Outside of 
these sectors, import-intensity drops rapidly, although 
intermediate sectors like chemical products still register an 
average propensity to impor~ of about one-third of output. 
At the light end of the industrial spectrum, including sectors 
like food processing, beverage industries and furniture, 
import-intensity is much lower. 
For manufacturing as a whole, the average propensity to import 
fell from 41,4 per cent to 35,6 per cent, with 17 out of the 25 
sectors registering a drop. In other words, the period is 
characterised by a significant degree of import substitution. 
The question now is to what extent FDI penetration is 
connected with the level and trend of import-intensity, 
remembering that FDI penetration itself has fallen. 
The most highly penetrated industry group, chemicals, rubber 
and plastics (SIC 35), is of intermediate import-intensity. 
Fabricated metals, machinery and equipment (SIC 38) is the 
second most penetrated industry group, and it is also the group 
with the greatest import~intensity. 
However, there is no direct evidence that foreign ownership per 
se is responsible for high import-intensity. For example, FDI 
penetration in SIC 38 dropped by sixty per cent between 1978 
and 1990, without a similar reduction in import-intensity. A 
more likely explanation for the high 
groups is to be found in their 
(Ganiatsos, 1986). Countries at 
import-intensity of these 
technological dependence 
South Africa's stage of 
development almost always exhibit a similar pattern of import 
dependence, irrespective of ownership. Furthermore, the most 
highly penetrated sector is not the most import-intensive. 
As far as the effect of FDI penetration on import substitution 
is concerned, the evidence contained in Table 4.6 suggests that 
highly penetrated sectors contributed little to this objective, 
which is hardly surprising given the highly inelastic demand 
for the type of (capital) goods that they need to import. It 
is the dominance of foreign-controlled technology that leads 
simultaneously to high import-intensity and high FDI 
penetration. Irrespective of 
in these sectors can only 
technology. 
ownership, efficient production 
be achieved by using foreign 
International experience of foreign-ownership and export 
performance has been mixed. As the UN Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (1985:5) points oht: "The issue at hand is cl~arly 
an empirical one, and conclusions may vary from country to 
country" (see also Oman, 1989). Some studies support the a 
priori proposition that MNC's can be powerful agents of export 
growth (Hellenier, 1973; Vernon, 1977; and Dunning, 1979; 
ECLAC, 1985; Willmore, 1985) 
exists over whether they have 
but considerable controversy 
fulfilled this role (Vaitsos, 
1978; 
1981; 
Nayyar, 1978; R. Jenkins, 1979; and Newfarmer and Marsh, 
Natke and Newfarmer, 1985; UNCTC, 1988). Most studies 
reach qualified conclusions, reporting only tenuous links 
between ownership and export propensity (see Lall, 1981; and 
Lall and Mohammed, 1983 for a literature review). As pointed 
out by Erdilek (1982) in his case study of FDI in Turkish 
manufacturing, there are strong reasons to expect MNC export 
propensities to vary greatly between different host countries 
because of extraneous factors specific to their location, such 
as the level of development, trade and industrial policies, 
etc. 
In other words, it is difficult to generalize about the 
international experience of foreign-ownership and export 
performance. The theoretical case is ambiguous, and many 
studies confuse the influence of ownership with other 
variables. In one of the most econometrically sophisticated 
studies undertaken thus fa·r, Newfarmer and Marsh ( 1981) report 
that U.S. MNC's operating in Brazil tend to have the ~ 
export propensities as local firms, but that MNC's of other 
national origins have significantly higher export propensities; 
which raises yet another i,sue, that of national origin. 
Clearly the whole question of linkages between MNC's and host 
country economies is a complex one, requiring a careful 
empirical investigation for each particular host economy. 
Since FDI has contributed little to import substitution in 
South Africa, it is particularly important to examine its 
impact on exports. For a number of reasons connected with 
trade policy and international trading conditions, manufac-
turing exports in South Africa have performed badly. Table 4.7 
gives the breakdown of the ratio of manufacturing exports to 
total output by sector for 1971 and 1985. One of the first 
features to be noted in this table is that the average 
percentage contribution of .exports to total output for the 
whole manufacturing sector doubled from 9,1 per cent in 1971 
to 19,5 per cent in 1985. This is a most encouraging trend, 
from a foreign exchange earning point of view. But as we know 
from Chapter 2, FDI is concentrated in chemicals, rubber and 
plastics, fabricated metals, machinery and equipment, and 
non-metallic minerals, and comparing these industry groups with 
others listed in Table 4.7, we can see that all three industry 
groups perform very badly in terms of export earnings; and 
that the trend over time reinforces this pattern. In contrast, 
those industry groups with lower levels of FDI penetration, 
wood and wood products, other manufacturing, and textiles, 
clothing and leather, tend to export much higher proportions of 
their output. The most improved industry group in terms of 
export proportions is Basic metals which, 
Input-output Tables for 1985 (Government 
according to the 
Printer) was the 
largest earner of foreign exchange in the manufacturing sector. 
This group is not highly penetrated by FDI, and its level of 
penetration dropped significantly, as compared with the average 






























EXPORT-INTENSITY BY MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 
1971 AND 1985* 
Sector 1971 
Food Processing 16.0 
Beverage Industries 3.3 
Tobacco Products 1.0 
Wool and Textiles 14.1 
Clothing 6.3 
Leather & leather products 21.3 
Footwear 2.3 
Wood and wood products 1.6 
Furniture 1.0 
Pulp and Paper 8.6 
Printing and Publishing 1.7 
Fertilizers, plastics 8.9 
and petroleum 
Chemical products 5.6 
Rubber products 3.8 
Other plastic products 1.9 
Glass and glass products 5.3 
Non-metallic minerals 4.2 
Iron and steel basic 10.6 
industries 
Non-ferrous metal 11.5 
industries 
Metal products 5.6 
Machinery, except 9.8 
electrical 
Electrical machinery 4.4 
Motor vehicles 1.5 
Transport Equipment 6.0 
Other Manufacturing 43.7 





























Input-Output Tables, 1971, 1985, Government Printer, 
Pretoria. 
See equation 12 
Prima facie, it 
contributed little 
appears that FDI in 
to e~port performance, 
manufacturing has 
at least over the 
last twenty years or so. The reason for this is that FDI has 
been drawn to import-competing sectors by trade policy and 
dependence on foreign technology which is more pronounced in 
these sectors (Willmore, 1986). However, now that the costs of 
further import substitution are escalating this pattern is 
likely to change. In other words, factors such as trade 
policy, comparative advantag~ and real exchange rates are more 
important variables than ownership in explaining why FDI has 
not raised the level of exports (Krueger, 1974). On the other 
hand, a policy of export promotion can only be successful if it 
rests on the technological contribution of FDI. Exporters thus 
need every assistance in acquiring and assimilating foreign 
technology. 
The simultaneous decline in FDI penetration and the increase in 
exports are largely unconnected, because the industry groups 
for which penetration is high are different to those for which 
export ratios are high. The contribution of FDI to exports and 
import substitution seems at best mediocre, and it is doubtful 
whether net exports (as a result of FDI) have been sufficient 
to offset the negative financial effect of FDI (see equation 
7). Although we cannot be s~re, owing to the crudeness of the 
data, it is also probable that the net trade effect of FDI is 
negative. 
4. CONCLUSION 
It emerges from the analysis above that the financial impact of 
FDI in the post-war period has been negative as a result of a 
negative basic transfer. This has come about because of 
unrestricted factor payments and a decline in new capital 
inflows. This net outflow position is aggravated by the 
likelihood of large transfer payments in the 1980s. At the 
same time, FDI appears to have contributed little to import 
substitution, and still less to exports. We must conclude that 
as far as the balance of payments is concerned, FDI since the 
war has been a drain on foreign exchange reserves. The 
resolution of this problem lies in attracting more FDI inf lows 
and imposing stricter exchange controls. Alternatively, the 
case for FDI must rest on broader considerations than its 
impact on the level of foreign reserves. 
Endnotes 
1. For analytical clarity we also ignore (post-Keynesian) 
arguments against foreign investment based on the 
"Cambridge critique" (Harcourt, 1972) of capital 
aggregation, and the impact of the so-called "transfer 
problem", which involve changes in real exchange rates or 
national incomes (and hence domestic production) flowing 
from capital movements (Johnson, 1956). 
2. The basic transfer of a country is defined as the net 
foreign exchange inflow (or outflow) associated with its 
international borrowing. It consists of the difference 
between the net capital inflow and interest payments on 
existing debt. The ne~ capital inflow is the difference 
between the gross inflow and amortization on past debt. 
Following Frances Stewart (1985:192), the net capital 
inflow, Fn, may be expressed as a rate of increase of 
total foreign debt, so that if total foreign debt 
accumulated over the past is D, and d is the percentage 
rate of increase of this debt, then 
Fn = d.D 
Interest payments on past debt are equal to the average 
rate of interest, r, times the outstanding debt, D, so 
that interest payments consists of r.D. The basic 
transfer is the net capital inflow less interest 
payments, or 
d.D - r.D = (d-r)D 
The basic transfer will therefore be positive or negative 





It is impossible to view the formulation of an appropriate 
policy framework for FD! in isolation from national and inter-
national economic and political trends. Foreign investment 
policies are only a subset of broader national policies aimed 
at promoting industrialisation. At the macro~economic level, 
these policies include monetary and fiscal management, exchange 
rate policy, and investment in physical infrastructure and 
human skills. ,At a micro-economic level, the important 
policies are those that affect the efficiency with which 
resources are allocated, and include especially those governing 
the regulation of trade. At an international level, factors 
such as protectionism, the establishment of free trade areas 
and attitudes towards risk exposure also play a role, not to 
mention in the case of South Africa, the high political prof_ile 
of FD!. 
Nevertheless, there is a range of policies in South Africa, as 
elsewhere, which specifically affect foreign investors, 
governing their financial operations 1 profit-repatriation, 
separate taxation, etc. Consequently, a proper analysis of the 
policy environment requires an examination of both general 
industrial policies and of measures aimed directly at foreign 
investment, in addition to the general international climate of 
opinion about the desirability of economic links with South 
Africa. Before investigating the nature and scope of these 
policies, attention is focused on the economic rationale behind 
them, and the rationale for drawing a distinction between 
foreign and local firms, and between host country and MNC 
interests. In certain theoretical respects this focus is a 
logical continuation of the theory outlined in Chapter 1, 
particularly that relating to the determinants of FDI and the 
distribution of net gains between MNCs and host countries. The 
structure of this chapter is as follows: firstly, we examine 
the host country-FD! relationship; secondly, stabilisation 
policy; thirdly, trade and industrial policies; fourthly, tax 
policy; fifthly, policies specifically affecting FDI, and 
lastly the future prospects for FDI in South Africa, including 
a summary of the major findings of this study. 
2. CARROTS AND STICKS THE HOST COUNTRY-FD! RELATIONSHIP 
For all their public rhetoric concerning the pernicious effects 
of FDI on their economies, in practice most developing 
countries have adopted a more ambivalent, even pragmatic, 
approach to foreign firms. Although there was a trend during 
much of the 1960s and 1970s towards greater restriction of FDI 
(IMF, 1985), and during the 1980s towards relaxation of these 
restrictions (Globerman, 1988; Pfefferman, 1988), these trends 
are often exaggerated in the literature. At the end of the 
day, authorities in most LDCs have done business with foreign 
firms, although perhaps not willingly (Hill, 1988; 
UNCTC, 1988). At the same time, host countries have attempted 
to improve their net benefits through a combination of some 
degree of regulation and incentives. 
The types of incentives offered include tax concessions, 
generous depreciation allowances, tariff protection and various 
subsidies. The specific nature and extent of regulation via 
bureaucratic controls differs from country to country but in 
general they include entry regulations specifying the sectors 
and industries in which foreign firms are not allowed to 
operate; stipulations concerning the extent of foreign equity 
participation; requirements that existing foreign firms should 
"dilute" their equity in favour of local nationals; 
performance requirements covering inter alia export 
obligations, utilisation and processing of domestic raw 
materials, employment generation and the setting up of domestic 
R and D facilities; requirements that local nationals should be 
appointed to managerial positions; and the imposition of 
ceilings on rates of · royalties payable and the duration of 
technology licensing agreements (Balasubramanyam, 1984, 1991). 
It may seem contradictory to use a policy framework that 
simultaneously includes incentives and disincentives, but this 
ambivalence is more apparent than real, and is largely the 
product of the special cost/benefit characteristic of the 
nation state - multinational company relationship that has been 
well outlined by Behrman (1971). Positive economic analysis 
can, of course, only take us part of the way down the road when 
it comes to questions of bilateral countervailing market power. 
It is that grey normative area that remains, which, in part, 
makes the issue of FDI and development so interesting. Various 
suggestions like the setting up of international codes and 
institutions have been suggested from time to time in order to 
oversee the distribution of gains between home and host 
countries, and implicitly to weaken the position of MNCs (Hood 
and Young, 1979). 
But given the practical difficulties involved in such schemes, 
not to mention the vexing problem of defining equity between 
nations, little has come of these proposals, although some 
regional groupings, for example the Andean Pact countries, have 
attempted to formulate a. common policy on FDI (Grosse 1989), 
and trade-related investment measures have been included in the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (Balasubramanyam, 1991). 
In any event, Kindleberger's famous comment in 1969 that "the 
national state is just about through as an economic unit" is 
clearly an overstatement in the developing world, if not 
elsewhere. 
In a world of competing legal jurisdictions, each with its own 
sets of economic rules, supra-national institutions are 
unlikely to have much success in controlling the ebbs and flows 
of FDI. Kindleberger's point was, of course, a little 
different, but competition for FDI amongst LDCs, whilst perhaps 
weakening them collectively (Vaitsos, 1971), bolsters economic 
nationalism (Parry, 1973). 
I 
Similarly, host countries are 
learning how to deal with MNCs all the time, and hence how to 
extract better terms from them (Bergsten, Horst and Moran, 
1978) . 
There are two ways of approaching the question of the 
relationship between the government and MNCs. The first 
approach is based on what streeten (1972:227) has called the 
Anglo-Saxon conception of welfare, which views the state as a 
socially benevolent guardian, and consequently as a neutral 
instrument in protecting the national interest. Notwith-
standing the well known problems associated with this orthodox 
welfare economics approach, it is the approach we have adopted 
because it has the great value of an individualistic, as 
opposed to class, basis. We are therefore concerned with the 
question of whether FDI in post-war South Africa has undermined 
development efforts, whilst ignoring its impact on the 
"relations of production". 
The second approach is class based, and addresses the 
political-economy of the state-FDI relationship within a 
general critique of capitalism, in which the state is believed 
to be a lackey of capitalism. This removes the notion of 
bilateral conflict between FDI and host country interests, 
because FDI is seen as supportive of certain class interests 
(comprador bourgeoisie) and destructive of others. This type 
of approach serves a useful function insofar as it focuses 
attention on what economic interests the state represents. 
The debate about which notion of government is most 
appropriate, has been enriched in the case of South Africa by 
the existence of Apartheid, which is variously seen as an 
aberrant form of racial capitalism or racial socialism (Lipton, 
1985) . This debate is far from over, but in the New South 
Africa is perhaps best left to historians. Needless to add, 
in this study no attempt has been made to locate the debate 
about the impact of FDI on economic development within a wider 
critique of capitalism. Implicit in our view is the notion 
that the government, whilst not possessing perfect knowledge of 
how to do so, is committed to increasing the living standards 
of all South Africans where economically feasible, rather than 
to feathering its own nest. Helleiner (1989:1443) has 
expressed similar sentiments as follows: 
"The possibility of alternative noncapitalist forms of 
global economic and political organisation is certainly 
deserving of study, but, in most of the literature of 
development economics, as opposed to political science 
or sociology, the current organisation of the world 
economy, TNCs and all, is assumed given. For economic 
analysts of development the key policy questions relate 
to the possibilities of more desirable developmental 
outcomes through alternative means of interacting with 
the present world, including the TNCs." 
Quite apart from this problem of defining exactly what the host 
government's interests are and whether they are divorced from 
those of the citizenry-at-large, Streeten (1972) has also 
directed our attention to rather more mundane matters that 
concern those whose job it is to advise the developing host 
governments on how to harness the beneficial effects of the 
MNCs and to control or curtail the damaging effects. Two sets 
of problems arise here. Firstly, whether it is technically 
feasible to exercise effective control over MNCs, and second, 
the extent to which the state is willing to confront the power 
of MNCs, assuming that this need arises. 
In addition, the debate about the role of FDI in development 
has often been conducted as if this was the same issue as that 
of foreign capital flows in development. Whilst this approach 
may have been satisfactory in past periods where foreign 
capital flows were almost synonymous with FDI activity, in 
recent times, the growth of "new forms" of international 
business activity (Oman, 1984) introduces a number of new 
analytical and policy issues. Consequently, the designing of 
optimal policy has become more complex still. It is not, 
therefore, surprising that this design includes a mixture of 
the carrot and the stick. 
Analysis of the technical feasibility of effectively 
controlling the FDI activities of MNCs goes to the heart of the 
conflict between national economic development and MNC profit 
maximising behaviour. In large part, the public rhetoric 
against MNCs is a sign of host country frustration at not being 
technically able to control FDI. The reasons for this are well 
known.· The MNC is less responsive to monetary policy than 
local firms, because it can straddle national banking systems. 
It is more easily able to circumvent fiscal policy through 
transfer pricing of various types, ranging from the allocation 
of overhead and other joint costs to under- and over-invoicing 
for inputs and intermediate outputs. Streeten (1972:226) 
concludes that: 
"While illegal evasion of the law is more difficult for 
the foreign firm, it has more scope for legal 
avoidance. It is larger and more powerful than the 
domestic firm, it is less dependent on the goodwill of 
the Government and it can always go elsewhere". 
At the same time, the existence of bureaucratic capture or rent 
seeking (Krueger, 1990) constitutes grounds for being cautious 
about interfering with market processes. 
3. STABILISATION POLICY 
Without getting involved in a detailed analysis of the conduct 
of monetary and fiscal policy (including exchange rate policy 
and control), it is important to note the impact of general 
stabilisation policies on economic conditions in South Africa, 
as elsewhere, because they are fundamental to the creation of 
a climate that may or may not attract FDI. 
As a consequence of the "openness" of the South African 
economy, the unpredictability of its export earnings, and its 
high propensity to import especially capital goods, the 
stability requirements of the balance of payments have often 
overshadowed domestic considerations, notwithstanding the 
abandonment of fixed exchange rates in 1971. Truu and 
Contogiannis (1987:285) have remarked that "in South Africa it 
is the tail (the balance of payments) that wags the dog (the 
domestic economy)". On several occasions, restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policy has had to be pursued in order to improve the 
balance of payments, although this conflicted with domestic 
demand conditions at the time. 
As elaborated in Chapter 4, ·in the past, deficits on the 
current account of the· balance of payments were often 
neutralised by net inflows of foreign capital, including short 
and long term debt. But in the 1970s and 1980s, this could no 
longer be generally relied on. In fact during this time, there 
opcurred a decline in the country's net gold and other foreign 
reserves. as a result of a net outflow of either short- or 
long-term capital, sometimes both, and a persistent 
depreciation of the rand. The virtual collapse of the currency 
.in August 1985 forced the authorities to suspend foreign 
transactions in rand, and declare a moratorium on the repayment 
of the major part of outstanding foreign debt. Although the 
authorities also restored the previous two-tier exchange rate 
system, designed to stem the outflow of international capital, 
downward pressure has continued to be exerted on the exchange 
rate and the level of foreign reserves since then. This, in 
turn, has necessitated a continued policy of domestic demand 
contraction in order to preserve a positive balance on the 
trade account of the balance of payments. Stabilisation policy 
has consequently been severely constrained in recent years, 
especially with imported inflation being an everpresent threat. 
As we pointed out in Chapter 4, the net contribution of FDI to 
foreign exchange reserves has been negative since the war, and 
large new inflows of long term private capital are needed to 
produce a positive basic transfer as far as FDI is concerned. 
In order to attract FDI there is a need to improve both 
investor confidence and profitability. Macroeconomic policy 
cannot overcome these problems on its own. A horse can be 
taken to the water, but it cannot be forced to drink. 
Nevertheless, stabilisation policy has a necessary and 
important role in attracting FDI (or stemming capital flight). 
The authorities are keenly aware of this role and 
to be going out of their way to make plain that 




fundamentals "right". Both the Reserve Bank and the Treasury 
have followed a conservative line since 1985 with the principal 
aim of restoring South Africa's international credit-
worthiness. The Reserve Bank has also been keen not to repeat 
the "monetarist" experiment of 1984 which directly preceded and 
partly precipitated the debt crisis in 1985 (Innes, 1986). At 
the same time, the deficit before borrowing has been kept as 
manageable as possible. 
Notwithstanding the laudable objectives of stabilisation policy 
during the post-war period, 
still exist. For example, 
time been pro-cyclical or 
problems with its implementation 
monetary policy has from time to 
destabilising, and low or even 
negative real interest rates have contributed to the process of 
capital deepening. High ~ exchange rates have also often 
been to the disadvantage of non-mineral exporters. Whilst such 
problems are not peculiar to South Africa, nor do they only 
apply to FDI, they form part of the economic background which 
does concern foreign investors. In this regard the successful 
rescheduling of outstanding debt and the ability of the 
authorities to finance it by contractionary policies has won 
them praise in some foreign quarters, particularly amongst 
those who are keen to invest in the New South Africa (Business 
Day, 27/6/1991). Local bankers, too, have come out in support 
of the Reserve Bank's current high interest rate policy, as the 
following extract reveals: 
"Standard Bank Group MD Conrad Strauss (said that) 
attempts to 'buy' political stability and goodwill with 
cheap money anq increased government spending would 
trigger potentially uncontrollable inflation .. He said 
South American hyper-inflation and foreign debt crises 
were the consequences of easy money policies and 
reckless use of deficit financing by governments. 
Brazil's inflation rate in 1990 was 2938 per cent and 
Argentina's 6500 per cent. The average inflation rate 
for all developing countries in 1990 was 110 per cent". 
(Daily Dispatch 5/7/1991). 
Whether "getting the economic fundamentals right" will in fact 
attract new or returning FDI in future is, of course, an open 
question. But, as the authorities correctly assess, unless 
this framework is in place, no amount of new-found political 
acceptability is going to create FDI. Unfortunately, as Kahn 
(1991b:15) has stated: "Confidence building is an asymmetric 
process - it is very easy to destroy confidence but it takes a 
long time to reverse it". 
4. TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
4.1 The Broad Historical Background 
The macro-economic environment and general policies towards 
industry are far more important than policies which are 
targeted specifically at FDI (Hughes and Seng, 1969). The 
impact of foreign trade and industrialisation policies of host 
countries on FDI has been the subject of considerable 
controversy. In South Africa, the relatively poor performance 
of the economy in recent years has sharpened the debate over 
trade and industrial policy. The open nature of the economy, 
and a growing realisation that the foreign exchange earnings of 
mining will not always be available to cross-subsidise 
manufacturing, has increased the importance of the role of 
foreign trade and trade policy in generating industrial growth 
in South Africa. Broadly speaking, the policy adopted up to 
about 1970 can be described as one of unadulterated import 
substitution, especially in the field of consumer goods, which 
was originally aimed at solving the unemployment aspect of the 
"Poor White" problem by protecting local industry. Since the 
1960s this has also 
combat the threat 
been supplemented by measures designed to 
of sanctions; and the sanctions themselves 
have been a form of artificial protection. 
Since the late 1960s and early 1970s the belief has grown that 
opportunities for further large-scale private sector import 
substitution have run out (Reynders, 1972; Kleu, 1973; 
Mccarthy, 1988), and attention has shifted to export promotion 
as an alternative source of market growth. This has resulted 
in a twin-pronged approach of continued ad hoc protection and 
"targeted" export development assistance (see Nedbank, 1991 for 
a useful summary), culminating in the General Export Incentive 
Scheme of 1990 (Holden, 1990b). It is not yet clear, however, 
whether the direction of causation in South Africa runs from 
growth in exports to growth in manufacturing or the other way 
round, though Holden (1990c) argues that from 1947 to 1970, 
"manufactured exports failed to stimulate manufacturing output 
while the growth of manufactured output promoted the growth of 
exports" (p.364). In the period since 1968, Holden argues that 
causality was bidirectional, with exports and industrial growth 
reinforcing one another. 
In the mid-1980s, industrial and trade policy underwent a 
further change, with the emphasis being placed on inward 
industrialisation, in terms of which it is argued that 
industrial growth should be based on the growth of domestic 
demand rather than on either exports or import substitution 
(Mercabank, 1986). Some reasons for this shift have been put 
forward by McCarthy (1988): 
"In the mid-1980s a combination of developments in South 
Africa, such as pessimism on export-oriented growth in 
the face of sanctions, insufficient opportunities for 
viable import substitution, increasing capital inten-
sity of production, disinvestment, the restrictions on 
the availability of foreign capital and especially 
increasing black urbanisation culminated in (the 
policy of) 'inward industrialisation'." (p.20) 
4.2 Some Theory 
On a theoretical level, Bhagwati (1978) has argued that, 
ceteris paribus, FDI will have a greater positive impact in the 
long run on those countries pursuing an export promotion 
strategy than on those pursuing an import substitution 
strategy. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is twofold. 
Firstly, by forcing LDCs to follow lines of comparative 
advantage more FDI is attracted than under the artificial and 
temporary inducements of tariffs and quotas. In other words, 
foreign firms are looking for permanent rather than temporary 
competitive advantages. Balasubramanyam (1984) finds support 
for this hypothesis based on a sample of LDCs for the period 
1967-1978, although the data he used did not take into account 
licensing, etc. 
Secondly, Bhagwati reasons that the welfare costs of foreign 
capital inflows under import substitution strategies are 
greater than those associated with export promotion owing to 
the tariff-induced misallocation of resources. As pointed out 
in Chapter 1 and Appendix 1, this is a theoretical argument 
based on an extension of the theory of domestic distortions. 
Although no empirical study exists as to whether this has 
occurred in South Africa, Holden (1989:17) has estimated that 
over the period 1978 to 1987 the terms of trade effect on 
economic welfare was positive and equal to 0,81 per cent of 
GDP. Unfortunately, the results of this study do not allow us 
to isolate the effects of tariff distortions from other 
influences on the terms of traqe. From a broader welfare 
perspective it is nevertheless obvious that in recent years 
South Africa has been subject to much greater negative 
external shocks via interest rate and exchange rate movements, 
than as a result of changes in the terms of trade (see Holden, 
1989). The possible existence of tariff-induced misallocations 
of resources does however suggest that a strategy of import 
substitution needs to be carefully monitored, and the theory 
clearly shows that is imperative to tax foreign profits. 
In addition, apart from the influence of distorted factor 
prices on the choice of techniques referred to earlier, 
protection leads to X-ineff iciency because domestic markets are 
sheltered from international competition (Knight, 1988; Black, 
1990:456). One of the effects of this may be to encourage 
capital deepening because firms are assured of their profit 
margins, and will therefore opt for more familiar (capital 
intensive) techniques, rather than incur the additional costs 
associated with cost minimising technologies. 
Such X-inefficiency is inconsistent with the accepted view that 
the basic goal of MNCs is global profit maximisation. 
Balasubramanyam reconciles this inconsistency by arguing that 
MNCs operate in many separable markets, almost like a price 
discriminator. At the same time, MNCs have limited human 
resources of varying quality, and he suggests that the poorer 
quality management can be accommodated by using labour-saving 
technologies. This relatively inefficient method of production 
. . 
is only possible because of trade protection. By implication, 
those LDCs pursuing import substitution strategies are likely 
to attract FDI that is less efficient, which lowers the 
potential contribution of foreign firms to the social product. 
In other words, Balasubramanyam is arguing that X-inefficiency, 
as such, is not present and that the observed high capital-
intensity is merely a method of achieving global efficiency in 
the allocation of different quality factors. On the other 
hand, if it were not for protection, this group of LDCs would 
probably not attract any FD! because less efficient MNCs would 
not be able to compete internationally. Thus although import 
substitution strategies are unlikely to maximise the social 
product of host countries,· half a loaf is perhaps better than 
none. 
A study by Holden and Holden (1981) shows that export 
industries in South Africa are more labour-intensive than 
import-competing industries. Since export industries use the 
relatively abundant factor of production - labour more 
intensively, it might be concluded that economic growth 
generated by export promotion enhances welfare more than 
import-substitution. On the other hand, it is uncertain 
whether an export promotion policy can be successfully pursued 
in the light of the intensification of international 
competition and the high cost structure present in South Africa 
( I DC I 19 9 0 ) . 
4.3 Present Trade and Industrial Policy 
As far as general industrial policies are concerned there are 
three issues of particular importance to FDI. These are trade 
and protection policy, 
enterprises. 
the regulatory system, and state 
South Africa's trade regime is characterised by large 
inter-sectoral differences. As pointed out in Chapter 2, 
manufacturing has been protected relative to mining and 
agriculture. For example, Holden (1990a) has estimated that 
when the price of gold is included in the price of exports, 71 
per cent of the protection given to importables is shifted in 
the form of an implicit export tax onto exportables. McCarthy 
(1988) estimates that the effective protection afforded 
manufacturing averages 30 per cent. According to the Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis (1990), the effective rates of 
protection (ERPs) are also highly dispersed between manufac-
turing sectors (see Table 2.12). Whether tariffs are impor~ant 
instruments of protection is however debateable in view of the 
wide array of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that have been 
legislated. These include import tax surcharges, various 
prohibitions on imports, import quotas, import licensing, local 
content regulations, etc~ As a result of these non-tariff 
barriers the system of protection is opaque and the magnitude 
of import barriers is difficult to measure accurately. 
Apart from the necessity of monitoring import tariffs, the 
reliance on NTBs imposes additional bureaucratic burdens on the 
system of trade regulation. The system is extraordinarily 
complex and pervasive, and almost certainly as important an 
obstacle to the development of an efficient manufacturing 
sector as the strategy of import substitution under present 
conditions. The effect of various regulations is that firms 
contemplating importing or exporting have to comply with an 
enormous range of bureaucratic requirements. The costs of this 
are impossible to quantify but they are nevertheless important. 
A good part of the problem is the uncertainty which surrounds 
the conflicting objectives of macroeconomic stabilisation 
policy on the one hand, and trade and industrial policy on the 
other. The priority accorded stabilisation policy means that 
arbitrary ad hoc adjustments to both tariff and NTBs are 
frequently made. 
An indication of this type of problem is contained in the 
following extract from Business Day (1 July 1991) which focuses 
on one fiscal aspect of the introduction of Phase VI of the 
local content requirement for motor manufacturers, in terms of 
which import penalties are expected to be offset by export 
rebates (see Bell, 1989). As this extract explains, motor 
manufacturers have responded to the new Phase VI programme more 
rapidly than the government expected with the result that 
export rebates now exceed import penalties, thus forcing the 
Board· of Trade and Industry to impost a temporary and 
unexpected tax on vehicles in order to balance the fiscal 
books. In other words, motor manufacturers are being penalised 
for being too efficient in terms of Phase VI regulations. 
"Toyota CE Bert Wessels has warned that an increase 
above the 70% local content requirement for motor 
manufacturers will create problems and could lead to 
more price increases for cars Wessels welcomed 
Trade and Industry Minister Org Marais' recent 
statement that Phase VI would be finalised in 
September. Constant adjusting of local content targets 
by the Board of Trade and Industry (BTI) had up to now 
prevented manufacturers from formulating a long-term 
strategy under Phase VI He said the success of 
manufacturers ·under Phase VI had left government unable 
to balance its excise account with the motor industry 
Last year the BTI imposed a temporary 2.5% ad 
valorem duty on vehicles to compensate for a R64m 
shortfall in government revenue in the fiscal year to 
March, after export rebates due to manufacturers 
outstripped import penalties, Wessels said •.• The 
additional 2% ad valorem duty announced in June would 
compound the problems faced by the motor industry, 
causing additional cost pressures and making it 
difficult for car-makers to keep price increases for 
the year to below inflation." (p.l) 
Bureaucratic complexities also bedevil the formulation of 
consistent trade policy as a result of the separation of 
advisory and implementary functions. Hence, there exists a 
Board of Trade and Industry (a semi-autonomous non-statutory 
advisory body) and the official Department of Trade and 
Industry, which implements tariff and NTB policy. Unfortu-
nately, the views of the two institutions often conflict. For 
example, in recent years the department has been critical of 
the board for being too interventionist, and for recommending 
cumbersome and complex structural adjustment programmes. The 
level of conflict between the department and the board depends 
largely on the views of the incumbent Minister of Trade and 
Industry, and the role of the board in shaping economic 
policy-making is prone to fluctuate as a result. In addition, 
the government has commissioned, and is now studying, a report 
on the Modification of Protection Policy prepared by the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) (1991). 
Broadly speaking, the department 
incentives, whereas the board (and 
targeted or selective intervention. 
favours generalised export 
now the !DC too) prefers 
Argument exists over the 
expense and vagueness of current (targeted) export incentives. 
At the same time, although the IDC report envisages a 
fundamental re-structuring of industry away from the import 
replacement strategy of the sanctions era to an outward policy 
designed to make industry more competitive internationally, the 
board continues to get four or five applications a week for 
increased tariffs (Financial Mail, 5/7/1991). In addition, 
with sanctions no longer a threat, the board is likely to be 
more confident of approving protectionist measures, even if 
they run counter to the spirit of GATT. 
A final outstanding feature of industrial policy has the 
prominent role of state enterprises. As noted above, the policy 
of import substitution instituted in the 1920s had as one of 
its main objectives the eradication of the unemployment aspect 
of the "Poor White" problem. Since the 1960s this has also 
been supplemented by measures designed to combat the threat of 
sanctions, which resulted in so-called "strategic industries" 
(Cooper, 1983). A principal means by which these objectives 
have been pursued is via state enterprise, principally because 
the projects undertaken were either too risky or uneconomic for 
the private sector to contemplate. The Reserve Bank 
publication South Africa's National Accounts, 1946 ·to 1990 
(1991) includes figures for gross domestic investment which 
give some indication of the extent of 
since the war. On average, according 
this state enterprise 
to Table 15 of this 
publication, public corporations account for 16,9 per cent of 
gross domestic investment -during this period, much of which is 
concentrated in institutions like !SCOR, ESCOM, SASOL and 
ARMSCOR (Knight, 1988). 
Although these institutions were originally state funded, on 
the whole an attempt has been made to run them according to 
market principles, but in practice this has not always been 
possible and some large losses are still being carried. The 
effect of this has been to introduce scope for 
x-inefficiencies, though it is not clear whether this is the 
result of firm-level inefficiencies or government-imposed 
constraints. There are also important implications for the 
pattern of FDI because MNCs have been excluded from sectors in 
which they might otherwise have invested. Indirectly, the 
presence of public corporations in an industry may also have 
discouraged potential FDI, in view of state support for firms 
in which they have a direct stake (for example, import 
licensing arrangements, and price controls}. 
On the other hand, with privatisation of the public 
corporations now well under way, the recognition by government 
of the need for a more aggressive technology policy and the 
increasing readiness of MNCs to deal with South Africa, at the 
least on a joint venture basis, many of the problems associated 
with extensive state ownership may fall away. A good deal of 
the progress which could be made in this regard, depends, of 
course, on the nature of the economic policies that will be 
folowed in the New South Africa (see below). 
5. TAX POLICY 
A particular area of concern is where tax concessions are 
present. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, the taxation of 
foreign capital is the most important and potent single weapon 
in host-country armouries, the corollary of which is that the 
major benefit of foreign capital is the revenue it brings into 
the state coffers. Tax concessions thus considerably reduce 
the benefits accruing to 
bargaining position. In 
policy suggests that it is 
host countries and weaken their 
addition, the theory of economic 
much more sensible to tax profits 
directly, rather than indirectly by imposing conditions on the 
use of local supplies, local labour or local share capital. 
Rather than artificially (and temporarily) increasing MNC 
profit levels, governments should encourage MNCs to lower costs 
by drawing resources from wherever in the world they are 
cheapest, which they cannot do if regulation interferes with 
their commercial operations. Galbraith (1978) and streeten 
(1972:227) are not alone in arguing that it is not sensible to 
seek the inter-country transfer of income "by attempting to 
transform the MNC from what it is - a profit-seeking animal -
into something it is not - a public service". 
Apart from being theoretically unsound, evidence from many 
studies suggests that, in practice, fiscal incentives simply do 
not work (Lim, 1983; O.E.C.D., 1983; Balasubramanyam, 1984, 
1991). In addition Helleiner (1989:1468) has observed that: 
"Tax holidays and other incentives offered by developing 
countries appear to have largely offset one another (where they 
have not been nullified by home government policies or other 
influences), leaving the overall flow and pattern of FDI 
basically unchanged". Defensive host country reactions have 
reduced the net benefits of FDI, and compounded the situation. 
Balasubramanyam (1984) argues that many LDCs off er tax 
concessions to compensate for their low resource endowments and 
labour skills, and to offset other disadvantages and risks 
inherent in investing in their countries. However, he says 
that these incentives appear to be of little significance in 
attracting FDI because most MNCs regard them as too volatile 
and transitory, and tax holidays as illusory and pointless 
since they are usually given to firms during the early years of 
their operations, when they are least likely to be profitable. 
Based on interviews with MNC management, Frank (1980) and 
Hughes and Seng (1969) report that MNCs regard market size, 
growth potential, political stability, and the availability of 
infrastructural facilities as the crucial variables in their 
investment decisions. This conclusion is consistent with the 
pattern of FDI location found in the Third World, where a 
limited number of countries meet these criteria. It is also 
consistent with experience inside South Africa where fiscal 
incentives to promote decentralisation have not been 
successful. According to the United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations' publication entitled Transnational 
Corporations in World Development (1988:80), capital inflows to 
the developing world were unevenly distributed, with only 
eighteen countries accounting for eighty-six per cent of FDI 
flows in the 1980s. 
There is also little clear-cut evidence to support the 
contention that fiscal incentives are responsible for biasing 
FDI towards "inappropriate" capital-intensive techniques, and 
towards inherently capital-intensive industries (Balasub-
ramanyam, 1983). Our survey (see Chapter 3) found little 
difference in choice of techniques between local and foreign 
firms. According to this survey the most important determinant 
of choice of technique was firm size not ownership or factor 
prices. 
The capital deepening of recent years is related to product and 
factor market conditions, and in particular general economic 
policies which have distorted these conditions. The conduct of 
monetary and exchange rate policy (negative real interest rates 
and over-valued exchange rates), and of fiscal policy (generous 
depreciation allowances) in South Africa during the 1970s and 
1980s lowered the market price of capital relative to its true 
social opportunity cost, 
imported capital goods. 
despite the increase in the cost of 
The point to note though is that this 
capital deepening is the result of general policies, and not 
those aimed specifically at FDI. 
6. POLICIES SPECIFICALLY AFFECTING FDI 
Generally speaking, the South African government has maintained 
a supportive attitude towards all foreign investment, including 
FDI, while at the same time stressing its national sovereignty. 
For example, the Franzen Commission Report (1970) states that: 
"The government •.. welcomes foreign investment and, in 
formulating economic policy, will endeavour to retain a 
favourable investment climate for foreign-controlled 
enterprises. on the other hand, the government would 
also appreciate the creation of more opportunities for 
South African participation in the management of 
foreign-controlled enterprises. The government, 
however, cannot allow foreign capital to be invested in 
puch a manner or in such amounts as will enable foreign 
control to be exercised over the whole economy or over 
certain strategic sectors." (cited in c. Jenkins 
(1985:154)). 
on the other hand, borrowing Hirshman's (1958) terminology, 
c. Jenkins (1985:154) argues that as a group foreign-controlled 
firms in South Africa have been too "mousy". In other words, 
she argues that they have .not exerted pressure on the state for 
fundamental social change. This view is debateable in view of 
the fact that disinvestment is itself a form of pressure for 
change, although it is unclear whether foreign firms have 
disinvested for political or economic reasons. Because of 
disinvestment and capital flight in recent years, the state's 
bargaining position vis a vis FDI has been considerably 
weakened. Renewed access to international credit lines and 
I.M.F. funding (Business Times, 22 December, 1991) is likely to 
bolster the bargaining position of the state. 
South Africa has no history of direct subsidisation of FDI in 
the form of tax credits or similar incentives, although the 
authorities have at all times maintained· their commitment to 
the unimpeded repatriation of foreign profits, dividends and 
royalty payments. Some foreign investors have also located 
their operations in areas which qualify for decentralisation 
benefits, in which case they have been able to reap higher 
profits. However, as pointed out in Chapter 2, only a small 
proportion of foreign firms have actually located in these 
areas, and the current package of decentralisation incentives 
is in any event being phased out, although there has been some 
speculation that they may be replaced by export processing 
zones or the like (Ministry of Constitutional Development and 
Planning, June 2 1989). 
on the contrary, foreign profits are subject to a 15 per cent 
non-residents or withholding tax. During the disinvestment 
era, as a method of encouraging disinvestment from and 
discouraging foreign investment to South Africa, the U.S. ended 
the double-taxation agreement with South Africa, which meant 
that U.S. firms were faced with an additional 34 per cent tax 
in the U.S. irrespective of whether profits were repatriated or 
not. This measure, together with the elimination of any tax 
credits (15 per cent on royalties and 10 per cent on interest), 
was a strong motivation to terminate operations in South Africa 
rather than run them down gradually. Obviously this legis-
lation will fall away· in the post-sanctions era but it is 
evident that there is an awareness of the important role tax 
policy can play in the encouragement or discouragement of FDI. 
Unlike many developing countries, South Africa also has no 
history of imposing domestic ownership reguirements on foreign 
, 
investors, although it does encourage local equity partici-
pation in terms of local borrowing regulations (see Chapter 3). 
A policy that has a direct bearing on the cost of FDI is that 
of maintaining a two-tier exchange rate. This exchange rate 
system is primarily designed to protect the level of foreign 
reserves against fluctuating capital flows, but, at the same 
time, as long as the financial rand is at a discount to the 
trade-related commercial rand, it has the effect of increasing 
the cost of FDI by artificially increasing prof its and 
dividends. Whilst it may not be possible to unify the rand in 
the foreseeable future, it must be recognised that both in 
terms of the balance of payments and the welfare of the country 
as a whole, a two-tier system represents a costly method of 
attracting foreign capital. 
The main object of economic development in the 1950s and 1960s, 
as perceived in the expanding body of specialised literature on 
the subject at the time, was economic growth through capital 
accumulation. The obstacles to growth were seen to arise less 
from technological backwardness per se as from two sorts of 
economic constraints the savings-investment gap and the 
import-export gap. There was no systematic consideration 
either of the impact of technical progress on development or of 
how such change took place or could be aided. In this sense, 
the view of the role of technology in economic development has 
undergone a revolution, and as we have pointed out in several 
places in this study, the current view is that technology 
transfer to developing countries is a vital component of the 
FDI p+ocess, if not the most important single contribution of 
the FDI package. 
Empirical research conducted during the last two decades has 
called into question the classic view that dependence on 
foreign technology is one of the principal restraining factors 
on development (UNCTAD, 1976). This research has focused 
attention on the economic and technological feasibility of 
domestic capital goods production in developing countries. The 
emerging consensus is that the viability of such production is 
circumscribed by global technological imperatives, and that 
more emphasis needs to be put on the diffusion and acquisition 
of foreign technology. Experience drawn from late 
industrialising nations shows that FDI is paramount in this 
respect, although the process of technology transfer must 
clearly be monitored to prevent abuse and to keep private and 
social costs as close together as possible. 
Although the incorporation of technological dependence in 
estimations of FD! penetration levels increases these levels 
consider~bly, particularly in heavy industry, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, South Africa is on average less highly penetrated 
than most other countries at comparable stages of development. 
In this respect there is no foundation for arguing that South 
Africa has an enclave or branch plant-type economy. Similarly, 
the hypothesis that MNCs are less 
expenditure than local firms 
investigations. 
likely to undertake R and D 
is not supported by our 
As far as the question of technology transfer is concerned, the 
department of trade and industry (DTI) (1990) has submitted a 
draft report to the Minister of Trade and Industry which 
recognises the important role FDI has to play in the overall 
strategy of promoting technology in South Africa. This report 
recommends that the government take active steps to promote the 
transfer of technology, notwithstanding any restrictive 
conditions that licensing agreements may contain. It also 
recommends that in order to promote locally developed 
technology in the private sector, the government should provide 
cash incentives to lower the risk and cost to individual 
companies. Somewhat belatedly, the government has nonetheless 
recognised the urgent need for the more rapid development of 
an active technology policy underpinned by government support 
on a selective and targeted basis. "An example of this form of 
stimulation is the programme of support for innovation in the 
electronics industry to which an amount of R40 million per 
annum has been allocated for five years (DTI, 1990:17). 
In time this policy must be extended to support the overall 
development of the capital goods 
logical capability is a crucial 
industry, of which techno-
part. The lead in this must 
be taken by the private 
government recognises and 
sector, a principle which the 
supports, but state support is 
crucial, especially in providing a scientific infrastructure to 
boost local research and development. To this end, the draft 
report also recommends the establishment of industrial parks, 
the reorientation of the education system towards science and 
engineering, and the rationalisation of existing tertiary 
education facilities (see also Justman and Teubal, 1991). 
Despite the danger that increased use of foreign technology may 
lead to further capital deepening, this is unavoidable if south 
African exports are to be competitive, and in this sense, even 
if capital intensive techniques are used, they may be regarded 
as "appropriate". The problem of capital deepening should 
rather be addressed by appropriate interest rate / exchange 
rate and tax policy. Capital deepening is a function of factor 
prices not technology imports. 
A positive spin-off from the disinvestment era was the de facto 
unbundling of the FDI package which resulted from the methods 
used by many foreign firms to "disinvest" (see Innes, 1989}. 
As this experience has shown, as long as patent and 
intellectual property rights are protected, and no restrictions 
are placed on licence fees, etc., technology can be obtained. 
Arguably "unbundling" may be an expensive method of acquiring 
technology (Balasubramanyam, 1984} but for countries like South 
Africa with dubious track records, it represents perhaps the 
only method. For the firm seeking to acquire the technology, 
the incremental cost of reproducing the same technology with 
its own technical capabilities may be several multiples of the 
transfer cost. 
As outlined above, the level of foreign reseryes has 
historically been the binding constraint on macroeconomic 
policy making. In recent years this has been reinforced by 
capital flight. The overarching policy requirement is thus the 
reversal of the outflow on the capital account. In this 
respect FDI holds little or no promise because it is a limited 
so~rce of foreign capital at the best of times. The 
authorities thus need to concentrate on re-establishing foreign 
creditworthiness and to open up new foreign credit lines, 
whilst simultaneously encouraging joint ventures. Although 
there is a need for both capital and technology, this can and 
perhaps should be obtained from diverse sources, especially if 
MNCs are reluctant to commit funds. Under these circumstances, 
reinvestment by MNCs is largely superfluous, providing that 
there is access to international capital markets and official 
lending agencies. 
7. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
One could write at length about the future prospects for 
existing and potential FDI in South Africa, but the 
imponderables are so many and so great that it is impossible to 
be specific. 
stand out. 
However, certain important policy conclusions 
As pointed out above, macroeconomic policy 
influence on FDI than trade and industrial 
exerts a stronger 
policy. In this 
connection, the outflow on the capital account can only be 
reversed if investor confidence is restored. In the peculiar 
circumstances present in South Africa this requires not only 
sound monetary and fiscal policies but also a political 
solution that defuses the threat (perceived or otherwise) to 
personal security and property posed by continued violence. It 
also requires clarity on the issue of nationalisation and 
expropriation. 
A possible solution to the need for clarity could be found in 
the formulation of an investment code which sets out attitudes 
towards FDI in particular and foreign investment in general, 
and establishes guidelines for monitoring FDI as well as 
guarantees on the repatriation of profits and royalties. 
Certain labour organisations have called for such a code with a 
view to imposing more stringent controls over FDI than exist at 
present. The National union of Metalworkers of South Africa 
(NUMSA) resolved at the union's 1991 annual congress that its 
umbrella body the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) should urgently draw up a draft code of investment 
which would "direct investment in favour or the 'working 
masses' and exclude speculative financial or property 
investment" (Daily Dispatch, 25/6/1991). The views of labour 
organisations may not be representative, but the call for a 
code of investment makes good sense, and the same principle 
applies to the issue of nationalisation and expropriation, the 
protection of intellectual property rights, and the free 
transfer of profits, licence fees, etc. Foreign investors need 
clarity on the course of future economic policy before they 
will consider investing in South Africa. 
However, even assuming that South Africa remains capitalist, it 
is unlikely that a return to political stability will be 
sufficient to induce large-scale private foreign investment 
given the subcontinent's dubious history. The question is 
whether this actually matters. As long as technology is 
accessible in the form of joint ventures, licensing agreements, 
etc., there is little need for FDI capital inflows as such. In 
any event, the major source of foreign capital is bank lending. 
As the events of the disinvestment era have clearly 
demonstrated, access to foreign bank lending and to 
international agencies like the I.M.F. is more crucial to 
development than investment by MNCs. For countries like South 
Africa with a history of political instability and fluctuating 
economic performance, the unbundling of FDI is an efficient and 
rational response on the part of both MNCs (who are looking to 
minimise risk) and host countries (who are looking the maximise 
the potential contribution of FDI to development). FDI via the 
financial rand is also more "expensive" than bank lending as a 
source of development capital. 
As far as trade and industrial policy is concerned, there is a 
clear need to simplify the existing tariff structure and to 
produce a consistent tariff policy. The frequent changes in 





has imposed an unnecessary burden on the 
sector (Cooper and Hartzenberg, 1992). Future 
must, if possible, avoid this trap. The 
the system of decentralisation benefits is one 
example of this, although it was by-and-large unsuccessful as a 
means of attracting FDI. As we argued above, specific tax 
breaks and subsidies are not an efficient means of attracting 
FDI and are to be avoided wherever possible. A possible way of 
improving the terms of trade vis a vis FDI in the New south 
Africa is by increasing non-residents tax, or by introducing 
specific taxes on non-productive speculative financial or 
property investment. Another way might be to encourage joint 
ventures by imposing domestic ownership requirements. 
Some commentators are of the opinion that the dual exchange 
rate should be done away with as soon as possible (Meyer and 
Vorhies, 1991), but a basic requirement for removing the 
two-tier system is long term political stability as the 
mid-1980s experiment with a unified exchange rate demonstrated. 
It makes no economic sense removing the system and then having 
to reintroduce it a few months or years later, a move akin to 
closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. Such 
changes in "the rules of the game" are potentially more 
destructive than leaving the system as it is, even if it is 
inefficient. 
The financial rand mechanism could be a useful way of 
channelling investment funds into specific sectors, although 
this would make the financial rand market narrower still. It 
would be extremely foolish to abolish the present system 
without first securing access to the IMF as a lender of last 
resort, especially since the $6.6 billion of foreign debt held 
by the Public Investment Corporation in the wake of the 1985 
standstill would flow out through the commercial rand (Business 
Times, 14/7/1991). This would cause a corresponding drop in 
reserves with disastrous consequences for the exchange rate and 
inflation. 
As far as the attitude of MNCs is concerned, two principal 
factors are plainly emerging. The first is that despite the 
erosion of economic sanctions and disinvestment on an official 
government level, several non-governmental ~nd state and local 
government bodies have declared that they will continue to 
support policies to isolate South Africa, at least until they 
are satisfied with the constitutional outcome of the current 
negotiations. This has been called a "guerilla-style" 
sanctions campaign and "local foreign politics''· The point is 
that many MNCs will be reluctant to reinvest if public opinion 
in their home countries remains hostile to South Africa. MNCs 
are likely to be more sensitive to grassroots opinion than 
governments, especially in the U.S. where a strong anti-South 
African lobby exists. Perhaps European MNCs will be more 
prepared to reinvest in which case the pattern of trade and 
investment established cturing the disinvestment era will be 
reinforced. 
The .second principal factor, already implicit, if inoperative, 
in many licensing agreements, is that the New south Africa is 
seen as a "gateway to Africa". South Africa is generally 
perceived as a reliable supplier with a strong comparative 
advantage in African markets. Although the African market is 
small in global terms, fierce competition for foreign markets 
is likely to stimulate FD! in general and joint ventures in 
particular. This view of South Africa as an export platform is 
compatible with the government's commitment to an export 
promotion trade policy, . but it also calls for the close 
monitoring of licensing agreements that may preclude exports. 
The likelihood of continued political instability and the 
threat of nationalisation will combine to discourage an inf low 
of foreign direct investment but this need not matter if 
foreign loan finance is available in conjunction with joint 
ventures. 
APPENDIX 1 
IMMISERIZING GROWTH, FOREIGN CAPITAL AND TARIFFS 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The theory of immiserizing growth is usually associated with 
the foreign distortions that are present in the large country 
case. In this case the growing country is a price maker in 
world markets (as a result of the distortions), and domestic 
growth, under free-trade conditions, causes a deterioration in 
the international terms of trade and consequently in the 
attainable level of welfare (Edgeworth, 1894; Bhagwati, 1958). 
It is less well known that domestic distortions may also cause 
immiserizing growth, even in the small country case (Johnson, 
1967), though Johnson himself did not use this term. In 
recent years many trade theorists have examined this more 
general cause of immiserizing growth in the context of a 
variety of domestic distortions (Bhagwati, 1968; Bhagwati and 
Brecher, 1980; Bhagwati and Tironi, 1980; Brecher and Diaz 
Alejandro, 1977; Brecher and Findlay, 1983; Jones, 1984; Neary 
and Ruane, 1988; Sechzer, 1988; Tsai, 1987). Despite this 
evidence of interest in domestic distortions as the cause of 
immiserizing growth, the policy implications have been largely 
neglected by most authors. The aim of this paper is to 
examine the policy implications of arguably the most important 
domestic distortion, namely tariff protection (Chacholiades, 
1978). For analytical clarity we shall examine only the small 
country case of tariff protection in order to avoid confusion 
with foreign distortions which are simultaneously present in 
the large country case when tariffs are levied1 . 
As Johnson (1967:153) points out, as a result of a tariff, 
additional factors of production (especially capital, which is 
more mobile internationally) are attracted to the sector in 
which the host country does not have a comparative advantage. 
This misallocation causes additional welfare losses over and 
above those directly associated with tariff-induced 
distortions under initial free trade conditions. If this 
waste of resources is greater than the increase in potential 
output per head, immiserizing growth will occur. 
In general, this possibility depends on the tar~ff rate, the 
nature of the factor used intensively in the protected sector, 
and the elasticities of substitution between factors. Capital 
inflows into capital-intensive protected sectors are a 
particular problem because as Corden (1974:334) points out, in 
the simple Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, with no factor or 
trade reversals, a country that is a net capital importer must 
have capital-intensive importables so that protection will 
induce capital inflow. The reason for this is that a country 
is likely to import that product which is intensive in the 
country's relatively scarce factor, and if the country imports 
capital, then, presumably, its scarce resource is capital. 
FOREIGN CAPITAL, TARIFFS AND TARIFF REVENUE 
Many countries attempt to attract foreign capital by means of 
tariffs although a production subsidy would be less costly 
(Carden, 1957). In line with the theory of noneconomic 
arguments for protection (Dixit and Norman, 1980), in this 
situation it is not possible to follow a first best solution 
to the problem of endogenous distortions, which would entail 
elimination of the tariff. A second best solution must 
therefore be sought. We argue here that this is achieved by 
transferring the tariff revenue as a subsidy to the 
exportables sector (specifically to that factor disadvantaged 
by protection) instead of returning the tariff revenue as a 
lump sum to consumers (Brecher and Diaz Alejandro, 1977; 
Chacholiades, 1978). 
As part of an optimal tax package, this reduces the need for 
further distorting taxation, and is particularly relevant to 
developing countries where the role of tariffs as a source of 
revenue is significant (Cordon, 1974:78; World Development 
Report, 1988:84). Whether this transfer from consumers to 
producers is welfare-superior will depend on the tariff rate, 
consumer preferences and the elasticities of substitution 
between factors. In principle, the resulting level of welfare 
may even exceed the free trade DI:§-inflow level in contrast 
with the Brecher and Diaz Alejandro (1977) results, although 
the free trade post-inf low level is unattainable because the 
distortion in consumption remains. 
This situation can be analysed with the help of Figure A.1. 
Before the capital inflow, the small country, which provides 
tariff protection to its capital-intensive import-comp~ting 
industry, produces at P0 and consumes at C0 . The domestic 
(tariff-inclusive) terms of trade (given by the absolute slope 
of parallel broken lines, d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , d 3 and d 4 ) is lower than 
the fixed world terms of trade (given by the absolute slope of 
parallel unbroken lines f 0 , f 1 , f 2 and f 3 ). The capital 
inflow causes the transformation curve to shift outwards to U' 
V'. If we assume that the tariff revenue is transferred to 
consumers only, 
of production 
because P1 c1 
production shifts to P1 , where the real value 
at fixed world prices is lower than at P0 , 
lies everywhere inside P0 C0 • This reflects 
overspecialisation in the wrong commodity induced by the 
combination of the tariff and the capital inflow. 
Consumption shifts to c1 , which lies on a 
indifference curve than c0 . If the tariff 
lower community 
did not exist, 
production and consumption would have occurred at P2 and c 2 , 
respectively, before the capital inflow, and at P3 and c3 , 
respectively, after the capital inflow. As a result of the 
tariff-induced distortion, capital accumulation reduces 
welfare. 
However, if the tariff revenue is transferred to producers of 
exportables as a production subsidy, the production point 
could in principle shift to P3 as a result of the capital 
accumulation. The real value of production at fixed world 
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Figure A. 1 
Foreign Capital, Tariffs and Tariff Revenue: 
Welfare Implications 
prices is considerably higher at P3 than P1 and is even higher 
than that prevailing at P2 • The existence of the tariff 
implies that the free trade post-inflow level associated with 
c3 is unattainable, but the tariff-distorted consumption 
point c4 still represents a higher level of welfare than the 
initial level c0 . 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The policy implications of this are quite striking. Whilst a 
first best policy response remains the elimination of tariff, 
if this is not possible, the second best policy response is to 
transfer the tariff revenue to producers of exportables in the 
form of a production subsidy. Depending on the extent of this 
transfer and the slopes if the income-consumption and 
Rybczynski curves (not shown), the tariff-induced production 
distortion can be completely eliminated, leaving only a 
divergence of domestic and international prices in 
consumption. Dixit and Norman (1980:156) express this point 
in the following way: 
''If various elasticities and marginal propensities are 
in suitable ranges to be determined, it is possible for 
the income effect of the tariff revenues to outweigh 
the Stolper-Samuelson price effect Thus we can 
secure a Pareto improvement at home even in the absence 
of any other redistributive tools". 
Whether this new equilibrium represents a higher or lower 
level of welfare than the free trade pre-inf low equilibrium is 
thus an empirical rather than theoretical issue. But this new 
equilibrium will always be preferable to the one in which the 
tariff revenue is transferred lump sum to consumers. 
Furthermore, the post-inflow equilibrium may be welfare-
superior to the pre-inflow position, tariff distortions 
notwithstanding. In terms of Brecher and Diaz Alejandro's 
(1977) analysis of the three effects contributing to 
immiserization, the first two, which refer to the static and 
dynamic welfare implications of capital accumulation in the 
presence of tariffs, are greatly diminished, whilst "the loss 
arising when foreign prof its are subtracted to determine 
national income" (p.317) remains the same. In terms of their 
Figure A.2, reproduced here, (in which they summarize the 
welfare implications of their paper and other literature on 
tariffs, capital accumulation and immiserization) the curve 
TAMM'D represents the pattern of tariff-induced welfare 
changes, on the assumption that the tariff revenue is 
redistributed to private consumers in the form of lump-sun 
transfers. 
In Figure A.2, F denotes the free trade welfare level. T is 
the welfare level when a tariff is imposed without any foreign 
capital inflow. Brecher and Diaz Alejandro show that the 
inflow of capital will initially diminish the welfare of the 
host country, from T to A. Only when the inflow is large 
enough to extinguish the host country's imports (point A) will 
the welfare level start rising owing to the Stolper-Samuelson 












inf low continues to such a degree that the host country 
achieves complete specialisation in the 
imported commodity, then its welfare rises 
shown by MacDougall (1960) (see Tsai, 1987). 
capital-intensive 
again (M'D) as 
The introduction of a transfer of tariff revenue to exporters 
as a production subsidy changes this pattern, so that the 
distance FT is reduced and the curved section TAM rises 
(rather than falls) from the vertical intercept, if we assume 
that foreign prof its remain untaxed but less than the post-
inflow gain. This result shows that a production subsidy to 
exporters paid out of tariff revenue will always be welfare-
superior policy to that based on lump-sum transfer of tariff 
revenue to consumers. This is illustrated in Figure A.2 by 
the curve SRR'E which shows that the level of welfare may move 
to R (from S) through any vertical point which lies above TAM. 
To some extent, this result is similar to the findings of 
Srinivasan (1983) and Tsai (1987), who have extended the basic 
2 x 2 x 2 model to analyse the welfare implications of 
introducing non-traded goods, an extension which requires the 
dropping of the assumption of a constant goods:price ratio, 
which underlies the Rybczynski Theorem. The effect of this is 
to make possible a positive post-inflow welfare impact, 
depending on the size of relative increases in the prices of 
non-traded goods and in wages. Under these circumstances, 
point A (which corresponds to the capital inflow just large 
enough to extinguish home imports) need not be the lowest 
point on the curve TAMM'D, and may even lie above the level of 
welfare consistent with T. According to Tsai, the host 
country's level of welfare may move to M (from T) through any 
point on the vertical line A'A". in Figure A.2. In our case, 
although the standard Rybczynski Theorem applies, the 
elimination of both static and dynamic production distortions, 
produces similar, if stronger, results. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions derived by Brecher and Diaz Alejandro, 
regarding the welfare impact of a small increase in foreign 
investment in the import-competing capital-intensive sector, 
need modification when the distribution of the tariff revenue 
is an issue, which from a policy viewpoint it always is. In 
fact the argument here is that, taking the tariff as a binding 
constraint on policy, the optimal (but second best) policy is 
to subsidize producers of exportables from the tariff revenue 
rather than return it to consumers as a negative income-tax. 
Whilst this may not enable a small host country to attain 
Pareto optimality, it prevents unnecessary further policy-
induced distortions, and thus immiserization on the scale . 
envisaged by Brecher and Diaz Alejandro. 
Endnotes: 
1. Johnston (1967:154) is at pains to draw the distinction 
between foreign and domestic distortions. In fact he 
refers to "immiserizing growth" only in the context of 
foreign distortions. In the case of domestic distortions 
he prefers the term "income-reducing· growth", which 
occurs under conditions in which foreign distortions are 
excluded by assumption. The clearest way to do this is 
to distinguish between "large" and "small countries". 
APPENDIX 2 
SURVEY METHOD 
The research method used to gather empirical information on 
FDI in host countries is determined largely by the purposes of 
the investigation. The well known study by Reuber (1973) was, 
for example, devoted to a cross sectional study of several 
countries, and the questionnaire method of gathering infor-
mation was supplemented by many other secondary sources. Many 
other studies, before and after, have adopted this approach 
when the objective was/is to examine the overall impact of FDI 
on a host country's economy. It allows one the opportunity to 
investigate the distribution and penetration patterns of FDI, 
and hence to pass comment on overall trends and levels that 
are intrinsic to issues raised by allegations of 
"dependency". It also allows one the opportunity to examine 
the empirical validity of theoretical arguments about rates 
of return, concentration, the balance of payments life-cycle 
(also called the transfer problem), linkages, etc. 
Although this approach has many advantages, the issues have 
often become unmanageably large and complex, requiring a micro 
rather than macro approach. This can of course be accommo-
dated alongside the type of cross-sectional study described 
above by using case studies at the firm or industry level. 
These can be very useful, and, indeed, the detailed focus 
that is often required to get at the root of the differences-
according-to-ownership problem necessitate it. At the same 
time, though, one loses the large picture, and such case 
studies usually become illustrative of the types of costs and 
benefits encountered, whilst saying little about the macro 
impact of FDI on the entire economy. So, conversely, what one 
recoups on the swings is lost on the roundabouts. 
A few of the more remarkable studies, such as those of Lall 
and Streeten (1977), Biersteker (1978) and Evans (1979) have 
successfully bridged this gap in various ways. 
Jenkins (1990:206), in particular, is of the view that "the 
conventional cross-sectional analysis of the behaviour of 
firms is a poor guide to the impact of FDI on host countries 
and that longitudinal industry studies are a more fruitful 
approach for future research". It is, however, doubtful 
whether one can dispense entirely with the input from evidence 
beyond the firm and industry. We also need to know about the 
pattern of outputs and industrial linkages that charaqterise 
the host economy, quite apart from associated problems of 
balance of payments disequilibria, etc. 
It seems then that there is no one "best" method of capturing 
the essence of the problem, and a wide variety of competing 
methods are still in evidence in the literature (Cardoso and 
Dornbusch, 1989). As pointed out above, the method chosen 
must be determined by the ends in mind, and in practice by the 
resources available. These resources expressed in terms of 
time and money often play a disproportionate role in this 
determination. We all have to cut our clothes according to 
the cloth available. 
In the case of this study, a data base on the number, size and 
sectoral affiliation of foreign firms operating in South 
Africa was constructed for some of the analysis in Chapter 2 
and it formed the basis of the selection of firms in the 
questionnaire survey in Chapter 3. Ideally, all of the firms 
selected (both foreign and local) should have been interviewed 
on a personal basis but this was impracticable given their 
dispersed locations and the time it would have taken. The 
second best option of a postal questionnaire was instead 
adopted, and after a pilot study of six firms (three local, 
three foreign) in the East London area, questionnaires were 
sent out to one hundred and twenty firms (sixty local, sixty 
foreign). 
attempt 
These firms were matched for size and sector in an 
to reduce the 
influencing our results. 
probability of exogenous factors 
It was decided to limit the sample 
to one hundred and twenty in order to preserve the matching of 
pairs of firms within size and sector categories. 
After a follow up questionnaire had been sent we ended up with 
fifty three usable replies, a return rate of forty, four per 
cent, which was regarded as satisfactory for this type of 
survey, especially since the nature of the information that we 
asked for could be construed as sensitive to the firms 
themselves and perhaps the national interest. In fact, a 
further twenty one respondents replied that much as they 
- ----~ 
wanted to take part in the survey, they were 
company policy from doing so, or felt it was 
Of these twenty one, seven were able 
constrained by 
prudent not to. 
to provide some 
information, but insufficient to render their returns usable. 
The stratification of the sample 
on the distribution of FDI 
revealed by our data base. 
ref erred to above was based 
in manufacturing in 1990 as 
Accordingly, one third of the 
sample was drawn from fabricated metals, machinery and 
equipment, one third from chemicals, rubber and plastics, one 
sixth from textiles, clothing and leather, and one sixth from 
other sectors. One tenth of the sample was drawn from firms 
employing between 51-300 people, and another one tenth from 
301-500 employees. A fifth was taken from firms employing 
between 501-1000 employees, a quarter from the category 
1001-3000, a further one fifth from 3001-5000, and lastly 
three twentieths from firms employing more than 5000. 
Unfortunately, the pattern of returns was unevenly distributed 
according to firm size and industrial sector, leaving many 
"cells" with nil returns or with only either foreign or local 
firms, and in some other cases with only a small (one or two) 
number of firms that were matchable. So although the initial 
selection of local and foreign firms was on the basis of a 
stratified random sample~ the small absolute number of returns 
that we eventually had to work with precludes any claim to 
representativeness. The only solution to this problem is to 
construct a larger sample or even include the entire universe 
of foreign firms in a survey. The results of our comparison 
of foreign and local firms must then perforce be tempered by 
the recognition that the influences of size and sector have 
not been eliminated, except in some cases where we have been 
able to isolate the differences between firms according to 
sector. Notwithstanding these limitations we believe that 
the results of the survey provide a useful outline of the 
impact of FDI in manufacturing, although we also recognise the 
need to supplement this information with that from other 
sources. 
The second part of this appendix contains a copy of the 
questionnaire itself as well as of the letters sent to firms. 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE STUDY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
RHODES UNIVERSITY 
Contact Phone No: Howard Cooper 0431 - 22539 I 28315 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE STUDY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
Where necessary please ring the correct answer. 
PART 1 : General Information 
H 
·i 
1. Name of fi'rm: ...................................................... 
2. Name and position in company of respondent: . ....................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3. Contact telephone number: . ....................................... . 
4. Address of head office (if different): ............................ . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5. Does your firm have any foreign shareholding, or is it 
subject to any foreign control? 
If yes, please .indicate: Yes/No 
a) % of foreign share holding .....•............................. % 
b) whether subsidiary ...................................... Yes/No 
c) 
d) 
whether licensing only 
other; please specify 
............................•..... Yes/No 
...................................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2/Part 2 ..... . 
PART 2: Investment Background 
1. Was your firm established by: 
a) setting up new facilities 
b) acquiring existing facilities 
c) forming a joint venture with 
i)1f other private firm(s) 
ii) the public sector 
2. Was your firm initially funded by: 
a) transfer from parent firm overseas 
b) debt raised locally 
c) equity raised locally 
d) a combination of the above; please specify .•..•••••••• 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •' ........................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3. Have you built additfonal productive capacity since starting 
production? 
If yes, was this funded by: 
a) transfer from parent firm overseas 
b) debt raised locally 
c) equity raised locally 
d) reinvested earnings 
e) a combination of the above; please specify .•.•••••••••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ! ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • '! ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Yes/No 
3/Part 3 •••• 
2 
3 
PART 3: Choice of Technology 
1. What percentage of your pl ant and equipment is imported? •.••••.. % 
2. Are local substitutes available? Yes/No 
If yes, what are your reasons for using imported plant and 
equipment? Please specify: 
................................................................... 
• . . . . . . · ;i ........................................................•. 
;i ................................................................... 
3. If an innovation (a new product, production process or machine) is 
introduced from overseas, does your firm make adaptations and 
modifications to suit local conditions? Yes/No 
If yes, is this owing to: 
a) differences in the size of 
Africa and overseas 
firms in South 
b) differences in labour costs 
c) Differences in capital costs. 
d) differences in the availability of technical staff 
. e) a combination Of the above; pleas·e specify .............................................................. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
"! ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
4. Is your firm currently using· 
a) more 
b) less 
c) about the same 
capital per worker than in the past? 
4/If more, •... 
If more, please rank below the importance of: 
Less Not 
Important Important Important 
a) higher labour costs 
b) more stringent quality control 
required 
c) shortage of skilled labour 
II 
d) intiexible production techniques 
e) industrial action, strikes, .etc. 
f) other, please specify: .................................•..... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5. Does your firm carry out research and development? Yes/No 
If ;es, approximately what percentage of your firm's budget is 
allocated to research and development ....... % 
6. Does your firm have technological ties or licensing agreements with 
foreign firms? ·ves/No 
If yes, please (i) specify the nature of the contract, i.e. does it 
include tie-in clauses or export restrictions, etc . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(ii) specify the basis on which contract or license fees are determined: 
................................................................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ ................... : ............................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5/Part 4 ..... 
4 
5 
PART 4: Trade 
1. Approximately what proportion by value of your firm's inputs are 
imported? ......... " 
2. Approximately what proportion of your firm's turnover by value is 
exported71 
·i . 
PART 5: Employment and Labour Relations 
1. Approximately what proportion of production have you 
lost annually on average over the last 5 years as a 
result of industrial action? 





3. Please indicate below by means of crosses the importance to your 
firm of the following factors in wage determination over the last 
10 years: 
a) trade union pressure 
b) codes of conduct 
c) shortage of skilled labour 
d) eradication of job 
reservation 








. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6/ 4. . .. 
4. What is your firm's general wage policy for 
going wage rate higher % lower % 
a) management 
b) semi-skilled workers 
c) unskilled workers 
5. What pr~portion of your total budget is allocated to social 




7/Part 6 ... 
PART 6 : FOREIGN FIRMS ONLY TO ANSWER 
1. Was your firm set up to: 
a) supply the local market 
b) supply foreign markets 
c) circumvent import tariffs on your firm's exports to 
South Africa 
d) take advantage of lower local costs 
II 
e) com~ete with other local firms 
f) compete with other foreign firms 
g) take advanta£e of government incentives 
h) other reasons; please specify 
.............................................................. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. Does your firm receive some form of protection or incentive from 
the government? 
Yes/No 
If yes, which of the following forms does it take: 
a) tariffs on imports that compete with your products 
b) quotas on imports that compete with your products 
c) remission of tax or duty on exports 
d) reduction of company tax (tax holiday) 
e) accelerated depreciation allowances 
f) other forms; please specify: ...............•.......•.•••.•.... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
8/3. . ... 
7 
8 
3. If your firm's import requirements are substantial, is this because 
local suppliers are: 
a) not available 
b) not competitive 
c) not up to quality specifications 
d) other, please specify: 
.............................................................. 
I! 
••• ~l • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• I . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4. Does your firm in South Africa use approximately the same ratio of 
capital to labour (or capital to output) as your parent firm? 
Yes/No 
If no, is this explained by: 
a) differences in the size of firms 
b) differences in labour costs 
c) differences in capital costs 
d) differences in the availability of technical staff . 
e) Other; please specify: 
.............................................................. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • .................................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5. Does your firm manufacture the same product range as your parent firm? 
If no, please specify why this is so: Yes/No .............................. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
9/6. . .•.. 
9 
6. Does your parent company have a specific strategy regarding 
a) sourcing of inputs 
b) marketing of output 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
If yes, please specify: .........•......•.............•.•.....•..•.. 
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
~· ·i
7. Have any' local suppliers, distributors or competitors come into 
being as a result, direct or.indirect, of your activities? Yes/No . 
If yes, approximately how many? .................................. 
Approximately how many jobs does this represent? .....•.•••.••••.•• 
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20 February 1991 
P.O. BOX 7426 
EAST LONDON 5200 
SOUTH AFRICA 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
··::·rv ·-· 
4"". 
De.:.~r Si 1·· 
As part cf my doctoral dissertation on foreign investment in 
South Africa, I am canvassing manufacturing companies on a 
number of pertinent issues such as tl1eir general investment 
background, choice of technolqgy, trade links etc. 
On the 14 January I sent you 
par··t: of th:is rwoj12ct. In Ci:H::i(~ 
has been misfiled etc., I have 
with this letter a copy of the 
<at tent.ion. 
a questionnaire to complete as 
it did not reach your desk er 
taken the libe::!r·ty of including 
original questionnaire for your 
As ·before I must reiterate that the information will be 
treated in the strictest confidence, and furthermore you will 
notice that no financial disclosure is requested. 
If you have any queries about this survey please contact me at 
East London <0431> 22539 or 28315. 
I hope to hea~ from you in the near future. 
Yours faithfully 
1-101.-JARD CODPE:::1:;: 
SEMI on LECTUHEH ____ .. ,_ .. _,_ .. ___ .. ___ _ 
HC/db 
APPENDIX 3 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPORTS AS A RATIO OF 
TOTAL OUTPUT BY SECTOR, 1971, 1985 
1971 1985 
SIC Sector 
Directl Indirect2 Total Direct Indirect Total 
311 Food Processing 0.069 0.022 0.091 0.075 0.040 0.115 
313 Beverage Industries 0.032 0.053 0.085 0.066 0.048 0.114 
314 Tobacco Products 0.163 0.047 0.210 0.075 0.014 0.089 
321 Wool and Textiles 0.372 0.199 0.571 0.163 0.106 0.269 
322 Clothing 0.092 0.203 0.295 0.021 0.075 0.096 
323 Leather & leather products 0.286 0.077 0.363 0.132 0.055 0.187 
324 Footwear 0.107 0.101 0.208 0.136 0.090 0.226 
331 Wood and wood products 0.223 0.085 0.308 0.075 0.072 0.147 
332 Furniture 0.005 0.079 0.084 0.010 0.029 0.039 
341 Pulp and Paper 0.235 0.106 0.341 0.182 0.081 0.263 
342 Printing and Publishing 0.149 0.070 0.219 0.199 0.083 0.282 
351 Fertilizers, plastics 0.426 0.077 0.503 0.235 0.061 0.301 
and petroleum 
352 Chemical products 0.194 0.115 0.309 0.254 0.077 0.331 
355 Rubber products 0.169 0.131 0.300 0.138 0.068 0.206 
356 Other plastic products 0.126 0.166 0.292 0.078 0.093 0.171 
362 Glass and glass products 0.324 0.122 0.446 0.336 0.040 0.376 
369 Non-metallic minerals 0.053 0.070 0.123 0.058 0.071 0.129 
371 Iron and steel basic 0.175 0.097 0.272 0.047 0.051 0.098 
industries 
372 Non-ferrous metal 0,138 0.056 0.194 0.073 0.024 0.097 
industries 
381 Metal products 0.128 0.073 0.201 0.123 0.043 0.166 
382 Machinery, except 0.188 0.243 1. 431 1.073 0.225 1.298 
electrical 
383 Electrical machinery 0.527 0.191 0. 718 0.726 0.155 0.881 
384 Motor vehicles 0.695 0.313 1.008 0.071 0.543 0.614 
385 Transport Equipment 0.569 0.151 o. 720 1.329 0.202 1.531 
386 Other Manufacturing 1.007 0.062 1.069 0.847 0.038 0.885 
Source: Input-output Tables, 1971, 1985, Government Printer, Pretoria. 
1) See Equation 12 
2) See Equations 13 and 14 
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